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Abstract
Disasters are an increasingly prevalent phenomenon in the world, not only because of
the effects of climate change, but also because of the increase in human population and
the diversity of human behaviours that triggered the catastrophic events. A form of real
interaction between human and earth has been clearly represented by the study of
disaster and development interfaces. Due to the unique lessons noted from best
practices reports and literatures, a case of Jogjakarta earthquake in 2006 in Indonesia,
has been chosen as case study to explore this topic, in particularly from a local economy
and recovery point of view.
Through the application of mixed qualitative and quantitative research methods, this
research seeks to explore evidences as a basis to formulate a concept that bridge
disaster recovery towards more sustainable development. Among others, social
networking, descriptive statistics, content analysis and comparative analysis are
applied in this research. The aim is to identify empirically the extent to which
collaborative works and networks in recovery context can contribute to initiating a
resurgence of the local economy after the disaster, and to further provide
recommendations for path towards a more sustainable local economic recovery,
general model and recovery governance platform.
The most important finding of this study is that most process and elements involved in
the disaster recovery governance platform proposed have placed the networks and
core understandings embodied in the fundamentals of collaboration at the heart of a
resilient disaster recovery study. In addition, the recovery process that empowers the
local citizens to be more responsible for their own recovery, with special attention to
social and cultural values as part of ten propositions resulting from this study, is
regarded as the core element of successful recovery. Furthermore, the local
governmental actors play key roles in the recovery of their local economy, supported
by the central government, and other non-government actors such as local leaders,
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By their very nature, disasters are aperiodic and catastrophic, making them difficult
and expensive to plan for, and causing enormous suffering, with long-lasting social and
economic consequences. Disaster management essentially consists of three phases.
Firstly, to prepare communities for a potential disaster through planning, design and
engineering as well as preparedness drills. For example, urban planning can take into
account flood pathways, houses can be designed to withstand earthquakes, and
transport infrastructure engineered to prevent collapse. Secondly, the response to
disasters should rescue people affected, alleviate suffering and fulfil basic needs within
the emergency relief stage. Thirdly, post-disaster recovery among others involves
housing reconstruction, rebuilding infrastructure, and revitalising local economies.
This thesis focuses on the third component of disaster management: specifically, on
how best to enable local businesses to overcome the impact of disasters and accelerate
the local economic recovery. It uses Indonesia as a case study, drawing on experiences
of recovery in Bantul Regency, and explores the importance of social capital and
networks. In conclusion, the thesis proposes a model, governance platform and
recommendations for creating resilient communities. This chapter starts with an
overview of social capital, which provides the theoretical motivation of the thesis and
the basis for the research questions.
Nearly two decades ago, Putnam (2000) published a book on social capital based on
longitudinal research of the social networks of American communities, Bowling Alone:
the Collapse and Revival of American Community. This book provides an analysis of
how social relations are a determinant for the revival (or the collapse) of communities.
At around the same time, Lin (2002) strengthened the theory on how social capital acts
as a driver of social actions in communities. However, prior to these seminal works,
preceding theorists had already linked together variants of social capital, including, but
not limited to, environmental governance (Ostrom, 1990), human capital development
(Coleman, 2000), and economic growth (Helliwell and Putnam, 2000).
The term ‘social capital’ was first mentioned by L.J. Hanifan (1920), followed by T.W
Schultz (1961) and J. Jacobs (1961), then by M. Granovetter (1971) and Bourdieu
(1977, as cited in Field, 2003). Furthermore, Bourdieu defined social capital as the
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‘capital of social relationships’, the central thesis of which can be summarized simply
using two words: relationships matter (Field, 2003, p. 15). In principle, social capital is
anchored to the family of capital theories, which state that capital is the accumulation
of money, and that when invested, provides profitable returns in the future.
Accordingly, the premise behind the notion of social capital is that social capital is the
investment in social relations, with the expectation of returns in the future. Through
this extension of classical theory to neo-capital theory, it is assumed that individuals
engage in interactions and networking in order to produce profit (Lin, 2002, p. 19).
Only a few scholars discuss social network and capital analysis in the context of
disasters, and far fewer in the context of recovery phases (Kapucu and Demiroz, 2011;
Kapucu, 2014). Olshansky (2005) highlighted that ‘recovery’ is the least explored topic,
and stated that ‘recovery studies are few, and systematic comparative studies are
fewer’. Berke et al. (1993) argued that this condition made recovery the most poorly
understood topic of the phases in disaster management. In this thesis, disasters are
defined ‘as social occasions, that they are disruptive, and they are related to social
change’ (Perry, 2005, p. 315). Nevertheless, a crisis will be acknowledged as a disaster
whenever it requires a response that is beyond the maximum coping capacity of the
community; and disastrous events impact mostly on poorer and more vulnerable
communities.
Based on vulnerability theory, the impact of disasters is unequal for people, influenced
by, amongst other things: disproportionate power, economic conditions, political
position, or social privilege (McEntire, David A., 2014). From an economic perspective,
a lack of resources, or access to those resources, will limit people’s ability to take
precautionary actions before, during and after the disruptive event. When disaster
strikes, long-term recovery can take years, strongly affecting economic activities and
the recovery of the small business community (Arendt and Alesch, 2015, p. 87). In
addition, recovery is influenced by societal resources and organizational capability; and
the effective recovery is defined as a function of how well such resources can be
mobilised to facilitate the recovery process (Johnston et al., 2012, p. 252-3).
According to Schwab (2014, p. 6), due to the inherent complexity of post-disaster
governance, there is a need for local communities to take local ownership of their
situation and gain a fuller understanding of the relationships between stakeholders. In
the recovery phase, networks provide a basis for social cohesion, as they enable people
and even agencies to cooperate with one another. The (social) network perspective
3
focuses on relationships among social entities and on the patterns and implications of
these relationships (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 3). Putnam (2000) viewed social
capital as a set of ‘horizontal associations’ among people that have an effect on the
productivity of the community. Two assumptions underlie this concept: the first is that
networks and norms are empirically associated; and second, that they have important
economic consequences.
The interrelation between social networks, social capital and community in a
sociological context has been mapped by Moody and Paxton (2009, p. 1492), based on a
review of literature published between 1963 and 2001 (see Chapter 2). Thus, referring
to that research, the key feature of social capital that will be explored in this thesis is
networks, since the social capital of a network facilitates coordination and cooperation
for the mutual benefit of the community at the micro-level of inter-individual and local
contexts, and at the aggregate level of intra-organizational post-disaster governance
(i.e. the micro-meso-macro levels). Mutual benefit, in terms of disaster recovery, is
reflected, on the one hand, in a community’s dependency on its economy for survival,
and on the other hand, in dependency on the community within which they exist for
their viability (Schwab, 2014).
In order to investigate successful collaborative governance within the context of
disasters, Indonesia offers a unique opportunity for case studies. There are several
reasons for this. First, Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world and
keeps growing. According to the National Bureau for Statistics (BPS), the population of
Indonesia counted only 60.7 million in the 1930s but is projected to reach 305.6 million
by 2035, constitutes a five-fold increase within a century (BPS, 2013a, p. 57). A growing
population also means that people are increasingly exposed to the risk of disaster
(Kusumasari, 2014a), especially considering that 67 percent of the population are
concentrated in coastal urban areas (BPS, 2013a), where the risk of storm and tsunami
damage is particularly high. The Indonesian Index for Disaster Risk (Indeks Risiko
Bencana Indonesia/IRBI) shows that around 65 percent of the total of 497
regencies/cities within the 34 provinces are categorized as high risk, while the
remaining 35 percent are classified as medium risk (BNPB, 2013). Second, the
Government of Indonesia (GoI) suffered 167,741.8 billion rupiah of loss and damage as
a result of disasters between 2000 and 2014 (BAPPENAS, 2014a, p. 3). The implication
of such disruption and economic loss is that the impact of disasters will hinder the
development of disaster-prone regions in Indonesia. Third, there has been much
progress in disaster risk reduction (DRR) programmes in Indonesia, for which
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President Yudhoyono was awarded the first Global Champion for DRR in 2011
(UNISDR, 2011).
Furthermore, this research specifically uses Bantul Regency in Yogyakarta Province as
a case study to explore a multi-level collaborative network and governance, with a
focus on the local communities, the micro level and up to the macro level. The case
study investigates social capital and network theories, as well as relevant recovery and
governance concepts, based on an empirical exploration of local economic recovery in
disaster settings, in particular the Yogyakarta earthquake that occurred in 2006. The
recovery took place less than two years, and thus the case reflects medium-term
recovery outcomes of 10 years, as well as ‘an extreme’1 case for a relatively fast
recovery process.
The disaster in Bantul Regency is categorized as an upper-middle disaster; that is a
certain level of disaster which still provides a space for community engagement either
within the recovery process or further implementation (see Sub-section 5.5.2 in
Chapter 5). In terms of economic recovery, Bantul Regency has shown progressive
development of micro, small and medium enterprises (i.e. MSME), primarily due to its
well-known tourism destinations and handicraft shopping clusters. Previous research
(Sunarti et al., 2013) has argued that Bantul Regency is considered to have leadership
and socio-cultural value (i.e. the Javanese culture), which is assumed to have
significance for the recovery process through the existence of networks (explored
further in Chapter 6).
Following this introduction section which aims to outline the underpinning theories
that provide motivation for the context of the case study, the remainder of this chapter
consists of three sections. The second presents the research questions and objectives
that guide the empirical components of this thesis. The third section of the chapter
describes the structure and scope of the thesis; and finally, the last section discuss the
thesis outputs and contribution.
1.2 Research Questions and Objectives
This thesis aims to (1) explore the existing collaborative networks and the underlying
mechanisms that facilitate post-disaster recovery governance; (2) investigate the
1 The term ‘Extreme case’ refers to an explanation of case study categories based on Bradshaw, M. and
Stratford, E. 2000. Qualitative Research Design and Rigour. In: Hay, I. ed. Qualitative research methods in
human geography. South Melbourne, Vic; Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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significance of networks in reviving the local economy; and (3) reformulate the concept
of resilience for recovery so that this can be integrated into the development process.
The overarching research question is ‘to what extent can disaster recovery be
enhanced through collaborative governance and social networks to significantly
influence the revival of a local economy?’. The overarching research question is
answered using a series of sub questions, each of which forms the basis for the
empirical work in the thesis, as follows:
Sub question 1: 'How is the regulatory and institutional framework in the recovery
phase organized so as to revive the local economy?'
The objectives of the empirical work are as follows: (1) to explore the regulatory
framework and post-disaster issues in the general context of disaster; (2) to investigate
Indonesian national policy-based networks at the macro level; and (3) to provide an
overview of recovery-related policies and implementation to revive the local economy.
This sub-question is answered in Chapter 5.
Sub question 2: ‘What were the multiphase governance and multilevel networks that
operated during the economic revival in Bantul after the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake?’
The objectives of this question are as follows: (1) to explore disaster recovery
governance during the recovery phase in Bantul in the aftermath of the Yogyakarta
earthquake; (2) to analyze the existing networks at an aggregate level, and to explore
the mechanisms that supported the recovery in the Bantul-Yogyakarta case study; and
(3) to understand recovery and unpack the principles that facilitate disaster recovery
governance needed to revive the local economy. This sub-question is explored in
Chapter 6.
Sub question 3: ‘How did the local-community actors in Bantul Regency –Yogyakarta
Province, initiate, cooperate and network to revive the local economy, at the level of
micro, small and medium enterprises (i.e. MSMEs)?’
The objectives of this question are as follows: (1) to explore post-disaster recovery
governance for MSMEs and the local economy of Bantul Regency, including an
empirical investigation of networks, risk perceptions and implementation; and (2) to
investigate the local economic recovery in Bantul Regency and to understand the
lessons and strategies used to create local economic revival. This sub-question is
investigated in Chapter 7.
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Sub question 4: ‘How can collaborative governance and networks in post-disaster
recovery contribute to local economic revival and resilient recovery for development?’
The objectives of this question are as follows: (1) to construct a conceptual model for
integrating post-disaster recovery into sustainable development policy based on case
study and the essential elements underpinning resilient recovery; (2) to develop a
framework for collaborative governance in disaster recovery to be integrated into
development policy based on knowledge derived from a case study and through
identifying the relevant factors; and (3) to formulate guidelines that would allow
stakeholders to integrate resilient recovery into development policy. This sub--
question is addressed in Chapter 8.
1.3 Research Contribution and Outputs
This study aims to reconceptualise the model and framework of post-disaster recovery
governance to revive the local economy in the context of Indonesia. The
recommendations include some updates for existing concepts used, for example: the
importance of the resilient recovery for further development process which focusing on
the local economic recovery. It is hoped that the results can be feasibly replicated or
rigorously tested to improve post-disaster recovery in other Indonesian disaster areas,
and it may also be suitable for other developing countries that have similar
characteristics to Indonesia.
The originality of the research lies in its attempt to link the concepts of social capital,
networks and governance to local economy, resilience and development, in the context
of post-disaster recovery. The aim is to reconceptualise existing models and
frameworks to improve development cycles in the recovery of disaster-hit areas. In
addition the application of integrated mixed-methods including analysis of multi-level
governance to trace the underlying mechanisms are also a novel contribution offered
by this thesis.
1.4 Research Structure
The scope of the thesis is within the theme of post disaster networks and governance,
specifically in the recovery phase. The focus of the research is local economic revival
and resilient recovery for development; and the case of micro, small and medium
enterprises (MSMEs) has been used to investigate this in depth. Furthermore, the
complete research matrix of the thesis, consisting of respective methods, instruments
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and data sources, can be seen in Appendix A. Meanwhile, below presents a mind map of
this thesis with the remainder structure of this thesis, as follows.
Figure 1.1. Mind Map of Empirical Chapters
Chapter2, ‘Theoretical Framework’, outlines the theoretical framework, starting with
an explanation of social capital and network theory in the context of individuals, local
communities and the aggregate level. This is followed by a discussion of network
theory in the context of post-disaster recovery, and finally a discussion on network
theory in the context of development. In addition, an overview of previous studies will
be presented and discussion on gaps in knowledge will be explored in more depth. The
gaps are used to derive the four sub-questions discussed above, which are answered in
the four different empirical chapters (from Chapters 5 to 8).
Chapter 3, ‘Overview of Case Study’, presents an overview of the case study area
chosen. It consists of two parts: an overview of the field sites, and an overview of the
disaster case itself. The first section focuses on the six sub-themes: location, population
density and distribution, livelihood and local economy, topography, climatology and
hydrology, and disaster history. The second describes the specific case of the
Yogyakarta earthquake in 2006.
Chapter 4, ‘Methodology: A Case Study, Methods and Framework’, describes the
research design, methods, and framework used. The chapter explains the design of case
study and mixed–methods as well as the research framework. The primary data used
are derived from focus group discussions (FGD), interviews and questionnaires,
whereas the secondary data is derived from information in the public domain,
including reports from research centres, government and non-governmental actors,
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and metadata from academic articles. The participants involved consist of experts,
practitioners, central and local government officers, and persons in charge of business
organizations and business entities (i.e. micro, small and medium enterprises/MSME),
as well as local communities and leaders. Bantul Regency, Yogyakarta Province,
Indonesia is chosen for the case study but is supplemented by other comparable
disaster cases. The qualitative data is explored using thematic content analysis, by
means of manual coding and/or NVIVO; the quantitative data is analysed using
discourse network analysis (DNA), social network analysis (SNA), and descriptive
statistical analysis.
Chapter 5, ‘Understanding Disaster Recovery Governance: Indonesian Regulatory
Framework and Institutional Network’, reviews regulations, policies and
implementation, as well as examples of Indonesian disaster governance from 2005 to
2015. This empirical chapter stands on the proposition that disasters cause complex
problems, and to be able to deal with these, there needs series of collaborative work
and/or network governance amongst relevant stakeholders. This empirical chapter
thus serves as the first analytical chapter that provides insight into understanding the
‘playing field’ in the Indonesia disaster recovery constellation. For that purpose, the
policies and practices related to disaster in general and post-disaster economic
recovery in particular, are explored in detail. The methods of analyses applied in this
chapter are regulatory mapping (RegMAP), discourse network analysis (DNA) and
content analysis of interviews and reports from government and non-governmental
actors.
Chapter 6, ‘An Aggregate Approach for Disaster Recovery Governance: A Multiphase
and Multilevel Analysis for Bantul Regency-Yogyakarta Province’, investigates the
networks at an aggregate level. The chapter begins with a review of the collaborative
governance and aggregate networks in the case of the Bantul-Yogyakarta Earthquake.
This is followed by exploration of the underlying mechanisms beneath the network that
facilitate the processes that improve and revive the local economy. The method of
analysis used in this chapter is social network analysis (SNA) and thematic content
analysis.
Chapter 7, ‘In-Depth Analysis from the Individual-Local Perspectives: Risk Perceptions,
Implementations and Strategies to Revive the Bantul Regency Economy’, begins with a
review of the individual local network. The baseline network data was gathered
through interviews and questionnaires from businesses (i.e. micro, small and medium
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enterprises/MSMEs) in Bantul. This is followed by a review of the relevant programs
and/or projects in Bantul District, which focuses on aspects of a) the spectrum of
activities undertaken; b) local economic recovery-related activities; and c) key
stakeholders. There is also an analysis of the drivers and/or determinants of the local
economic recovery, based on lessons from the case study. The method of analysis used
in this chapter is social network analysis (SNA) and thematic content analysis.
Chapter 8, ‘The Nexus of the Resilient Recovery and Development: A Synthesis from
Disaster Recovery Governance in Bantul Regency’, consists of a synthesis of how the
social network can facilitate the recovery process, and uncover its correlation to the
revival of the local economy. The chapter explores the reconceptualization of the model
and disaster governance framework toward a resilient recovery through the
identification of the relevant factors that determine resilient recovery in order to
improve the local economy for development. It focuses on what works, what does not
work and why. For this purpose, the chapter also compares other lessons and
frameworks, both from discussions on disaster and risk governance and from the
discussions on collaborative governance from which the proposed framework is
derived. The methods of analysis applied in this chapter are thematic content analysis
and comparative analysis.
Chapter 9, ‘Conclusion’, presents a reflection on and discussion of the study’s
implications for policy and the body of knowledge that provides ten propositions for
disaster recovery governance. This is followed by research limitations and the potential
for future research, and completed by a closing statement.
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Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, the series of discussions below are based on selected literature that
illustrates the basic underpinning theories for the whole thesis, whilst the specific or
other relevant theories are provided within each empirical chapter. The theoretical
discussion starts with social capital and network theory. In this sub-section, definitions,
interlinkage and applications (e.g. local and aggregate context) are further elaborated
in depth. Following that, the network theory in post-disaster governance context is also
discussed. In this sub-section the disaster governance and resilient recovery are
explored. Subsequently, the network theory for development is finally completed the
theoretical discussion. In this sub-section, the focus of discussion emphasizes on
uneven development, sustainable development, well-connected community and
collaborative governance.
In addition to theoretical discussion, the exploration of the lacuna in extant knowledge
is discussed in the last section of this chapter. This section identifies the origin of the
thesis theme and boundary, and at the same time, becomes the justification of the
chosen overarching research question.
Studying livelihood and local economic revival after disaster, there are some contextual
characteristics that should be considered as basic assumptions. Firstly, geographical
location and/or territory becomes a crucial economic factor (Semitiel García, 2006).
Following that, the network, social and cultural, as well as institutional conditions,
which are embedded specifically in particular areas, are expected to have an impact on
socio-economic systems. Secondly, disaster is defined as a disruptive phenomenon to
social lives; therefore, community is an essential unit of analysis in investigations and
representative of ‘social lives’, as victims on the one hand and agents of change on the
other. In this case, the interaction and behaviours within the community provide
insight into the recovery processes underpinning livelihoods and the local economy.
Thirdly, recovery processes using collaborative and networked governance, it is
predicted, will contribute to the development agenda.
Based on those assumptions, the overarching research question is set out: ‘to what
extent can disaster recovery be enhanced through collaborative governance and
social networks to significantly influence the revival of a local economy?’. The
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overarching research question is answered using a series of sub questions which
connect disaster recovery to local economic revival and development. For that purpose,
the theoretical framework (see Figure 2.1 below) uses a flexible sequential framework,
which implies that one theory supports another theory, and vice versa. The below
framework serves as a guide in the form of a diagrammatical outline used to assess the
case study and its relevant activities as shown in the subsequent empirical chapters.
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2.1 Social Capital and Network Theory
2.1.1 Social Capital and Network Theory: Definitions and Interlinkages
2.1.1.1 Social Capital
Social capital: a capital captured through social relations
Social capital has been a relatively recent development in theory and research and it is
increasingly influential as it has started to catch on in policy circles (Field, 2003). While
earlier scholars pointed to the phenomenon of resources or capital through social
relations or even employed the term social capital, it was only in the 1980s that several
sociologists, including Pierre Bourdieu (1970s-1980s), James Coleman (1980s), Robert
Putnam (1980s)2 and, more recently, Nan Lin (2000s) explored the concept in some
detail (Lin, 2002, p. 21). Despite their differences, all of them consider personal
connections, interpersonal interaction and shared sets of values within their
understandings of social capital concept.
Social capital was first mentioned by Bourdieu (1977, as cited in Field, 2003, p. 15) in
terms of the ‘capital of social relationships’. He believed that ‘economic capital is at the
root of all other types of capital’ (1986, as cited in Field, 2003, p. 15) thus, the idea of
social capital is anchored to the family of capital theories. The notions of capital can be
traced to Marx’s classic theory of capital, which provides analysis on how capital
emerges from social relations between the capitalist and labourers in the process of
commodity production and consumption, as a part the generation of surplus value,
profit and investment.
Derived also from the theory of capital, capital is defined as a resource when it is
‘invested and mobilized’ in pursuit of a goal or action. From this point of view, capital
can be seen from two perspectives (Lin, 2002, pp. 6-7): (1) capital as the outcome of the
production process (surplus value/profit); and (2) capital as the causal factor in
production (investment). Thus, capital is defined as an ‘investment of resources with
expected returns in the marketplace’ (Lin, 2002, p. 3). The market can be economic,
political, labour or community. Hence, in economic thought, the term ‘capital’ originally
2 There is a growing consensus that three leading figures have made seminal contributions. However,
there are certainly important differences between them. In brief, Bourdieu shares with Marxism a concern
that economic capital is at the root of all other type of capital; Coleman takes as his starting point the idea
of individuals acting rationally in pursuit of their interest; Putnam has inherited and developed the idea of
association and civic groups as a basis of social integration and well-being.
14
meant an accumulated sum of money, which could be invested in the hope of a
profitable return in the future.
According to Field (2003), the central thesis of social capital can be summarized in two
key words: ‘relationships matter’, or in other words, social networks are a valuable
asset. Social capital, according to Lin (2002), stresses the importance of social
connections and social relations in achieving goals. Furthermore, social capital is seen
as resources that are accessed through such connections and relations; and it is said to
be critical to individual, social groups, organizations and community in achieving
objectives. In the notion of social capital (that is capital which is captured through
social relations), capital is seen as a social asset by virtue of actors’ connections and
access to resources in the network or group of which they are members (Lin, 2002, p.
29). Similar with Lin, Field (2003, p. 1) also pointed out that:
People connect through a series of networks and they tend to share common values with other
members of these networks; to the extent that these networks constitute a resource, they can be seen
as forming a kind of capital
Thus, social capital is best understood by examining the mechanisms and process by
which embedded resources in social network are captured as investment. According to
Lin, ‘it is these mechanisms and process that help bridge the conceptual gap in the
understanding of the macro-micro linkage between structure and individuals’. Field
(2003, p. 7) summarized this into a very clear notion, as follows:
The idea of social capital draws attention to the links between the micro-level of individual
experiences and everyday activity and the meso-levels of institutions, associations and community.
Moreover, by defining connection as a form of capital, the concept points broadly towards a set of
explanations that can link the micro-, meso- and macro-levels together
Why does social capital work?
According to Putnam (1993, p. 169, as cited in Field, 2003), ‘features of social
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, [that] can improve the efficiency of
society by facilitating coordinated actions’. This explains the core elements of social
capital, and why social capital works. In terms of pursuing the goal, i.e. profit, it has
been argued that there are four elements -information, influence, social credential, and
reinforcement- that can be offered as reasons why embedded resources in social
networks enhance the outcomes of actions (Serageldin and Grootaert, 2000, pp. 47-49;
Lin, 2002, p. 20), as summarized below:
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 The flow of information is facilitated. Formal and informal institutions can help
avert market failure related to inadequate or inaccurate information.
 Coordination for collective decision. Uncoordinated or opportunistic behaviour by
economic agents can also lead to market failure. The association reduces
opportunistic behaviour by creating a framework within which individuals interact
repeatedly and enhance trust among members.
 These social ties may exert influence on the agents who play a critical role in
decisions. Some social ties, due to their strategic locations and positions, also carry
more valued resources and exercise greater power on organizational agents’
decision-making. Thus, they carry a certain weight in decision-making processes
regarding individuals.
 Social credentials. Social ties and their acknowledged relationships to individuals
may be conceived by the organization or its agents as certification of the
individual’s social credentials. ‘Standing behind’ the individual using these ties
reassures the organization (and its agents) that the individual can provide added
resources beyond the individual’s personal capital, some of which may be useful to
the organization.
 Social relations are expected to reinforce identity and recognition. Being
assured of and recognized for one’s worthiness as an individual and a member of a
social group sharing similar interests and resources not only provides emotional
support but also public acknowledgement of one’s claim to certain resources.
Social capital: reconceptualization
As has been explained above, the premise behind the notion of social capital is rather
simple and straightforward (Lin, 2002, p. 3): ‘investment in social relations with
expected returns in the marketplace’. Through the development of classical theory to
neo-capital theory (e.g. human capital and cultural capital) it was shown that
individuals engage in interactions and networking in order to produce profit (Lin,
2002, p. 19). Therefore, social capital is a kind of investment in social relationships
through which resources of other actors can be accessed and borrowed (Lin, 2002, p.
24)
According to Lin (1982, as cited in Lin, 2002, p. 21), there are two types of resources
that individuals can gain access to and use: personal resources and social resources.
Personal resources are resources possessed by an individual and may include
ownership of material, as well as symbolic goods. Social resources are resources
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accessed through an individual’s social connections. Depending on the extensiveness
and diversity of their social connections, individuals would have differential social
resources.
Social capital also includes mobilized social resources. According to Flap (1988, as cited
in Lin, 2002), there are three elements of social capital: the number of people in the
network; the strength of the relationship; and the resources of these people. For
Coleman, social capital consists of two elements: it is an aspect of a social structure, and
it facilitates certain actions of individuals within the structure. Furthermore, he argued
that social capital is the resources, whether real or potential, gained from relationships.
These social relationships serve important functions in facilitating the actions of
individual actors; they form the basis of social capital. For this reason, social capital is
not fungible across individuals or activities. In explicating the concept of social capital,
three forms were identified: obligations and expectations, which depend on
trustworthiness of social environment, information-flow capability of the social
structure, and norms accompanied by sanctions (Coleman, 2000, p. 36).
According to MacGillivray and Walker (2000), the components of neo-capital can be
broken down in terms of different types of trust, as follows:
Table 2.1. Type of Social Capital
Type of Capital Human Social (informal) Social (Formal)
Type of Trust Trust in ourselves Trust in each other Trust in organization
Component Self-esteem – Self
Respect – Self
Confidence
Level of Trust Number of
Organizations
Attitude Norms Service provided







Source: MacGillivray and Walker (2000, p. 203)
Another perspective focuses on social capital at the group level, with discussion of: how
certain groups develop and more or less maintain social capital as a collective asset,
and how such collective assets enhance group members’ life chances. Those who have
discussed this include Bourdieu, Coleman, and Putnam. Bourdieu, for example, argued
that social capital represented an ‘aggregate of the actual or potential resources which
are linked to possession of a durable network’ (1980, as cited in Field, 2003, p. 17),
which is made up of ‘social obligations and connections’. In other words, for Bourdieu,
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social capital is a collective asset shared by members of a defined group, with clear
boundaries, obligations of exchange, and mutual recognition. The advantage of the
social capital depends on the size of one’s connections’ and on the volume or amount of
capital in these connections.
In summary, then, Bourdieu, Coleman, Lin, Flap, and so on, share a converging
understanding about social capital, as follows (Lin, 2002, pp. 24): ‘Social capital
consists of resources embedded in social relations and social structure, which can be
mobilized when an actor wishes to increase the likelihood of success in purposive
actions’.
2.1.1.2 Bridging Network Theory toward Social Capital
Social network analysis dominates social capital research3 (Jiang and Carroll, 2009;
Moody and Paxton, 2009); some scholars have made hasty conclusions by associating
social network with social capital or as part of social capital theory. Moody and Paxton
(2009), argued though that both fields have experienced significant progress. However,
research that explicitly links them both is relatively rare. Usually, the previous
researches link the classification of ‘bridging and bonding’ from social capital theory
with the concept of ‘weak and strong ties’ from social network theory (Jiang and
Carroll, 2009, p. 53). However, historically, social network and social capital have
different theoretical roots. In fact, although they share common ideas (Moody and
Paxton, 2009, p. 1491), according to Jiang and Carroll (2009), there are few differences
between a social network and social capital. It is important to understand these
differences, as it prevents us making incorrect inferences.
Historically, social capital can be traced back to two lines of reasoning (Jiang and
Carroll, 2009, p. 51). The first focuses on the connection between individuals and/or
groups. The second focuses more on given sets of norms, social sanctioning, trusting
behaviours and social support (i.e. participation, gathering, reciprocity, etc.) that
comprise social systems. Social capital is viewed more as collective possession, and
both of these lines are underpinned by sociological theories. On the other hand, social
networks, by definition, focuses on the ‘ties and networks [that] constrain resource
flow by keeping it within ties and networks’ (Jiang and Carroll, 2009, p. 52); resource in
3 Moody and Paxton (2009, p. 1492-94) had mapped the interrelation between social network, social
capital and community in sociological literature between year of 1963 and 2001. From the given map, it
was revealed that there is an overlap between social network and social capital, either in terms of the
structure of the field as well as the addressed topics.
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this case could be in the form of information, economic, intellectual or emotional
resources (Moody and Paxton, 2009, p. 1497). Throughout its development, social
network theory has been supported by economic and management theories. Its basic
proposition is that people who are well connected will gain more benefits from
resources, and/or can claim resources from others; thereby, social networks tend to
seek resources from individuals. Mostly social network research is related to job
opportunities, economic returns, and promotion within organizations.
The network’s concept had been discussed in social network theory, even before
discussions of social relations became popular in social capital theory4 (Freeman, 2004;
Moody and Paxton, 2009). In addition, according to Jiang and Carroll (2009, p. 53), if we
trace it back from its early conceptualization, social capital has resonances with a
‘social system (i.e. content) approach’ rather than discussions of network’s concept.
This means that the target of the social capital studies is ‘the property of social systems,
their origins and consequential behaviours’ in pursuit of resources. Approaching social
phenomena through social network analysis is claimed to be powerful, providing that
the analysis uses computational ability, data mining and visualization technology
(Scott, 2000). However, the social network focuses more on networks, centrality and
density, as well as the benefit (within) derived from networks for social life. In addition,
it tends to lack explanation of the underlying processes and mechanisms of exchange
even within networks or in social systems (Jiang and Carroll, 2009; Moody and Paxton,
2009). For that reason, it is called a ‘social network (i.e. structure) approach’.
In spite of their differences, social capital actually influences social networks, and vice
versa (Jiang and Carroll, 2009; Moody and Paxton, 2009). On the one hand, particular
positions in the network configuration will bring about a particular type of social
capital. Thus it can be said that social capital is influenced by social ties as well as the
underlying network configuration. On the other hand, social networks are embedded in
particular social systems, since social capital will continuously shape the configuration
of the network, ‘how the network came to be, and how it changes’ (Moody and Paxton,
2009, p. 1498). Furthermore, according to Moody and Paxton (2009, p. 1493) the social
network more or less reflects what is discussed within the social capital literature. In
regard to these shared ideas, which derive from different theoretical propositions,
4 According to Moody and Paxton (2009, p. 1493), ‘the literature on social capital is newer than social
networks and therefore comparatively sparse’. Furthermore, according to Freeman (2004), it was Jacob L
Moreno and Harrison C White who introduced social network analysis in the first place in the 1930s, whilst
social capital was developed by Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam in the 1970s.
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many studies have been conducted to bridge these differences (Jiang and Carroll, 2009;
Moody and Paxton, 2009). Figure 2.2 shows how these theories are connected and how
they overlap.
For instance, with respect to network configurations, a closed network configuration is
noted as a practical way to increase the effectiveness of social norms and as a
sanctioning mechanism which leads to the formation of a high social capital (Jiang and
Carroll, 2009, p. 53). This is explained further by Coleman (as cited in Jiang and Carroll,
2009) through his research on the closed network of Jewish diamond traders in New
York City. The closed network, it is claimed, has contributed to a reduction in
malfeasance in the business environment.
However, not all kinds of social capital should be preceded by ties in networks. There is
also social capital that arises without a preceding ‘direct’ connection. A very good
example of this is when disaster strikes a particular area in Indonesia. Most people
originally from that area, wherever they live now or whether they have previously
known each other or not, will have a shared bond and will support and help one
another. This shows that social capital can be produced without prior contact, relations
and/or interaction (Jiang and Carroll, 2009, p. 55; Moody and Paxton, 2009, p. 1494).
Jiang and Carroll (2009) proposed that there should be a way to bridge this
phenomenon, namely the ‘identity-bond’ (see the overlapping area in the Venn diagram
in Figure 2.2). Identity bond is perceived as ‘a connection’ without (prior) networks,
even when they never meet before, during and in all likelihood in the future.. Shared
social identity relies on common perspectives and knowledge, as well as geographical
and historical background (e.g. school alumni, religion, tribes) that tie them to one
another. Social identity in fact derives from family theory, which focuses on
psychological and cognitive factors (Jiang and Carroll, 2009, p. 56).
In short, it can be concluded that social capital is mainly generated from social
interactions (Jiang and Carroll, 2009, p. 53). Therefore, it cannot be built instantly, but
it can be strengthened, diminished or even destroyed. However, in a particular context,
social capital also involves non-network factors. Where there is no evidence of any
connections among people, social network analysis cannot fully explain social capital.
In the context of the community, it is likely difficult to distinguish social capital derived
from shared identity from that which originates from social networks. However, if we
focus too much on networks and put aside concerns with content, then what Moody
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and Paxton (2009, p. 1495) discussed will likely be correct: ‘we suspect that without
content specificity, much of this current trend in network research risks removing the
“social” from social network’. In other words, we can say that a focus on both social
capital and social network will provide an in depth understanding and better
prediction.
Figure 2.2. Interlinkages of Social Network, Social Capital and Social Identity
Source: adapted from Jiang and Carroll (2009, p. 57) and Moody and Paxton (2009, p. 1494)
According to Moody and Paxton (2009), the reasons that underlie the decision to bring
social network analysis in discussions on social capital, and vice versa, can be viewed
from two perspectives: First, from the perspective of social network analysis on social
capital, and second, from the perspective of social capital analysis on social network. In
the case of the former, the rigor of social network analysis, in particular its focus on
connectivity and structural equivalence5, provides a quantifiable way to explain the
relationships within social capital theory. The mathematical language of social network,
if adopted in social capital research, would make social capital theory more
understandable, more precise and would allow for subsequent further testing of
conclusions. Another input that needs to be considered is that social network analysis
5 According to Moody and Paxton, connectivity refers to the connections in a network that carry goods (e.g.
information, resources, etc.), while structure equivalence refers to nodes (individuals) occupying the same
position in one or more networks. There are many other terminologies that might contribute to social
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can help to distinguish the hierarchical relations, even within an organization which
has been claimed to solely consist of horizontal relations. On the other hand, in the case
of the latter, a focus on social capital would fill the gaps and limitations in social
network analysis, which tends to simplify social reality. However, recent research has
shown that to some extent the social network model can be expanded according to the
needs of social capital theories (Moody and Paxton, 2009, p. 1499). In this case, the role
of social capital is to enrich social network research and to uncover elements of social
relations left unexplored when purely using social network analysis. Elements of trust,
reciprocity, and identity bonds may help in building a more comprehensive picture of
social relations. For instance, the level of trust in relatively stable areas might be
different to that in post-conflict or disaster areas. The context or situation will more or
less disrupt the network configuration.
In sum, the benefit of bridging both theories in one line of inquiry lies in the strength
and limitations of both theories. Social network theory provides quantifiable measures
of social structure, rigorous conceptual development and detailed theory of network
configuration. Meanwhile, the theory of social capital provides insights in terms of
adding complexity, intensity and including context in social network models. In other
words, ‘social capital can contextualize network models by highlighting how context
shapes relations’ (Moody and Paxton, 2009, p. 1499).
2.1.1.3 Social Network
What is a social network?
The notion of social network and social network analysis has attracted the attention of
many researchers from different backgrounds and has been used widely in social and
behavioural sciences (including psychology, sociology and anthropology), as well as
economics, marketing and industrial engineering. However, the pioneers of social
network analysis came from social psychology and sociology, namely: Jacob Moreno,
Cartwright, Newcomb and Bavelas, Harrison White, Mark Granovetter; and
anthropology, like W. Lloyd Warner, George Homans, Ronald Breiger, Barnes and
Mitchell (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Freeman, 2004). Thus, social network analysis,
has been an interdisciplinary method from its beginnings (Knoke and Yang, 2008).
Social Network analysis is based on an assumption of the importance of relationships
among interacting units, and the relationship defined by linkages among units are a
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fundamental component of network theories. According to Wasserman and Faust
(1994, p. 4), there are few a principles, as follows:
(1) Actors and their actions are viewed as interdependent rather than independent,
autonomous units;
(2) Relational ties (linkages) between actors are channels for the transfer or ‘flow’ of
resources (either material or non-material);
(3) Network models focussing on individuals view the network structural environment
as providing opportunities for, or constraints on, individual action;
(4) Network models conceptualize structure (social, economic, political, and so forth)
as lasting patterns of relations among actors
The social network perspective focuses on relationships among social entities, and on
the patterns and implications of these relationships. Being in a node of a network
directly and indirectly provides potential access to other nodes (actors) in the social
network. Since individual actors may be embedded in hierarchy structures and other
networks, they bring to bear resources embedded in the positions of these hierarchies
as well. For example, individual actors may interact because of their shared interest in
scholarships or grants, but they also bring the interactional context other than their
personal and positional resources, such as affiliations with religious institutions and
political parties, as well as the networks and resources of their spouses, relatives,
friends and fellow workers.
In social network analysis, the ties may be any relationship existing between units, for
example: kinship, material transaction, flow of resources and support, behaviour
interactions, group co-memberships, or the affective evaluation of one person by
another. Although social network analysis can be applied widely, it cannot be divorced
from the main theoretical and empirical concern of social research. Theoretical notions
have also provided impetus for the development of network methods. Some of the
theoretical concepts that have motivated development of specific network analysis
methods include: social group, isolate, popularity, liaison, prestige, balance, transitivity,
clique, sub-group, social cohesion, social position, social role, reciprocity, mutuality,
exchange, influence, dominance, and conformity (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 14).
Network models can be used for: 1) formal description (of theories and concepts); and
2) evaluation and testing. In terms of evaluation and testing, network models may be
used to test theories about relational process or structures. Such theories posit specific
structural outcomes, which may then be evaluated against observed network data
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(Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 4). For example, a study of patterns of trade among
nations to see whether or not the world economic system exhibits a core-periphery
structure. In short, the central objectives of network analysis are ‘to measure and
represent these structural relations accurately, and to explain why they occur and what
are their consequences’ (Knoke and Yang, 2008, p. 4).
How do networks make things happen?
How do networks make things happen, especially in terms of economic transaction?
This question actually has already been answered in our daily lives, as when a person
want to make something happen, many people will ignore the formal procedures and
responsibilities, and choose to talk to someone they know.
A simple illustration in everyday lives is if they look for someone to fix their washing
machine, or move home, people tend to talk to people they know. They call help from
friends, family and acquaintances or ask for recommendations for services. So, people’s
networks really do count (Field, 2003). Thus, it is the case that ‘it is who you know as
well as what you know’ that makes a difference in life and society’ (Field, 2003, p. 2);
the more people you know, and the more you share a common outlook with them, the
richer you are in social capital (Lin, 2002; Field, 2003). Of course, just knowing people
is not enough if they do not feel obliged to help. Field (2003, p. 3) argued that if they do
share values, they are much more likely to cooperate to achieve mutual goals. Putnam
(1993, as cited in Serageldin and Grootaert, 2000, p. 45-46) viewed social capital as a
set of ‘horizontal associations’ among people who have an effect on the productivity of
the community. In this definition, the key feature of social capital is that it facilitates
coordination and cooperation for the mutual benefit of the members of association.
2.1.1.4 Controversy in Social Capital and Network Research
There is controversy when attempting to generate coherent social capital theory that
remains unexplored or debatable. This is structured as follows (Lin, 2002, pp. 26-28):
(1) Social capital: collective or individual assets? (Coleman, Putnam)
(2) Social capital: closed or open networks? (Bourdieu, Coleman, Putnam)
(3) Functional and/or measurement issues (Coleman)
Most scholars agree that social capital involves both collective and individual goods
(Lin, 2002, p. 26); that is, institutionalized social relations in which embedded
resources are expected to benefit both the collective and the individual in the collective.
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However, according to Lin (2002, p. 26), social capital as a relational asset must be
distinguished from collective assets and goods such as culture, norm, trust and so on.
Though a causal proposition may be formulated (e.g. trust might promote relations and
networks), it should not be assumed that they are all alternative forms of social capital.
Another controversy exists in discussions of the extent to which a network is closed
and the density of social relations and social networks. Bourdieu believed that social
capital is related to dominant positions and solidarity, which in this case is influenced
by a clear demarcation of the group, hence, a closed and dense group are required. In
addition, Coleman also agreed that network closure is a distinct advantage of social
capital, because he believed that it will maintain and enhance trust, norms, authority,
sanctions, and so on.
However, Lin (2002) argued that density or closure is not necessary for the effective
operation of social capital, nor is it realistic. Furthermore, it is explained that social
networks have stressed the importance of bridges in networks in facilitating
information and influence flows. To argue that closure or density is a requirement for
social capital is to deny the significance of bridges, structural holes, or weaker ties. In
line with this view, Field (2003, p. 3) points out that ‘social relationships can sometimes
imply to exclude and deny as well as include and enable’. At the same time it can also
serve as a ‘liability as well as an asset’ (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000, p. 226).
The main reason to choose a dense and closed network is because of interest to
preserve or maintain resources. According to Max Weber (as cited in Parkin, 1982, p.
100), social closure means ‘the process by which various groups attempt to improve
their lot by restricting access to rewards and privileges to a limited circle’. He therefore
explained that exclusionary social closure is thus action by design to secure for itself
certain resources and advantages at the expense of other groups. On the other hand,
searching for and obtaining resources, such as a better job, and accessing and extending
bridges in the network should be useful. Rather than making the assertion that closed
or open networks are required, it would be theoretically more viable (Lin, 2002, p. 27):
(1) to conceptualize for what outcomes and under what conditions a denser or sparser network
might generate a better return and;
(2) to postulate deduced hypotheses (e.g. a denser network would be more likely to promote the
sharing of resources, which in turn would maintain group or individual resources; or an open
network would be more likely to access advantaged positions and resources, which in turn
would enhance the opportunity to obtain additional resources) for empirical examination
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A third controversy that required clarification is Coleman’s statement (Lin, 2002, p. 28)
which implicitly said that the potential causal explanation of social capital can be
captured only by its effects. Lin (2002) criticized this on the grounds that it would be
impossible to build a theory in which causal and effectual factors are merged into a
singular function. This is not to deny that functional relationships may be hypothesized
(e.g. resources embedded in social networks make it easier to obtain better jobs). But
the two concepts must be treated as separate entities, with independent measurements
(e.g. social capital is the investment in social relations, and better jobs are represented
by occupational status or supervisory position).
Another issue regarding this is how to measure social capital and its impact (i.e. a
measurement issue) in comparison to other tangible capitals. So far, the various
capitals have been largely thought of in strictly economic terms: their value was
measurable, their worth could be added up and compared, the relationship between
inputs and outputs was a direct one, and any changes in value could be accounted for in
terms of a common currency. Social connections, though, are not easily reduced to a
simple set of common denominators, and much of the academic discussion has taken
place outside the world of economics, residing largely with social and political
scientists, educationalist and historians (Field, 2003, p. 12).
Coleman (1988, as cited in Fevre, 2000, p. 103) claimed that ‘the role of culture, and
particularly spontaneous sociability, has been greatly underestimated by conventional
economic analysis in explaining the large variations among society that are otherwise
at a similar levels of endowment’. This claim led to the idea that social capital could
make a vital contribution to economic growth and prosperity. However, Fevre (2000, p.
109) was pessimistic about this idea and pointed out there is still dispute on how the
terminology of ‘relationship’ becomes ‘social capital’. He explained that even where
there is a relationship between social capital and economic performance, this is no
guarantee that it will be always necessary to economic development. Thus, he pointed
out that the extent and nature of any relationship between social capital and economic
development should always be a matter for empirical enquiry. In addition, Bourdieu
(1986, as cited in Field, 2003, p. 16) argued, the more transparent the economic value,
the greater the convertibility but the lower its validity as a source of social
differentiation.
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2.1.2 Network Theory in Individual and Local Community Context
2.1.2.1 Trust – Social Relation – Reciprocity
Svendsen and Svendsen (2009) argue that intangible forms of capital, such as cultural
and social capital, should be accounted for alongside the traditional and visible capitals
such as physical and economic capitals. Social capital is the willingness of society to
share values and to trust each other (Field, 2003), and therefore leads to willingness to
cooperate with other people (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2009). According to Silvia (2011,
p. 43), ‘trust is the glue that holds the network together’. Meanwhile, Ostrom and Ahn
(2009, p, 22) argue that trust may be enhanced ‘when individuals are trustworthy, are
networked with one another and are within institutions that reward honest behavior’.
Through this arrangement, people will become willing to suspend the conflict if there is
a difference. Trust can thus overcome problems that may arise during the process due
to different organizational cultures, operating procedures, perspectives, and goals for
the network (Silvia, 2011).
Besides trust, various other forms of intangible capital including: norms, social
relations, reciprocity, tolerance, optimism, and many more, can also improve the
efficiency of society to facilitate coordinated action (Putnam, 2000). Reciprocity is
broadly defined as an internalized personal moral norms as well a pattern of social
exchange (Ostrom and Ahn, 2009). As an illustration, Helliwell and Putnam (2000)
investigated the reason why the northern parts of Italy have been richer than the
southern parts over the last several centuries. Recent research has shown that
differences in per capita income are matched by differences in the societal structure,
with horizontal structures common in the north and hierarchical forms common in the
south, and by differences in the extent of civic community, citizen involvement and
governmental efficiency.
Further research was then undertaken, this time to investigate the convergence among
Italian regions from 1950s to the early 1980s and the divergence that started in 1983.
The hypothesis is that some Italian regions have been able to establish and maintain
higher levels of output per capita by virtue of greater endowments of social capital. As a
result, it was confirmed that convergence is faster, and equilibrium income levels
higher, in regions with more social capital, using any of three measures – civic
community, effectiveness of regional development, and citizen satisfaction with their
regional governments (Helliwell and Putnam, 2000, p. 265). Social capital became one
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of the key assets for community resilience (Guarnacci, 2016), and subsequently
resilience also matters for a better recovery (see Sub-section 2.3.2.2). Thus, this is
relevant to the context of disasters, where the goal of the recovery process is to begin
recovery immediately and for the improvement of life in the future (Kapucu, 2008),
2.1.2.2 Local Network for a Well-Connected Community
Social capital is defined as ‘the non-contractual ability of a community to increase the
externality of its resources or the actions taken by its members’ (Jiang and Carroll,
2009, p. 54). The community is brought into the definition because of the assumption
that social capital, as well as social networks, mostly involve community context. To
investigate this, Moody and Paxton (2009, p. 1492) mapped the interrelation between
social networks, social capital and community in sociological literature between 1963
and 2001. They produced a map of the topic structure for both literatures. Therein it
was revealed that: (1) there is an overlap between social network and social capital,
either in terms of the structure of the fields or as well as the addressed topics; and (2)
‘community’ became a significant research cluster in both fields.
In addition, they argued that social capital, along with social networks, helped ‘to build
better models of the social world’ (Moody and Paxton, 2009, p. 1500). For that reason,
they argued for the need to integrate insight from the ‘content’ aspect of social capital
with the ‘network structure’ view from social network literature. Both theories will
provide insight into whether, for instance, social networks or trust will influence
interactions within communities that lead to recovery. As a result, their role is to
provide hypothetical independent variables in order to explain social reality (Woolcock
and Narayan, 2000). As Moody and Paxton (2009, p. 1500) concluded:
Similar network structures based on different contents will produce different social effects. At the
same time, shared values or norms based in different network structures will produce different social
effects. In short, the intersection of social capital and networks should improve our ability to model
behaviour.
Warren (1963, as cited in Berke et al., 1993) identified a community’s horizontal
integration as ‘the structural and functional relation among the community’s various
social units and subsystems’. Furthermore, it was found that the relation would be
equal to the lack of ‘superordinate-subordinate’ relationships. Community with a high
degree of horizontal integration are underpinned by a strong network among them,
enabled them to cooperate with one another. This would privilege them with the
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possibility of becoming a problem solving entity and enabling access to policy
decisions. Conversely, a community with a low degree of horizontal integration would
lose this privilege. Networks provide a basis for social cohesion with people they know
directly, for mutual advantage. Strictly speaking, the metaphor of social capital implies
that connections can be profitable; like any other form of capital, ‘you can invest in it,
and you can expect a decent return on your investment’ (Field, 2003, p. 12).
2.1.3 Network Theory in Aggregate Context
2.1.3.1 Networked Government and Collaborative Forms of Governance
Moynihan (2005, as cited in Kapucu, 2014) describes governance as a networked form
of government that involves entities across sectors with different skills, expertise, and
resources. It has become more popular and developed more with its complex
institutional structures, diverse political grounds and the features of distributed
knowledge and resources amongst different actors and across sectors (Ansell and
Torfing, 2015). Stoker (1998) identifies five key elements of governance and its
structures: (1) governance structures are comprised of both state and non-state actors;
(2) boundary spanning is a common practice for dealing with public issues; (3) power
dependencies and resource dependencies exist between different agencies and entities;
(4) the network may be self-governed; (5) structures rely on the capacity and power of
non-state actors in order to achieve better governance outcomes.
Some descriptions of governance reflect the idea that the government plays a central
role in engaging other sectors, while others, such as those by Rhodes (1996), argue that
the state plays a minimal role. Other descriptions of governance identify the changing
role of the public, private, and non-profit sectors, where inter-dependence becomes
inevitable and the blurring of sectoral boundaries becomes the norm (Stoker, 1998).
In addition, some scholars do not differentiate between collaborative public
management, interactive governance, network governance and collaborative
governance (Kapucu, 2014; Ansell and Torfing, 2015). Much like governance,
‘coordination’ or ‘collaboration’ between entities and networks can also take various
forms. Meanwhile, in the UK, the popular term to represent collaboration is ‘joined-up’.
However, many other words are also used to describe cross-organizational working,
namely: partnership, alliance, cooperation, and network, as well as joint-working
(Huxham et al., 2000, p. 339). Brown and Keast (2003, as cited in Kapucu, 2014)
describe cooperative networks as reflective of informal short-term relationships
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between entities, coordinative networks as arenas for joint working, decision-making
and collective action for limited time action, and collaborative networks as arenas for
more formal, long-term and sustainable relationships with a high level of inter-
organizational trust and familiarity.
However, Kapucu (2014) suggests that although these terms are very similar and may
follow similar characteristics and processes, in essence they are fairly different.
Collaborative governance has a broader meaning compared to collaborative public
management, which clearly focuses on managing localities and holds public agencies
and their roles in the collaborative arrangement as central and essential. Collaborative
governance, on the other hand, has a broader, global appeal that includes collaborative
public management, network and inter-organizational as well as inter-jurisdictional
cooperation and collaboration.
2.1.3.2 Collaborative Governance
Collaborative governance is a form of governance where both public and private
entities are involved in deliberative, collective and consensus-oriented decision-making
in order to gain a joint production of work output, policy, or solution (Ansell and Gash,
2008; Emerson et al., 2012). Ansell and Gash (2008) identify six conditions for
collaborative governance: (1) it is initiated by the government or a government agency,
who plays a leadership role, but participants include non-governmental agencies and
other actors; (2) there is direct and deliberative engagement in decision-making by
both state and non-state actors; (3) formalized structures to organize, meet and engage
with each other are created; (5) decisions are made through dialog, deliberation and
consensus; and (6) collaborative governance is aimed at improving public policy or
public management. They also identify the difference between consultative techniques
and collaborative engagement techniques, which reflect two-way communication and
multilateral engagement and emphasize their importance in effective collaborative
governance.
There is a growing body of literature exploring the terms of collaborative governance,
either at the local, sub-national, national or global scales (Ansell and Torfing, 2015),
and which then examines the process of forming more complex multi-level governance.
Ansell and Torfing (2015) furthermore argue that the appropriate scale of governance
network and forms of collaborative work are essential as scale inappropriateness
might lead to failure of policy development.
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In addition, collaborative leaderships is essential, and is expected to be able to guide
the entire entities within the network toward the accomplishment of shared goals
(Silvia, 2011). Silvia and McGuire (2010, as cited in Silvia, 2011, p. 67) argue that there
are fundamental differences between leadership in network and in hierarchy settings.
Within the first, the leader spends significantly more time on people-oriented
behaviours, including creating trust, maintaining close social relations, treating people
equally, etc. Conversely, for the latter, the leader focused the time more on managerial
tasking, such as scheduling, assigning, and internal coordination.
2.2 Network Theory in Post-Disaster Governance Context
2.2.1 Disaster Governance: Phases and Transition
2.2.1.1 What is Disaster
Disaster is defined differently by many scholars. However, Perry (2005, p. 315)
summarized definitions from a social point of view from many other scholars and
practitioners, as follows: ‘disasters are defined as social occasions, [that] they are
disruptive, and they are related to social change’. He explained further that a context of
social change refers to human and institutional adaptability. Meanwhile from an
environmental perspective, Ride and Bretherton (2011, p. 14) viewed a natural disaster
as an environmental system disruption that involves an interaction between humans,
vulnerability6, and then nature itself. Natural disasters could be in the form of volcanic
eruptions, earthquakes, floods, landslides, and fires.
Disaster is classified as a disastrous event if it has a certain impact on human activities
and lives. With the exception only of drought, most natural disasters occur in days,
hours, even minutes. Some, such as earthquakes, occur with almost no warning at all
(Schwab, 2014, p. 26). According to Anderson (1985), there is a difference between a
crisis (whether natural or political) and a disaster. She argued that a crisis is a more
predictable event than a disaster, since the phenomenon has happened frequently in
certain areas. Thus, not all crises become disasters; moreover, disastrous events mostly
impact poorer and vulnerable areas. In short, ‘crises become disasters only when they
outstrip the capacity of society to cope with them’ (p. 46).
6 According to ISDR on Disaster Risk Reduction Global Review, 2007, vulnerability can be broadly defined
as a measure of capacity to absorb the impact and recovery from hazard event and is conditioned by range
of physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes
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2.2.1.2 Disaster Management Cycle
The disaster management cycle (see Figure 2.3 below), in terms of the progression of
disaster-related activities, can be divided into preparedness, early warning, mitigation,
relief, recovery and rehabilitation (Collins, 2009, p. 27). Collins (2009) explains that
preparedness is defined as readiness for disaster through having an adequate level of
development. Early warning is defined as the ability to predict a disaster and to ensure
that people who are at risk are well-informed about the potential for disaster.
Mitigation consists of measures to reduce the impact of potential disasters. Relief
means to reduce the impact by restoring lives, livelihood and infrastructure to a locally
acceptable standard. Rehabilitation involves dealing with the longer effects of the
disaster and a focus on restoration of development. Other scholars have developed
similar models, namely Frerk (1995) and Von Kotze and Holloway (1996).
According to Schwab (2014, p. 8), the traditional disaster management cycle model
involves four interconnected phases: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.
For the best outcomes, mitigation and recovery should be integrated through effective
planning because they reinforce each other. McEntire, David A. (2014) suggests that
these phases should not be understood and interpreted in a linear fashion but should
instead be viewed as functional areas that usually overlap each other. Hence, the
various stages of the cycle are not necessarily sequential, but can also be simultaneous.
If possible, they should both also happen before the disaster. In order to reduce
disaster risk, the disaster management cycle requires sustainable development
solutions. In addition, there are many problems involved in the recovery process,
namely intense political pressure, inadequate time, inadequate resources, and multiple
and conflicting interests between groups (Berke et al., 1993). However, variations in
magnitude, frequency, impact, and availability of resources, would surely foster some
adaptation as the phases are enacted.
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Figure 2.3. Disaster Management Cycle and Development
Source: Collins (2009, p. 27)
2.2.2 Post-Disaster Governance: Toward Resilient Recovery
2.2.2.1 Disaster Recovery: Perspectives, Definitions and Measures
Perspectives on recovery
Recovery can be approached from different points of view. Olshansky (2005) has
identified recovery from the perspectives of process, urban system, economics and
finance, as well as social and family impact. As a process, recovery has no definite end.
This will depend on communities’ expectations for post-disaster recovery, which might
change over time after going through the entire process. Some of them identify
recovery as ‘normal’, others as a ‘return to pre-disaster situations’, while still others
will be satisfied with ‘business as usual’. On some level, viewing recovery as a process



























contended that 'recovery' should meet its minimum requirement, i.e. a completed
housing reconstruction and economic activities functioning at pre-disaster level.
The term ‘recovery’, when used in the context of an urban system, is usually applied
with reference to mega disasters, wherein a severely damaged area it caused a change
to the surface and functioning of the city. The damage will surely disrupt the existing
urban form, though the city might be rebuilt in the same area or not. Olshansky (2005)
argued that the betterment of the city’s physical appearance would absolutely happen.
However, in principle, development would follow according to the needs of the public
and in response to economic reconstruction.
In terms of economics, recovery is influenced by previous socioeconomic levels: ‘the
higher the socioeconomic level, the more likely households and businesses are to
recover to pre-disaster levels’ (Olshansky, 2005). In addition, Olshansky (2005) argued
that alongside socioeconomic levels, social networks play an important role during
periods of recovery. The more integrated individuals are within networks, the faster
they will recover. This is related to the fact that they can draw upon support from
friends and families, which will accelerate the recovery process (Johnston et al., 2012).
Another perspective is to see disaster as a ‘value-added’ approach (Berke et al., 1993).
This conventional approach sees recovery as ‘ordered, knowable and predictable’. This
approach consists of four stages: (1) emergency response, including debris removal,
temporary housing, and search and rescue; (2) restoring public services, including
electricity, water, and telephones; (3) replacing or reconstructing capital stock to pre-
disaster level; (4) initiate betterment, development and reconstruction (i.e. economic
growth and local development). However, there are critiques regarding this approach.
The idea that the process is linear and ordered, particularly in the context of uncertain
decision making processes, is not entirely accurate. Moreover, if it involves community
participation in decision-making, then this sequence cannot be strictly applied,
especially when, the decision-making process often involves political interest.
Recovery: what and who?
Many practitioners and policy makers have defined recovery as ‘rebuild back, stronger
than ever’ (Phillips, 2009, p. 21); Others define it as a return to normalcy. However,
what is meant by ‘normal’ in the context of disaster recovery? Arendt and Alesch (2015,
pp. 150-151) discussed ‘normal’ in terms of the community developing to levels of
system performance reflecting those prior to the disruption and when all key functions
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are being performed adequately. However, many scholars argue that recovery is not
achieved merely when all of the damage and destruction are restored or replaced. As
Nigg (1995, as cited in Arendt and Alesch, 2015) suggests, there should be social
processes beside the outcomes desired to be achieved.
In addition, according to Johnston et al. (2012, p. 252), the main point of recovery is
‘how society organizes, mobilizes and coordinates the diverse range of organizational
and professional resources that can be called upon to assist recovery’. Meanwhile,
according to Comfort et al. (2010, as cited in Kapucu, 2014), the recovery process is ‘a
complex system of interacting jurisdictions, public agencies, private and non-profit
organizations, and households that are engaged in a shared effort to rebuild a
community following a disaster’ (pp. 669-670). Thus, recovery is no longer understood
as a linear process, but more as the interactive process between decision makers and
community in a broader sense, including households, businesses, various groups or
institutions.
Recovery is the least-understood disaster management phase. As Schwab (2014, p. 44)
argues, it involves complex management processes (i.e. restoring housing,
transportation, public services, restarting economic activity as well as fostering long
term community redevelopment and improvement). Recovery requires sustained
commitment in rebuilding goals and objectives. This includes not only relief and short-
term restoration of facilities and services but also intermediate recovery and long-term
redevelopment. Furthermore, effective recovery may be enhanced by pre-event
planning that identifies linkages between all four disaster management components.
According to The American Planner Association (APA), in addressing any recovery
situation, it is important to understand its type and scale in order to determine the
necessary processes required. The term ‘recovery type’ refers to both the intensity of
impacts and the combined social, economic, and physical process by which an area
regains ‘normal life’ and adapts to new circumstances. Recovery types can be
characterized by the physical actions around which they are centred: restoration or
redevelopment (Schwab, 2014, p. 52).
It has been argued that restoration is the more common type of recovery to address
disasters where a relatively small amount of damage has taken place and buildings
remain largely intact and do not need replacing. Meanwhile, redevelopment is a less
common recovery type to address where there has been substantial destruction of
physical structures and substantial damage requiring the replacement of pre-existing
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buildings to assure safe occupancy. The term recovery scale refers to the size of the
area affected by the disaster in terms of geographic area, numbers of individuals and
households, numbers of structures, and types of facilities that must be restored or
reconstructed. However, in recovery planning, the scale used is geographic, as in
neighbourhoods, districts, communities, or regions (Schwab, 2014, p. 52). The
following table outlines a classification of recovery from The American Planner
Association (APA).
Table 2.2. The Classification of Recovery
Scale Type A: Restoration Type B: Redevelopment
Can be discontinuous,
involving multiple locations at
each geographical scale




Characterized by major life or
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e.g. Tohuku earthquake and
tsunami
Source: Schwab (2014, p. 53)
Measuring recovery
Until now, there has not been a centralized and formal system for collecting and
archiving recovery indicators, nor are there comprehensive models of the recovery
process itself. Beside qualitative questions concerning ‘what constitutes successful
recovery’, Schwab (2014, p. 14) noted that there should be careful consideration and
design to determine the level of success, with a focus on ‘the scale at which success will
be measured, the length time involved, and who will be responsible for the evaluation’.
Thus, communities must first decide on a clear definition of recovery before they can
measure it, and this definition can have numerous dimensions: environmental,
physical, economic, social, and institutional, and so on. This needs to include some
holistic description of the ‘new normal’. It is expected that both local government and
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the public can use the measurement to monitor progress and evaluate achievement
(Schwab, 2014, p. 14). Whilst discussion of the detailed indicator of recovery is still
ongoing, the general indicators of ‘successful recovery’ have been widely agreed,
namely speed and quality (Olshansky, 2005).
Alongside the process, measuring the ‘speed and quality’ is not as easy as it sounds. For
instance, the level of livelihood recovery post-disaster may differ amongst community
members. It depends heavily on perceptions, which are greatly influenced by gender,
occupation, community-based organization, and their participation in such
organizations (Minamoto, 2010). On the basis of comparative study of post-disaster
reconstruction and mechanism in three different disasters in India, it was identified
that success and failure depends on the mandate, scope, power, structure and nature of
the organizations that take charge along the process (Shaw, 2013).
The speed of recovery is important to many businesses, people who have experienced
great loss, and suffered from lack of psychological well-being; therefore, realistic
timeframes and desired outcomes should be established and monitored for every
recovery program and project (Schwab, 2014). Schwab (2014, p. 13) pointed out that
timeline strategies can be used to parse problems and manage uncertainties, moving
from broad goals to particular challenges, either in spatial or systematic forms. Ideally,
the community wants to recover from the disaster and become more resilient with a
sustainable place as a result of recovery programs (Schwab, 2014, p. 9).
2.2.2.2 Resilience for a Better Recovery
According to The National Academy of Science, ‘resilience is the ability to prepare and
plan for, absorb, recover from, and more successfully adapt to adverse events’ (Schwab,
2014, p. 20). According to Godschalk (2009, as cited in Schwab, 2014, p. 25),
opportunities to advance community resilience may arise during long-term recovery
from a disaster that may not arise at any other time. It is not only fostered by
government, but also by individuals, organizations and business communities.
Furthermore, it involves technical, organizational, social and economic dimensions.
Many researchers argued that it is the practice of everyday resilience in response to
daily stress that best equips organizations to handle catastrophic and unexpected
challenges (Schwab, 2014). Resilience allows a community to respond and recover
effectively from specific events; therefore, it is important to embed the concept of
resilience within the wider framework of sustainability (Schwab, 2014, p. 21).
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Sustainability is a frame of reference that aims to preserve for future generations the
resources and opportunities that exist for current generations (Desta, 1999; Lélé, 1991;
Hopwood et al., 2005). The community can therefore plan in advance and take
appropriate steps to mitigate hazards before the disaster.
Nevertheless, one should not solely focus on hazards. Since society changes over time,
vulnerability to disaster may increase as well. In principle, vulnerability theory explains
the unequal impact of disasters on people, and then identifies the cause based on, but
not limited to, disproportionate power, economic conditions, political positions, or
social privilege. The objectives of the vulnerability theorist are to focus our attention on
human lives, especially those at highest risk and most vulnerable. In short, vulnerability
theory proposes that ‘the social distribution of risk is not shared equally across all
groups’ (Phillips, 2009, pp. 37-38). According to Wisner (2001, as cited in Phillips,
2009), vulnerability theory offers guidance for those involved in recovery management
to decentralize their recovery efforts, involve the community in the decision making
process, and integrate local knowledge for better outcomes. Increases in vulnerability
might result from poverty, population changes, diversity, industrialization, and
globalisation, as well as improper land use and construction (McEntire, David A., 2014,
pp. 432-6):
(1) Poverty. A lack of resources will limit people’s ability to live in safe houses and take
precautionary actions before, during and after the disruptive event, e.g. limited
choices for insurance.
(2) Population Growth and Urbanization. The more people are exposed to hazards,
then the more vulnerability will increase. Furthermore, the increase in demand for
water and food would likely increase the rate of drought and famine. If the number
of infants, and disabled people and elderly people increases, then vulnerability will
also increase, as they have insufficient capability to protect themselves during
disaster.
(3) Diversity. The most obvious difficulty is that different ethnic groups speak different
languages, which makes early warning processes more complicated. Language
barriers also constrain the delivery of disaster relief and recovery assistance.
(4) Industrialization. The increased use of technology may also lead to a greater risk
to nearby populations. Possible vulnerabilities are for people who live close to
chemical and nuclear areas. Examples of these include chemical contamination
from the Bhopal Disaster (1984) and nuclear fallout from Chernobyl (1986).
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(5) Globalization. The shrinking of distance and disappearance of national borders
that are beneficial to the facilitation of free trade and commerce are not without
their drawbacks. Disaster, terror or human-made disaster in one part of the world
may adversely affect those in other countries.
(6) Land use and construction. Vulnerability has also increased due to improper
location and building construction. In fact, for some reason, the most hazardous
land is also the most desirable real estate. In addition, construction also plays a role
in disaster vulnerability: for example the design of the buildings may be flaw, or
shortcuts may have been taken in the building process.
2.2.2.3 Disaster Recovery as an Opportunity for Development Agenda
Disaster is viewed as an ‘interruption’ to development, because what follows disaster is
a period of uncertainty. Thus, the main concern in a disaster from the perspective of
development is to quickly recover and reduce vulnerability as soon as possible, so that
the focus can shift to basic and long term development (Anderson, 1985). A failure to
bring development back on the right track may lead to a disparity between regions. In
this case, the uneven development is not caused by the out-migration of resources to
other regions, but by the disaster itself. In addition to this, pre-disaster conditions will
influence the post-disaster conditions. As Olshansky (2005) argues, ‘the negative trend
that existed before the disaster will usually worsen during the recovery period. These
include declining economies, social problems, and out-migration’. In line with this
argument, Anderson (1985) argues poorer societies will experience higher levels of
suffering after a crisis (whether that is a natural disaster or political crisis).
To some extent, economic activities should immediately start to operate, though this
might be in temporary shelters with only the minimum of services. In addition to this,
local businesses need to re-open in order to restore the local economy (Berke et al.,
1993). The early signs of post-disaster recovery will provide essential information for
the formulation of further comprehensive development plans. The post-disaster
‘window of opportunity’ is an excellent time to assess economic development
strategies, target industries, and incentive programs in supporting community
resilience and sustainability. Redevelopment planning undertaken after the disaster
can provide input to the economic recovery goals that can either complement pre-
disaster economic development strategies or create new goals (Schwab, 2014).
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It is true that disaster recovery can be seen as a development opportunity; however, it
needs to be linked to the local government system. Development opportunity comes
after disaster, as significant financial, technical and human resources enter into the
region, positively contributing to the development of the region in the long term.
Nevertheless, the local government also should be involved since most activities need
to reflect the local socio-economic and cultural contexts (Shaw, 2013). When discussing
disaster and development, Anderson (1985) notes the important elements of
‘suffering/loss’ and ‘coping ability’. In her view, disaster can be assumed to be an
indicator of a failure of development; meanwhile, development also can be understood
as an integrative process to reduce vulnerability to disaster. Moreover, development
can be said to have failed if the communities have a low level capacity to cope with
disaster, in which the suffering as well as the long-term loss cannot be minimized.
Those who cope better are those who develop.
According to the Brundtland Commission (1987, as cited in Collins, 2009, p. 16),
‘sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the needs of future generations’. Sustainable development has
environmental, social and economic dimensions; conversely, unsustainable
development increases the risk of disaster by propagating environmental degradation,
social decay, economic collapse, and so on. The interconnection between poverty and
environment is very clear, as Mike Davis (2006, as cited in Zeiderman, 2012) argues
poor people are likely to be forced to live with disaster. This can be illustrated by the
case of Bogota (Zeiderman, 2012) which showed that vulnerability had a long history,
starting when migrants seeking economic opportunity were unable to buy housing,
which caused people to construct rudimentary housing on steep slopes or hazardous
parts of the flood plain. This phenomenon can also be seen in many other parts of the
developing world.
Development may increase hazards and human vulnerability to disaster, but at the
same time development also extends life expectancy and wellbeing as well as provides
means of protection against disaster. Limitations have been more to do with uneven
development and development that is not appropriately applied to different
environmental, social, or economic contexts. Appropriate development can provide the
means to avoid disasters, mitigate their impact or aid in sustainable recovery once one
has occurred. As such, there is a need for both development and emergency oriented
prevention and response (Collins, 2009, p. 28).
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When the disaster strikes, long-term recovery can take years, but generally home-
owners and businesses expect that recovery should happen much more quickly
(Schwab, 2014, p. 26). Nevertheless, if the disaster affects the economic activities of key
employers or major business entities, long-term hardship will emerge for the
community (2009, as cited in Arendt and Alesch, 2015). The problems that might arise
include permanent employer relocation, shutdowns, disruption to major supply chains,
or other chain reactions, all of which cause major and possibly enduring disruption to
local and regional economies. Thus, economic recovery is a complex policy area that is
not easily developed through traditional government action. It requires participation
from the private sector (Schwab, 2014, p. 84), as well as the community, as the
community depends on its economy for survival, and the businesses depend on the
community within which they exist. Arendt and Alesch (2015, p. 87) illustrate this as
follows:
When we examined the consequences of extreme natural hazard events for small business two
decades ago, we found numerous businesses in Northbridge that failed because of the Northbridge
Earthquake without having experienced any physical damage from the event. The small business is
more vulnerable than the larger business. Reasons for that were not only because the disaster has
destroyed their business facilities, but also due to losing customers.
In addition, Arendt and Alesch (2015) have argued that the government only provides
disaster aid and insurance payments, and then with that aid, the community is expected
to stimulate and revive the local economy on their own. However, in reality, it is not
that simple, because ‘the stimulus is too little and far too brief a time to yield long term,
sustainable gains for the community’s economy’ (ibid., p. 88).
2.3 Network Theory for Development
2.3.1 Uneven Local Economic Development and Sustainable Development
2.3.1.1 Understanding Uneven Development
The problem of underdevelopment was first defined as a lack of surplus to invest in
further growth. This problem was addressed by pioneers in development economics,
including: W. A. Lewis, A. O. Hirschman, R. Nurkse, G. Myrdal, P. Streeten, R. Prebisch
and H. W. Singer. Underdevelopment was seen as a ‘trap’ or ‘vicious circle’ from which a
country had to break loose or, to use the aeronautic metaphor of W. W. Rostow, to ‘take
off’ into self-sustained growth’ (Hettne, 2009, p. 80).
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In the 1960s, Rostow (1960, as cited in Anderson, 1985; Bingham and Mier, 1993) laid
out a development approach through the lens of economic growth called the ‘Stages of
Economic Growth’. He focused on economics, and pointed out that sustained
development will be shown by investment rates, growth rates and changes in Growth
National Product. Another similar model was proposed by John Friedman (1966, 1967).
However, Friedman and Rostow failed to address the issue of distribution of economic
growth, and other social dimensions of development (See Box 2.1 Theory of Stage of
Economic Growth). In addition, most economists have ignored certain things, such as
the influence of culture, the importance of networks, the role of technological
innovation and institutional dynamics.
All countries have adopted conventions for the calculation of gross national product
(GNP), and gross domestic product (GDP) (the United Nations’ Standard National
Accounts). GNP and GDP per capita is the most common indicator of the level of
development. ‘Economic Growth’ refers to an increase in either of these indicators.
There are, however, well-known problems associated with this approach, such as: (1)
the necessary data are often incomplete, unreliable, or not available; (2) informal jobs
are excluded from national income statistics; (3) there is a large subsistence sector; (4)
there is still a mixed up understanding of the difference between cost and income; (4)
per capita income tells us nothing about distribution of income (Nixson, 2001, p. 14).
Source: Summarized from Anderson (1985), Bingham and Mier (1993), and MacKinnon and Cumbers (2011)
Significant problems arise when international comparisons of income level are made.
Income data measured in national currencies have to be converted into a common
currency, usually the US Dollar. If poor countries artificially maintain an overvalued
exchange rate (i.e. their domestic currency is valued too low), this will overstate the
Box 2.1. Stages of Economic Growth Theory
Walt Rostow (1960) has categorized development into five stages: traditional, take-off precondition,
take-off, maturity and mass consumption. The traditional stage of development is recognized by the
limited availability of technology. The second stage is a condition whenever the region’s economic and
social structures begin to change. This may be because the leading regions invest in lagging regions, in
terms of transportation, communication, etc. During this period, there is also a transfer of skills from
leading regions to lagging regions. The third stage, take-off, happens when an external stimuli and
investments increase. According to Rostow, the take-off stage lasts for 20-30 years. When the time
comes, there will be a shift in the importance of the agricultural sectors vis a vis technology (e.g.
communication, transportation, etc.). The last, mass consumption is characterized by the export of
many goods and services which were formerly imported.
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income of the country when expressed in US dollars. Nevertheless, many of the
necessities of life in poor countries, basic foodstuffs for example, are very low-priced in
dollar terms. For example, in contrast to Paris or London, a haircut in Kampala, Uganda,
will cost less than one dollar. This means that the gap on average is not as great as
these statistics would suggest. Indeed, a number of attempts have been made to
compute more meaningful comparison (Nixson, 2001, pp. 14-15).
In order to overcome the problems associated with the use of existing exchange rates,
attempts have been made to compare per capita incomes of different countries directly
through the use of ‘international prices’. The theory of purchasing power parity (PPP)
holds that, in the long run, the exchange rate of two currencies should move towards a
rate that would equalize the prices of an identical basket of goods and services in each
country (Nixson, 2001, p. 15). ‘Burgernomics’ is based on the theory of purchasing-
power parity and the notion that one dollar should buy the same amount in all
countries, called Big Mac index, ‘We first launched this 14 years ago as a light-hearted
guide as to whether currencies are at their ‘correct’ exchange rate. It is not intended as a
precise predictor of exchange rates, but a tool to make economic theory more digestible’
(Nixson, 2001, p. 15). However, economic growth and economic development are not
synonymous. GDP per capita might be rising, but at the same time poverty might be
increasing, inequality in the distribution of income might be rising and massive
environmental damage might be occurring. Economic growth might well be a necessary
condition for economic development but it is not a sufficient condition. If economic
growth does not lead to a reduction in poverty, inequality, and unemployment, then
economic development cannot be said to be occurring (Nixson, 2001, pp. 12-13).
It was Myrdal (1957, as cited in Midgley, 2013, p. 25), who notably criticized the
standard model of development, which mostly focuses on economic aspects. He argued
that the growth economy policy should be accompanied by a social development policy
to ensure that the economic growth is distributed fairly to the whole population. This
should also be shown by the betterment of the standard of living for the majority of the
population and/or decreasing rates of poverty. Accordingly, development should be
followed by social improvement as well as an increase in equality. The social element7
mainstreaming in development was also supported by Raymond A. Baur (1966) and
the World Bank in the 1970s (under Robert McNamara’s presidency). Their proposition
7 They focused on the basic needs such as adequated food, clothes, houses, and other services like
education and health services, etc. Other proponents of this school of thought also included political
participation and social opportunities within their basic needs list.
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is that the fulfilment of basic needs is expected to influence productivity, since it will
result in increased output as well as an investment surplus.
Thus, another pivotal aspect is the social dimension, or as many scholars call it, social
development. Social development is defined as ‘a process of planning social change
designed to promote the well-being of the population as a whole within the context of
dynamic and multifaceted development process’ (Midgley, 2013, p. 13). Development
as a multifaceted process cannot be understood in isolation; the local dynamics,
endogenous processes and informal processes of social change should be understood
comprehensively (Olivier de Sardan, 2005, p. 24). According to Michael Todaro (as
cited in Nixson, 2001, p. 13), there are three basic core values that should serve as a
conceptual basis and practical guidelines for understanding the ‘inner meaning’ of
development. These are:
(1) Sustenance: the ability to meet basic needs (food, health, shelter and protection);
(2) Self-esteem: a sense of worth and self-respect (implying dignity, honour and
recognition);
(3) Freedom: an expanded range of choice for societies (including freedom from
oppression, material wants, greater protection from environmental disaster).
Regional development will influence overall national development (Semitiel García,
2006). In this case, the regional development refers to change in regional productivity,
which can be measured by population, employment, income and manufactured value
added, as well as social development indicators such as quality of education and health
services, environmental quality, equity and creativity (Bingham and Mier, 1993). There
are two mainstream views in regional development theory: (1) development-from-
above; and (2) development-from-below. The idea of development-from-above is that
regional development will serve as a spurt process from the core and growth centres,
which will then, trickle down to the periphery and hinterlands8. Development from this
point of view is stimulated by exogenous forces: export, investment from outside, and
migration. Meanwhile, development-from-below argues that the regions should be
8 Bingham and Mier (1993, p. 28) have distinguished clearly between core and periphery, growth centre
and hinterland and leading and lagging regions, as follows:
Core and periphery is to address regions on global scale…Growth centres are urban or extended
metropolitan areas (urban fields), meanwhile hinterland are outside the urban fields. Thus within
the both core and periphery regions, there will be growth centres surrounded by hinterlands. The
leading and lagging concept is to distinguish the advance regions from underdeveloped regions at
both the global and the regional levels. The periphery can be composed of growth poles that are
leading regions while their hinterlands are lagging. The core can have hinterlands that are leading
regions.
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actively in charge of their own development. Economic development will be sustained
if the regions are able to continue producing goods and services to export, in addition
to goods and service for local consumption. This requires capital and skilled labours.
Trade, capital and labour thus become three types of external relationship that are
crucial for regional development (Bingham and Mier, 1993). Appendix B outlines the
mechanisms of regional development theories.
The most influential critique of the modernization paradigm was formulated by Andre
Gunder Frank (1969). According to him, underdevelopment was not an original state,
but rather a created condition: ‘the development of underdevelopment’. In this
theoretical perspective, the development of one unit could lead to the
underdevelopment of another, depending on how the two units were structurally
linked. Poverty was seen as a structure rather than as a particular stage
(backwardness), as in the competing modernization paradigm. The conclusion drawn
was that real development implied self-reliance and even delinking from the capitalist
system. (Hettne, 2009, p. 82).
From the writer’s point of view, the theory of regional development (see also Appendix
B) does not implicitly suggest that in order to develop a region, one region should
exploit another. In this case, one must see problems from another perspective: how to
improve lagging regions. Thus, there should be better approaches in development.
2.3.1.2 Practical Views on Local Economic Development
Local economic development, according to the American Economic Development
Council (AEDC), is defined as ‘the process of creating wealth through the mobilization
of human, financial, capital, physical and natural resources to generate marketable
goods and services’ (Bingham and Mier, 1993, p. vii). Furthermore, in terms of local
economic development, a number of models have been introduced, namely (1)
Community Development; (2) Affirmative Action; (3) Entrepreneurship. According to
Szostak (2012, p. 183), community development involves dealing with processes ‘to
strengthen civil society (by strengthening links within the community and its
interaction with sources of academic and professional advice), in order to prioritize the
actions of social or economic or environmental policy’. Thus, it will empower the
capacity of both individuals and community-level institutions.
Development can also be approached from the perspective of political economy and
institutional economics (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; MacKinnon and Cumbers,
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2011), as follows: (1) the communitarian view; (2) the network view; (3) the
institutional view; and (4) the synergy view.
Communitarian view
From the communitarian point of view, ‘social capital is inherently good, that more is
better, and that its presence always has positive effect on community welfare’
(Woolcock and Narayan, 2000, p. 229). In this case, they hold on to the assumption that
social capital is equal to numbers and density of groups, such as clubs, associations, and
civic groups within the community. The central point in this view is to look at social
relations in terms of reciprocity and helping behaviours. According to Minamoto (2010,
p. 549):
Community-based organizations can be seen as representations of the local structure, and in recent
years, various studies have focused on community-based organizations and regional networks as
social capital with a role in fostering socioeconomic development in the developing world.
However, the critique to this view lies on the unexpected side effect of ‘bad culture’
within groups, which may greatly hinder development. This may include gangs, drugs
cartels and so on. Thus, we can say in this case that the cost of being a member
outweighs the benefits. Another critique focuses on the assumption that members are
homogenous and the claim that this automatically benefits members. From extant
literatures, in fact, discrimination based on race, ethnicity, and gender are still issues
facing community-based organizations up to now (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000).
Network view
The network perspective emphasizes the pivotal role of vertical and horizontal ties
between people, as well as the broader context of connection among other entity
groups. In relation to economic development, according to Granovetter (1995, as cited
in Woolcock and Narayan, 2000, p. 232):
The economic development takes place through a mechanism that allows individuals to draw
initially on the benefits of close community membership but also enables them to acquire the skills
and resources to participate in networks that transcend their community, thereby progressively
joining the economic mainstream.
Thereby, from this point of view, the terminology of ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ in social
capital can be recognised. However, although outcomes for social capital will depend on
network configurations, the network view still believes that ‘strong intra-community
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ties give family and community a sense of identification and common purpose’
(Woolcock and Narayan, 2000, p. 230). Moreover, the strength of this view is that they
investigate social capital from both sides, i.e. in terms of both benefits and limitations. It
therefore provides many valuable services for its community members, on the one
hand, but increases the risk of non-economic claims (i.e. obligations and commitments),
which may lead to ‘negative economic consequences’, on the other (Woolcock and
Narayan, 2000).
Networks, along with the market and organizational hierarchy, are considered a way of
organizing economic activity (Szostak, 2012). Therefore, network analysis is potentially
a valuable addition to the study of economic growth. There are many influences that
networks have on the economy, for instance in terms of investment, innovation,
institutional change and entrepreneurship. Networks generate generally beneficial
outcomes by encouraging trust and transmitting information.
The critique of this view mostly is focused around the idea of relativity, whose claims
may lead to difficulties in drawing inferences for long-term policy-making or for wide
areas (e.g. society or nations). In addition to this, the network view, to some extent,
ignores the capabilities that communities have in shaping institutional performance,
and conversely, how the institutional arrangement then influences the configuration of
the network, as well as the interactive processes within the network.
Institutional view
The institutional view proposes that ‘the vitality of community networks and civil
society is largely the product of the political, legal and institutional environment’
(Woolcock and Narayan, 2000, p. 234). Unlike the proponents of communitarian and
network views, who treat social capital as an independent variable for targeted
outcomes, the institutional perspective conversely views social capital as a dependent
variable, since it is closely related to the quality of the embedded institutional aspects.
From the institutional point of view, it is also underlined that firms themselves take
into consideration bonding, credibility and competence, as well as external
accountability to civil society. Also, according to this view, ‘generalized trust’, ‘rule of
law’, ‘civil liberties’ and ‘ bureaucratic quality’ contribute to economic growth.
On the other hand though, ‘ethnic fragmentation’ and ‘weak political rights’ have
slowed economic development. In addition, the middle class consensus, bonding
society as well as strong institutions, will contribute to the production of a stable and
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positive impact in crisis situation. In short, the institutional view believes that
‘investment in civic and government social capital are thus highly complementary to
investment in more orthodox forms of capital accumulation’ (Woolcock and Narayan,
2000, p. 235). However, because of the macroeconomic lens underpinning it, the
institutional view lacks a microeconomic perspective. One criticism is that it barely
touches upon the grassroots level. The betterment of the institutional aspect would
take years to accomplish, while in the meantime people, as the most impacted party of
poor development, need an immediate support.
All of the previous views leave a number of questions unanswered. To remedy this,
many scholars have proposed a new view, one that integrated the previous three views
and offers synergy between them (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000, p. 235).
Synergy view
Known as the synergy view, this perspective understands development as collaboration
of all the previous views. As Uphoff (1992, as cited in Woolcock and Narayan, 2000, p.
238) concluded:
Paradoxical though it may seem, ‘top-down’ efforts are usually needed to introduce, sustain and
institutionalize ‘bottom-up’ development. We are commonly constrained to think in ‘either-or’ terms
– the more of one the less of the other – when both are needed on positive-sum way to achieve our
purposes.
Thus, the synergy view focuses on the nature of the community (e.g. norms, trust,
reciprocity, etc.), networks and social relationships, interaction, as well as institutional
context, since one surely influences the other, either direct or indirectly. To illustrate,
the state, business entities and civil society can establish a forum to set priorities and
build consensus on common goals in pursuit of development. In this context, social
capital plays an important role as a ‘mediating variable’. Thus, there are fundamental
transformations that take place, from ‘traditional kinship-based community life to
societies organized by formal institutions’ (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000, p. 238).
2.3.1.3 Sustainable Development
Most economists think that the environmental issue had become an obstacle to the
achievement of economic growth and development agenda. Although the debate
between economists and environmentalists started in the late 1960s (Desta, 1999, p.
11), sustainable development is not a new thing for the economists. More than two
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centuries ago, Thomas Malthus (1766-1834), warned about resource scarcity resulting
from population growth. According to Thomas Malthus in his famous book, ‘An Essay
on the Principle of Population’ (1798), human populations grow exponentially, while
food production grows at an arithmetic rate, therefore ‘a population increase would
exhaust existing resources’ (Hettne, 2009, p. 50).
The Malthusian trap has become concern of for environmentalists, and a major issue in
development theory up to now, as it has brought the notion of ‘sustainability’ into the
development framework. In the late 1960s, the focus of the environmentalists was still
how technological improvements could alleviate pollution. In the 1970s, the concept of
sustainability became popular because of Neo-Malthusian views and because the idea
of the relation between the environment and development had become more widely
accepted. Then, in the late 1980s, the environmentalists began focusing on the scarcity
of natural resources that resulted from continued economic growth9. Moreover,
complex environmental threats were also recognized, such as deforestation, ecosystem
damage, acid precipitation, ozone depletion, contaminated sites, air pollution,
hazardous waste, and global warming (Desta, 1999, p. 12).
The term ‘sustainable development’ was first coined in 1980 by the World
Conservation Union, United Nation Environmental Programme (UNEP), and Worldwide
Fund for Nature. Following this, the United Nations General Assembly established the
World Commission on Environment and Development, known as the Brundtland
Commission (i.e. named after its chairperson, Mrs. Gro Harlem Brundtland) to
formulate the notion of sustainability. According to the World Commission on
Environment and Development, the fundamental idea of sustainable development is
‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
the future generations to meet their own needs’ (Brundtland Report, 1987, as cited in
Collins, 2009, p. 16). Thus a key element of this notion lies in its emphasis on
‘maintaining interregional welfare over time’ (Nixson, 2001, p. 13).
Sustainable development is a complex concept which involves multidimensional issues.
The UNEP argues that sustainable development consists of ecological, economic and
social basis factors which support the continuation of development itself. In addition,
the sociocultural and political aspects will determine the social actors and institutions,
9 Clearer notions of the environment and a sense of the need to protect it grew following the European
Nature Conservation Year in 1970, the United Nations Environmental Conference at Stockholm in 1972,
and the report issued by the Club of Rome (The Limits to Growth) in 1972.
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the governance and ownership of resources, as well as the stability of social and
cultural systems. In a practical sense, the policy makers are expected to take into
account the potential cost of environmental damage, and calculate the impact on long-
term income improvement and the sustainability of well-being. In short, Desta (1999)
argued that sustainable development was a precautionary action to ensure the long-
term objectives of economic development, whilst maintaining the quality of the
environment.
2.3.2 A Well Connected Community for Disaster Recovery
In the context of disasters, a conversation with a victim of a tsunami provides an
example of how social capital provides a springboard from which to rebound from
disaster. In spite of everyone’s grief, there is always a hope that there are strong ties
within the community.
In my mind I said: “Ya Allah, today I start my life from zero. Ya Allah, today I become alone again.”
And then suddenly in my mind again: “No. you are not alone. You are not starting from zero.” And
then I said: “Yes, I am not alone. I am not starting from zero.” I said: “I have knowledge. I have
friends that make me strong.” But as strong as I was, I also cried. I cried anytime I go while calling
the names of my children. I saw the dead bodies there. It was something like everything happened.
Tabrani Yunis, Acehnese, Director of the local centre for Community Development and Education, as
cited from Pelupessy et al. (2011, p. 19).
In comparison to a man-made disaster, a natural disaster indeed has some ‘advantages’.
In social capital theory, it is called ties or bond. Ride and Bretherton (2011) argued that
the common perception among victims is the belief that natural disaster comes ‘purely’
from outside the human and from beyond respective local community habits, which has
encouraged the ties between them and the need to deal with the crisis collectively.
Community diversity, according to Johnston et al. (2012, p. 253), has also determined
how community responds to recovery issues, and their ability to use resources and
experiences to fulfil the needs and to plan future strategy.
In order to achieve a certain level of livelihood and local economic recovery, the idea of
a bonding community which can help people cope with disaster can be used as a
reference (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000, p. 226):
When people are on hard times, they know it is their friends and family who constitute the final
safety net. Intuitively, then, the basic idea of social capital is that a person’s family, friends, and
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associates constitute an important asset, one that can be called on in crisis, enjoyed for its own sake,
and leveraged for material gain. What is true for individuals, moreover, also holds for groups.
Thus, it is social bonding through networks and relations that play an important role in
alleviating poverty and vulnerability (Anderson, 1985; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000).
In addition, many studies, as cited in Woolcock and Narayan (2000), have connected
being in poverty and exclusion from certain social networks and institutions that could
be used to secure good jobs and decent housing. On the other hand, social ties can be
both a ‘blessing and blight’, as many nations are still employing nepotism, which leads
to discrimination, distortion and corruption.
According to Berke et al. (1993), recovery through the strengthening of community-
based organizations indeed provides an opportunity to facilitate economic, social and
physical development, but with the underlying assumption that communities are
actively engaged in defining goals and directing redevelopment initiatives. A well-
connected community is also recognized as crucial aspect in terms of aid distribution.
For the purpose of effectiveness and sustainability, aid distribution post-disaster,
either from government or non-government organisations, should involve a
participatory process and community development (Anderson, 1985). Whenever the
community is prepared and well-connected, then aid distribution processes will be
distributed smoothly. In addition to community engagement, the ‘power’ embedded in
a well-connected community cannot be ignored. From a study in the Caribbean and
Midwestern United States, as quoted from Berke et al. (1993), it was found that groups
particularly from the business communities benefited most from recovery aid. This was
because of their relationship with the central authority and local institutions. They used
their power to pressure authorities to provide certain advantages, including in
choosing the business area to be rebuilt. Ironically, most of the aid programs are
claimed to have a little connection to broader development agendas, and have tended
towards short-term relief.
2.3.3 Collaborative Governance for Post Disaster Recovery toward
Development
Collaborative networks are essential in disaster management and aim to tackle the
structural problems associated with traditionally rigid, less open command and control
response and recovery system. In this case, Kapucu (2014) defines collaborative
governance as a collective effort of stakeholders when recovering from disasters.
Furthermore, he explains that collaborative governance is being utilized and applied to
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managing disaster due to the catastrophic effect of disasters that are beyond the scope
of any single jurisdiction or sector.
Due to the limited research into disaster recovery topics (and in particular within a
livelihood and local economy context, see Chapter 2, Section 6 below), the research that
specifically links recovery network into regular development process is also sparse.
However, to understand the similar process, it can be started with Woolcock and
Narayan (2000, pp. 242-3), who tried to connect social capital approach to economic
development policy. The network support in the recovery process toward the
betterment of development policy can be based on the expansion and modification of
their recommendation:
 Network for Assessment. To assess the (on-going process of) development, there is
a need to look through a social perspective. For preliminary study, a social network
can be the primary resources to investigate, for instance, the marginal groups in
terms of economic risk and vulnerability.
 Network for Institutional Analysis. To map the relation among stakeholders, there
is a need to conduct institutional analysis to identify the range of stakeholders and
their interrelations. This is meant to understand how policy will affect the power
and interest of the stakeholders at all levels and intersecting sectors of given
problems to be addressed by policy. The dominant and marginal group should be
identified in this sense to avoid producing biased policy.
 Local government and Community based Organization Network. There is a need
to emphasize community organization capacity, especially in order to establish the
connection between communities and other social groups. These organizations are
meant to bridge the interests and available resources of different stakeholders, as
well as to facilitate the consensus-building among stakeholders, as it is widely
believed that an agreed goal is crucial for economic development.
 Network for Accountability. There is a need for accountability, which would be
best achieved through information disclosure at all levels. Thus, the information
and knowledge flowing through social relations and networks is also an essential
aspect.
 Network for Knowledge Exchange. There is also a need for the betterment of
physical access and communication technology for fostering the exchange process
of knowledge and information across communities and social groups.
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 Network for a more integrated process. Finally, in order to maintain its
sustainability, the measures (e.g. social learning) should be incorporated firmly into
the development process in a way that fosters the engagement of multi-level
communities in the stages of the development process (i.e. design, implementation,
management and evaluation).
Early on in the development of market economies, when markets are thin and
incomplete, a thick network of interpersonal relations functions to resolve allocative
and distributive questions. In particular, when the scale of the organization is relatively
small, the system works reasonably well. Clearly, at least one important function of
what we have come to call ‘social capital’ is to complement or substitute market-based
exchange and allocation. Thus, Stiglitz (2000, p. 67) concluded that social capital is
affected by, and affects, the development process. He urged the importance of the
public’s role in the enhancement of social capital, but who should undertake that public
role, and how it should be done, are questions that need a great deal more thought.
However, investigations of social capital should be undertaken prudently. George
(2008, as cited in Minamoto, 2010) began with a hypothesis that placed rural (i.e.
agrarian village) and non-rural (i.e. tourist destination area) areas in a dichotomous
relationship, and found that there were no significant differences in the level of social
capital in both areas. He then investigated more deeply in follow-up focus groups,
concluding that tourist areas in fact had their own type of ‘social capital’, which more or
less functioned in a similar way to agrarian villages, and were able to encourage them
(i.e. people within tourist areas) to participate in recovery processes.
2.4 Lacuna in Extant Knowledge
2.4.1 Overview of Previous Studies
2.4.1.1 Disaster Recovery Governance
Studies of disaster recovery governance are inter-disciplinary. The issue can thus be
approached from many points of view. Below is an overview of previous studies on
collaborative disaster recovery governance.
From a psychological perspective, Johnston et al. (2012) investigated the role of
community engagement in reducing anxiety and trauma in communities following
earthquakes in New Zealand between 1987 and 2003. The purpose was to compare the
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effectiveness of different types of community engagement in facilitating the recovery
process. The methods of data collection were semi-structured interviews with key
informants (i.e. individuals and agencies), along with comprehensive analysis of
relevant documents, such as reports, papers, and newspaper articles.
From this research, it was suggested that effective recovery is not solely dependent on
individual abilities to cope with the impact of disaster, but in fact the community
environment plays an important role in supporting the recovery process. Communities
should be given the necessary information and allowed to participate. Community
participation has empowered people to articulate, solve and take action in managing
problems associated with anxiety and trauma. In addition, Johnston et al. (2012)
highlighted the strong need to integrate the involvement of multi-agency communities
due to various problems that should be addressed. They found that many agencies
have shown a lack of cooperation prior to disaster. Later on, the limited interaction of
multi-agency communities was identified as a major problem hindering the
effectiveness of the recovery process. They also underlined the need to have clearly
documented, shared and agreed upon planning guidelines. The planning process should
be a collaborative effort, aided through regular communications, meetings, exercises
and education, before, during and after the disaster.
Another study, involving an institutional perspective, came from Jahangiri et al.
(2011). They conducted a comparative study of community based disaster
management in selected countries in order to establish an institutional model for Iran.
They compared six issues in disaster management: policy-making, planning,
coordination, controlling and organizing as well as experience and access to
information, by using a descriptive-comparative method. From this research, it was
advised that community participation should be embedded in various stages of the
disaster management cycle so that it will bring the process closer to the goals.
Community participation means that people’s contribution in the disaster management
cycle can lead to institutionalization in the community (Jahangiri et al., 2011, p. 82).
However, in the process, there is a tendency that participation will depend heavily on
the specific characteristics of each nation.
Research on recovery governance can be also viewed from the perspective of physical
redevelopment, i.e. rehabilitation and reconstruction. Lawther (2009) used the British
Red Cross Maldives recovery program as a case study. This study is based on the
writer’s experiences and observation during his involvement in the housing and
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infrastructure redevelopment program. Based on the lessons learnt, it was revealed
that community involvement is essential to the overall success of the program.
However, it was suggested that there should be a design for how to involve the
beneficiaries and the community. The aim is to delineate a scale and context of
involvement in the program so as to avoid any delay in the rehabilitation and
reconstruction process. He highlighted the aspect of procurement models, methods of
community involvement, and personal management capacity to facilitate community
involvement within the program. In addition, he has also underlined the importance of
institutional capacity building in driving community involvement within the program.
Livelihood and local economy can be approached from social perspectives. In this
case, an overview of previous studies from social capital and networks point of view is
offered. Research regarding livelihoods and recovery through the lens of social capital
was conducted by Minamoto (2010). Minamoto tried to understand the relationship
between people’s perceptions of livelihood and micro-social capital in order to
investigate effective disaster support at the community level. A household survey (i.e.
190 households; random) was undertaken. According to this study, social capital
factors that represent the people’s perceptions of livelihood recovery are networks,
leadership, trust and community-based organizations. In addition to this, Minamoto
found that participatory design in organizations was a negative factor in livelihood
recovery, since it encouraged semi-forced participation. This research was designed to
investigate the issue of effectiveness at the community level, but neglected to integrate
it either with broader disaster management systems, or development issues, since the
main focus was on effective assistance to the community level in terms of fair aid
distribution.
2.4.1.2 Indonesia’s Disaster Case Studies
In the wake of the tsunami in Aceh province and the earthquake on the western coast of
Sumatera, Indonesia in 2004, many researchers tried to explore the lessons learnt and
to contribute to the future handling of similar disasters. In the early years after the
disaster, there were a number of scientific studies explaining how the phenomenon
occurred and how emergency response, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and recovery
planning was conducted.
Pelupessy et al. (2011) investigated community resilience in Aceh not only in the
context of natural disasters, but also in relation to conflict issues. They conducted
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interviews with survivors and volunteers who were active in the community response
and/or NGO program. They used the interviews to construct a complete picture of the
community response. The lack of knowledge of the tsunami threat was found to be one
of the factors that led to the high death toll, because people ran and ran, but only a few
knew to climb to higher ground. However, this was because there were no evacuation
routes and standard protocols to respond to disasters such as this at the time.
Understanding of the social capital of trust, how to help other, self-reliance and well-
connected religion-based community were the main contributions of this study, which
used a qualitative approach drawn from psychology, development studies, peace
studies and social approaches. In this study, the negative impact of people’s relations
was also revealed, and it was shown that aid distribution is distorted by the greed and
laziness of some people within communities.
To sum up, they showed that the assumption that victims are helpless and rely heavily
on the help of outsiders was not entirely acceptable. In fact, they concluded that
cultural and social capital to some extent had contributed to community resilience,
especially in the context of crisis: ‘those who were active rather than waiting for
assistance recovered from disaster better’ (Pelupessy et al., 2011, p. 38).
Another study of the Aceh tsunami was conducted by Régnier et al. (2008). They
investigated livelihood recovery, with a focus on economic rehabilitation through micro
entrepreneurship activities. The activities were conducted in 2005-2007 and were
expected to generate employment and income. The research was an evaluative-
comparative study between Aceh in Indonesia and Tamil Nadu in India, and was based
on the experience of European NGO projects in those two locations. It was found that
conducting livelihood recovery is not an easy task, owing to chaos, uncertainty and low
levels of trust. They argued that economic activities will succeed when conducted
alongside the agencies that existed before the disaster. Another major finding was that
there is a need to cooperate among the development agencies and NGOs to ensure not
only a division of labour but also the sustainability of the activities themselves. In
addition to this, it was also shown that compared to large scale reconstruction,
microeconomic rehabilitation projects were limited in terms of aid and scope.
A similar study regarding livelihood was also undertaken by Thorburn (2009). The aim
of this study was to investigate the effectiveness of international aid and support in
Aceh’s villages in terms of livelihood recovery. The indicators of recovery were
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‘productive activities’ and ‘return to normal life’ and data focused on the early period of
recovery and came from questionnaires (533 households), interviews (298
transcripts), focus group discussions (54 transcripts), histories (52 families), 35 case
studies and 18 village profiles. From the study, it was found that basic needs were
being met in all the villages. Households’ income had dropped, but after two and half
years income had recovered to pre-disaster level.
A ten-year comparative study of social protection was also conducted through a case
study of Indonesia and Thailand after the 2004 tsunami (Balgos and Dizon, 2015). The
focus of the study was to investigate how people in those two areas rebuilt their lives
and how they survived by examining the social protection programs and focussing on
the livelihoods of affected communities. Balgos and Dizon (2015) argued that social
protection is not only a means to aid survivors, but also reduces poverty, improves the
lives of survivors and facilitates communities’ adaptation and mitigation to future
disaster risks.
Another disaster study compared the Aceh case to the situation in Yogyakarta. The
following quote provide an illustration of how the disaster management was
conducted:
I like how they handle the disaster in Jogja. The sultan forbids the NGO to come there. The Sultan
asked people to work together to rebuilt what is broken. So, the mutual assistance is still there.
Dian, NGO, as cited in Pelupessy et al. (2011)
In the case of Yogyakarta, the livelihood recovery investigation focused on a 2006
earth-quake. Resosudarmo et al. (2012) investigated the determinants of livelihood
recovery in relation to the role of aid in the recovery process. The research was
conducted using a survey of 500 small and micro enterprises in Bantul District and was
undertaken 6 and 12 months after the earthquake. According to Resosudarmo et al.
(2012), there were significant findings: smaller enterprises are more resilient and
show a quick recovery process; the infrastructure condition is crucial; the speed of aid
distribution is essential; it is important that industrial cluster system support is
available. Other important findings were the fact that ‘affected firms are usually able to
compete effectively with firms not affected by disaster’ (Resosudarmo et al., 2012, p.
255), as long as they used aid for the right targets. The aims of this study were related
to aid, with the focus mainly on outputs instead of the underlying processes. In
addition, another study in Yogyakarta was undertaken by Kusumasari and Alam
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(2012a). However, the focus here was more on the role of local government capability
in managing pre, during and post-natural disaster in Indonesia, and the Bantul local
government was used as a case study.
2.4.2 The Gaps in Knowledge
The East Asia tsunami in December 2004 attracted the attention of the world to the
potential threat of disaster to human lives and civilization. Many researchers have
discussed various aspects of disaster, whether the discourse of physical reconstruction
or social intervention, deriving underpinning theories or formulating practical
implementation strategies. As an interdisciplinary research area, the study of disaster
can be approached from many different perspectives. It can also be studied using in-
depth case study, in the form of descriptive or prescriptive research.
The trend in previous studies has shifted from a physical approach to a social one. The
latter approach has created a new paradigm and affected the overall disaster cycle
system. Alexander (as cited in O'Brien et al., 2010) noted that despite the existence of
six approaches to disaster (geographical, anthropological, sociological, developmental,
medical and technical), only geographical and sociological approaches play a pivotal
role in enriching existing knowledge of disaster. Although both disciplines share a
common knowledge, geographical approaches focus on human and environmental
factors, whereas sociological ones view disaster in terms of social disruption.
Humans should no longer be assumed to be objects or powerless victims. O'Brien et al.
(2010) argued that a focus on humans is an essential entry point, as it might lead to a
process of social learning. Humans in the collective can build a better preparedness
system and community resilience, which result from a process of social learning. Since
a collective of humans can also be understood as a community, community has become
an essential issue in both sociological and geographical approaches.
Over the last decades, community-based approaches to disaster study have been widely
applied and developed, especially when focusing on preparedness and mitigation,
followed by study of recovery. Scrutinizing all the stages of the disaster management
cycle, Sementelli (2007, p. 498) has pointed out that ‘much of the disaster literature
tends to focus heavily on the tasks of response, planning and preparation’.
Unfortunately, there is not much research that focuses on the recovery phase (Kapucu,
2014). Moreover, as Olshansky (2005) highlighted recovery is the least explored topic,
and systematic comparative studies of recovery remains fewer. Berke et al. (1993) that
58
this means that recovery is the most poorly understood of all the different phases in
disaster management. Based on the recent report ‘A Global Outlook on Disaster Science’
(Elsevier, 2017, p. 17), which contains analysis of recent scholarly output (i.e. 27,273
Scopus indexed papers), it was revealed that the recovery phase is the least explored
topic in disaster studies (3,671 articles, or approximately 13.5 percent).
In the recovery phase, the level of community engagement also varied. However, due to
the uncertainty characterising the post-disaster situation, wherein most of the
government has less flexibility, the more people engaged in the community, the higher
the probability of a successful recovery (Olshansky, 2005). Furthermore, Olshansky
(2005)explained that community participation will contribute to successful recovery,
such as helping to build multi-channel communication and to gain the community’s
support.
However, on this topic, Johnston et al. (2012) called for further research, arguing that
there should be an investigation of the benefits of community meetings and whether or
not community engagement contributes to effective recovery. In addition, according to
Sementelli (2007), disaster study through the lens of economics is relatively rare. Many
writers have focused on this process, but mostly avoid measuring the ultimate goal of
the recovery, one of which is to revive livelihoods and the local economy (Olshansky,
2005; Olshansky et al., 2012). As Semitiel García (2006, p. 2) pointed out:
Traditional economic research generally considers nations instead of regions, average agents
instead of differentiated actors, and their attributes instead of relationships. Moreover, usually only
economic aspects are taken into account while the social, geographical and historical character of
economic system and process are ignored.
In addition to this, according to Semitiel García (2006, p. 2), ‘the territory and specific
locality’ are noted as essential economic factors in development. The specific locality
involves cultural and institutional conditions, and is expected to contribute to regional
development. Since this factor is hard to reproduce in other regions, research on
livelihood and economic revival after disasters requires the selection of regions instead
of nations as the unit of analysis. As noted by Semitiel García (2006, p. 2), ‘the social
and relational character of economic actors should be considered according to the links
both maintained among them, in a formal and informal sense, and being affected by the
economic history and the location factor of their area’.
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This research is thus interdisciplinary and seeks to approach the aims and research
questions from three different perspectives: 1) disaster governance, especially in the
context of the post-disaster recovery period; 2) development theory, especially from
local economic perspectives; 3) social network theory, complemented by social capital
theory. Figure 2.4 maps these various fields.
The area marked ‘x’ shown below is where the focus of this research lies. In addition,
though, the idea of well-connected communities, from community development theory,
will influence the collection, analysis and interpretation of data and results.
Sustainability and resilience will also be discussed. However, this will be limited to the
context of disaster recovery in Indonesia through a case study of Bantul District,
Yogyakarta Province. To summarize, keywords that encapsulate the scope of the
research are ‘disaster recovery’, ‘local economy’ (i.e. specifically small and medium
enterprises), and ‘social network’.



















































Chapter 3. Overview of Case Study
3.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to provide sufficient background knowledge of the area of the case
study, including an overview of Bantul Regency and the specific disaster that this thesis
seeks to analyse, namely the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake. This chapter also serves as
introductory information before delving into greater detail in the empirical chapters
(Chapter 5, 6, and 7). The reasoning for selecting the area will be explained further in
the next chapter on Methodology (see Chapter 4).
3.2 Description of Case Study Area: Bantul Regency
3.2.1 Location
Geographically, Bantul Regency is located between 07º44'04" and 08º00'27" South
latitude and 110º12'34 " and 110º31'08" East longitude. Bantul Regency is the most
Southern area of the Province of Yogyakarta, with boundaries as follows (see
Figure 3.1).
 North : Yogyakarta City and Sleman Regency
 South : Indian Ocean
 West : Kulonprogo Regency and Sleman Regency
 East : Gunungkidul Regency
According to the official government website (Bantul Regency, 2012a), Bantul Regency
covers 15.9 percent of the Yogyakarta Province and consists of 17 sub-districts (i.e.
kecamatan) and 75 villages, as shown in Table 3.1.
61
Figure 3.1. Administrative Area of Bantul Regency
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Table 3.1. The number of sub-districts and villages in the area of Bantul Regency
No. Sub-district Urban Type Villages Rural Type Villages
Area
Km2 %
1 Srandakan Poncosari (24 Dusun) Trimurti (19 Dusun) 18.32 3.63
2 Sanden Sri Gading (20 Dusun) Gadingsari (18 Dusun)
Gadingharjo (6 Dusun)
Murtigading ( 18 Dusun)
23.16 4.59




Donotirto (13 Dusun) 26.77 5.29
4 Pundong Seloharjo (16 Dusun)
Panjang Rejo (16 Dusun)
Srihardono (17 Dusun) 24.30 4.82





6 Pandak Caturharjo (14 Dusun)
Triharjo (10 Dusun)
Gilangharjo (15 Dusun)
Wijirejo (10 Dusun) 24.30 4.82
7 Pajangan Guwosari (15 Dusun) Triwidadi (22 Dusun)
Sendangsari (18 Dusun)
33.25 6.59





9 Jetis Patalan (20 Dusun)





10 Imogiri Selopamioro (18 Dusun )
Sriharjo (13 Dusun)





Girirejo (5 Dusun )
54.49 10.80





Dlingo (10 Dusun) 55.87 11.07















14 Piyungan Sitimulyo (21 Dusun) Srimulyo (22 Dusun)
Srimartani (17 Dusun)
32.54 6.45







16 Kasihan Tamantirto (10 Dusun)
Ngestiharjo (12 Dusun)
Bangunjiwo (19 Dusun)
Tirtonirmolo (12 Dusun) 32.38 6.42





Bantul Regency 41 Villages 34 Villages 504.47 100.00
Source: Bantul Regency (2012a)
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3.2.2 Population Density and Distribution
Like most other regions, population growth in Bantul Regency is influenced by natural
growth (i.e. birth and death) and migration (i.e. outmigration and inward migration).
There were no significant increases in the population between 2011 and 2012.
However, a substantial increase occurred in the Sub-district of Banguntapan, counting
up to 2,328 people in one year. As a result, the population density in Banguntapan Sub-
district became the highest, measuring up to 4,383 people per km2, and thus
constituting an increase of 83 points from the previous year. In contrast, the population
rates of the Sub-districts Srandakan, Santen, Kretek and Pundong were not showing
any significant changes, and therefore the average population density within these sub-
districts remained the same. The total population and its respective density in the
various sub-districts of Bantul Regency between 2011 and 2012 can be seen in
Table 3.2.
Inevitably, uncontrolled population growth will lead to a population explosion. With
around 930,000 people residing in an area of only 506.85 km2 (update from the BPS of
Bantul Regency, 2014), local governments face various challenges especially in terms of
budget constraints, and the allocation and distribution of resources among different
communities with diverse needs. In addition, local governments need to find local
solutions to address pressing issues, such as waste or garbage disposal, access to clean
water, the impacts of climate change, and the continuous threat posed by disasters. In
future, the uncontrollable population explosion is also likely to impact the vulnerability
and the ecological capacity of Bantul Regency area.

















1 Srandakan 18.32 28,668 1,565 28,755 1,570
2 Sanden 23.16 29,744 1,284 29,814 1,287
3 Kretek 26.77 29,323 1095 29,470 1,101
4 Pundong 23.68 31,779 1,342 31,881 1,346
5 Bambanglipuro 22.70 37,480 1,651 37,617 1,657


















7 Bantul 21.95 59,754 2,722 60,192 2,742
8 Jetis 24.47 52,313 2,138 52,667 2,152
9 Imogiri 54.49 56,536 1,038 56,823 1,043
10 Dlingo 55.87 35,667 638 35,817 641
11 Pleret 22.97 43,731 1,904 44,155 1,922
12 Piyungan 32.54 49,427 1,519 50,137 1,541
13 Banguntapan 28.48 122,510 4,302 124,838 4,383
14 Sewon 27.16 105,701 3,892 106,929 3,937
15 Kasihan 32.38 112,708 3,481 114,412 3,533
16 Pajangan 33.25 33,216 999 33,549 1,009
17 Sedayu 34.36 44,798 1,304 45,116 1,313
Bantul Regency 506.85 921,263 1,818 930,276 1,835
Source: BPS of Bantul Regency (2014)
3.2.3 Livelihood and Local Economy
In 2012, the structure of the economy in Bantul Regency was dominated by four
sectors, namely agriculture (25.56 percent), industry and manufacturing (18.9
percent), trade, hotels and restaurants (21.16 percent), as well as the service sector
(16.89 percent). The agricultural contribution in the local economy of Bantul Regency
comes from food crops varieties. Furthermore, the dynamics of development in Bantul
Regency have given rise to structural transformations in the economy, which has seen a
shift from reliance on the primary sector to the secondary and then to the tertiary
sector. The contribution of the primary sector is made by agriculture, mining and
extraction, all of which continue to decline year by year. This is due to the increasing
conversion of the agricultural land, and at the same time the strengthening of the small
and medium industry sector (MSMEs). The added value and investment from MSMEs
annually is around 500 billion rupiah (Bantul Regency, 2013).
Table 3.3 illustrates the population of Bantul Regency according to livelihood sectors.
The population figures represent the total persons aged 10 years and over who are in
employment.
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Table 3.3. Population of Bantul Regency according to Livelihood Sectors in 2011
No. Livelihood Sectors % Total Population
1 Agriculture 25.56 235,475
2 Mining and Extraction 1.98 18,241
3 Manufacturing and Industry 18.95 174,579
4 Electricity, Gas and Water 0.07 645
5 Construction 8.88 81,808
6 Trading 21.16 194,939
7 Communication and Transportation 4.64 42,747
8 Finance 1.61 14,832
9 Services 16.89 155,601
10 Others 0.26 2,395
Bantul Regency 100 921,263
Source: Bantul Regency (2012b)
With the handicraft industry evenly distributed across almost all the areas of Bantul, its
impacts, such as job opportunities and income generation, are widely felt in the Bantul
people’s lives. In 2005, the productivity of MSMEs reached a value of 439.59 billion
rupiah (BPS Bantul Regency, 2011). A village’s craftsmen usually hand down their
expertise and knowledge from generation to generation. Importantly, the villagers’
craft production centres shape not only the industrial and trade sectors, but also the
tourism sector.
As regards the employment rate in the small industry sector, for example before
disaster struck in 2005, the Kasihan sub-district recorded over 1,500 villagers
(becoming 2,367 in 2009) working in centres that crafted furniture and bamboo
handicrafts. This noticeable highest employment rate within the small industry sector
is contributed from the cluster of furniture crafts in the village of Tirtomolo and
bamboo handicrafts in Bangunjiwo village. In addition to furniture and bamboo
products, Kasihan was also famous as a cluster of ceramics and pottery, which later on
also serves as a tourist destination in Bantul. Table 3.4 below shows the profiles of
some of the handicraft clusters in Bantul.
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1 Pottery in Kasongan –
Bangunjiwo, Sub-district of
Kasihan
441 2,367 1,400,000 8,053,890,000
2 Leather-based Handicraft in
Manding – Sabdodadi, Sub-
district of Bantul
55 265 55,250 7,855,550,000
3 Furniture in Bawuran, Sub-
district of Pleret, Srimartani-
Srimulyo, Sub-district of
Piyungan, Panggungharjo, Sub-
district of Sewon, and
Sumbermulyo, Sub-district of
Bambanglipuro
147 767 6,475 6,267,300,000
4 Wood craft in Krebet –
Sendangsari, Sub-district of
Pajangan
35 220 29,000 435,000,000
Source: Bantul Regency (2009b)
3.2.4 Topography
Topographically, most of the area in Bantul Regency is terrain (a slope of below 2
percent), covering 61.99 percent of the total area. Meanwhile, the steep area (a slope of
between 25 and 40 percent) and very steep area (a slope of more than 40 percent)
cover the remaining 8.41 percent and 7.91 percent of Bantul’s total area, respectively.
The distribution of the terrain area starts from the middle of the South coast, and then
extends to the North including the Sub-districts of Sanden, Kretek, Srandakan,
Pundong, Pandak, Bantul, Jetis, Sewon, Kasihan, and Banguntapan, as well as parts of
the Sub-districts of Imogiri, Pleret, Piyungan and Sedayu. The steep and very steep
slope areas are located in the Eastern parts of Bantul Regency, specifically in the Sub-
districts of Kretek, Pundong, Pleret, Piyungan, Dlingo, and most of the Imogiri Sub-
district. Table 3.5 illustrates the distribution of the slope grade in the Bantul area,
based on data obtained by the Land Agency, which can be accessed on the official
website of Bantul Regency.
Based on the classification of slope, the physiographical elements of Bantul Regency
can be grouped as follows:
 The Western part is made up of sloping and undulating areas. The soil fertility of
these areas is suitable for cultivating wetland food crops;
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 The regency’s middle section is typically marked by plain and sloping areas, which
stretch from the South to the North. The high soil fertility of these areas is ideal for
the cultivation of wetland food crops.
 The Eastern part is characterised by hilly areas that extend from the South to the
North. These areas have low soil fertility, with the implication that only some types
of plants are able to survive, and has only limited uses for food crops from rain-fed
agriculture.
 The Southern part is made up of coastal areas, and is actually a part of the middle
section regency. Here, there are a lot of sandy areas, particularly on the South coast
of the sub-districts of Srandakan, Sanden and Kretek. With intensive irrigation,
these areas can be cultivated with agricultural crops (i.e. palawija) and perennial
crops.
Table 3.5. Area of Bantul Regency according to the Class of Slope
No. Class of Slope (%)
Area
Km2 %
1 0-2 314.21 61.99
2 2-8 58.98 11.64
3 8-15 28.00 5.52
3 15-25 22.93 4.52
4 25-40 42.64 8.41
5 > 40 40.09 791
Bantul Regency 506.85 100.00
Source: Bantul Regency (2009a)
3.2.5 Climatology and Hydrology
In general, Bantul Regency has a low level of rainfall10, and experiences about five to six
months of wet weather and two to four months of dry conditions. A wet weather period
is defined as months with rainfall of at least 200 mm, while a dry period involves
months with rainfall of less than 100 mm. In order to cultivate crops, such as palawija,
rainfall of at least 100 mm is required. During dry spells without any rainfall (of
maximum two months), the moisture of the soil is still considered adequate.
In the regency of Bantul, there are three main watersheds: the Progo watershed, Opak
watershed, and Oya watershed. These watersheds have permanent streams, which flow
throughout the year. Nevertheless, during the dry season, some smaller rivers
discharge a relatively small water flow. These rivers are perennial streams with thick
10 Climate in Bantul around Bantul Regency from year of 1998 to 2008. Regency is recorded according to
Oldeman’s Method (i.e. agro-climatic classification) from observation stations.
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aquifers, with the base flow relatively high and effluent. The Opak River tips at Mount
Merapi, then flows towards the South through Sleman Regency, the City of Yogyakarta,
and Bantul Regency, and then further towards the Indian Ocean. The Opak watershed
has an estimated area of 1,350 km2 and an approximate length of 70 km. One of the
main tributaries of the River Opak is the Oya River, which has an area of around 750
km2 and a length of 112 km.
According to research published by the Faculty of Engineering at the University of
Gadjah Mada, the geological profiles of drilled wells in the Regency of Bantul are
generally located at the formation of free aquifers and half-depressed aquifers. The
thickness of the aquifer formation in the urban areas of Bantul Regency surpasses 100
metres. Bantul Regency is part of the Merapi Aquifer System (SAM), comprising a multi-
layered aquifer with relatively similar hydraulic characteristics, which are related to
one another. Around the Bantul city area, the thickness of SAM is documented to
measure around 125 meters.
Underground water within the Bantul area flows from North to South with a graded
slope, as the hydraulics gets smaller. The morphology of this underground water
resembles a cone, spreading radially. Indeed, this is the common characteristic of
underground water within volcanic areas since the recharge area is derived from the
slopes of Mount Merapi. Bantul Regency has experienced a decrease in the topographic
gradient, which is accompanied by a decline in the hydraulic gradient and the value of
the aquifer's characteristics. As a result, the groundwater flow velocity has decreased.
3.2.6 Disaster Hazards History
Bantul Regency is marked by a high disaster risk zone, given its numerous areas prone
to flooding, landslides, earthquakes, tsunamis, and droughts. The earthquake that
occurred on 27 May 2006 devastated most of the sub-districts in Bantul Regency. The
tsunami following the earthquake of 2006 occurred in the Southern coastal region of
Bantul Regency, which includes the Sub-districts of Kretek, Sanden, and Srandakan. In
addition, incidences of drought affect Bantul Regency almost every year, particularly in
the Sub-districts of Dlingo, Piyungan, Displays, Pleret, Imogiri, and Pundong. Table 3.6
below shows the disaster-prone locations in Bantul Regency according to their
disaster-risk potential.
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Table 3.6. Disaster-prone areas in Bantul Regency
No Disaster Risk Potency Disaster prone locations
1 Earthquake All sub-districts
2 Landslides Sub-districts of Imogiri, Dlingo, Pleret, Piyungan and Pundong.
3 Flooding Sub-districts of Kretek, Srandakan, Sanden, Pandak, Jetis,
Pundong, and Pleret.
4 Tidal-wave and/or Tsunami Sub-districts of Kretek, Srandakan, Sanden, and parts of Sub-
districts of Pandak, Pundong, Imogiri, Jetis, and
Bambanglipuro.
5 Drought Sub-district of Dlingo, and parts of Sub-districts of Piyungan,
Pajangan, Pleret, Imogiri, Pundong, Sedayu, Kasihan, and
Kretek.
Source: Bappeda of Bantul Regency, 2013
Bantul Regency is classified as a disaster-prone area, and as high risk in terms of
earthquake potential. The occurrence of an earthquake on 27 May 2006 has
highlighted the magnitude of this risk. This major earthquake had a disastrous impact,
resulting in more than 5,700 deaths, 37,000 people being injured, and more than
200,000 displaced and made homeless. In addition, there was considerable damage to
the existing facilities, affecting the housing, social system, infrastructure and other
productive sectors. The total loss and damage suffered as a result of this disaster in
both the Yogyakarta and Central Java Provinces is estimated to have reached 29.1
trillion rupiah (the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake will be explained further in Section 3).
Besides earthquakes, Bantul Regency is also vulnerable to tsunamis. On 17 July 2006,
the Pangandaran tsunami occurred. The Indonesian Agency for Meteorology,
Climatology and Geophysics (BMKG) announced that an earthquake on the ocean floor,
reaching a magnitude of 7.1 SR, triggered the tsunami, which was located 293 km
Southwest of Cilacap. The height of the tsunami wave was observed in the Southern
coastal area of Bantul Regency, reaching 1-3.4 meters. Although fortunately the natural
phenomenon failed to impact on lives and properties in the Bantul area, it nevertheless
affirmed that the Southern coastal area of Bantul Regency faces a multi-hazard threat
from earthquakes and tsunamis. Based on the records of the Disaster Management
Agency of Bantul Regency (BPBD of Bantul Regency), in addition to earthquake and




In Bantul Regency, flooding occurs not only due to high rainfall, but also as a result
of accumulated water that flows from the Northern City of Yogyakarta and the
Northern part of Bantul Regency, where the sub-districts of Kasihan, Sewon, and
Banguntapan are located. In May 2011, for example, heavy rainfall resulted in the
overflowing of the Code River. Consequently, several houses in Dusun Sorogenen
and Timbulharjo were submerged. Subsequently, in January 2012, following the
Winongo River’s flooding, BPBD of Bantul Regency recorded around 70 residents
that were displaced, 15 of whom had to be evacuated by rescue teams. Refugees
were scattered in several locations, such as Dusun Jogonalan Kidul, Dusun
Jogonalan Lor, Dusun Glondong Dua, and most of them lived near riverbanks. The
flooding also ravaged Dusun Pandeyan, Bangunharjo, and Sewon. The total damage
and losses in Bantul reached 29 billion rupiah. In 2013, floods that followed heavy
rainfall submerged more than 200 Ha of agricultural land in Bantul Regency. The
flooded agricultural land was located in the Sub-districts of Pundong,
Bambanglipuro, Pandak, Kretek, and Sanden. Similar to the flooding in 2011, this
flooding occurred as a result of heavy rainfall and the accumulation of stagnant
water due to poor drainage.
2. Cyclone
In 2011, a cyclone struck the sub-district of Piyungan and resulted in 54 houses
being damaged. Most of the damage occurred in Dusun Sitimulyo, causing some
wreckage to 35 houses. The total damage caused by this cyclone was documented
to be around 28 million rupiah. In addition, in 2013, dozens of trees felled by the
hurricane caused various degrees of destruction to the Sub-district of Jetis. The
fallen trees hit several houses, which fortunately only resulted in one person being
injured. Apart from the Sub-district Jetis, the Sub-districts of Imogiri and Sewon
also had to deal with the damages caused by fallen trees.
3. Tidal Wave
In 2011, a tidal wave hit the beach of Kuwaru in the sub-district of Srandakan. This
tidal wave damaged plants, dozens of buildings, and even the asphalt road along
the shore of Kuwaru. It occurred as a result of natural factors that are typical for
this region. In addition, in 2013, a tidal wave and abrasion caused damage to
Samas Beach in the sub-district of Sanden, and resulted in all families living within
200 meters from the edge of the sea being evacuated. The incident destroyed six
houses, 12 of which had been abandoned due to the evacuation efforts.
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4. Drought
In 2011, droughts plagued 95 Ha of wetland in the Sub-districts Sedayu and
Piyungan, resulting in crop failures. The long period of drought caused the
irrigation water supply to diminish. Moreover, in 2012, the impacts of the drought
were also felt in several other areas within the regency, including the sub-districts
of Dlingo, Imogiri, Pleret, Kretek and Pajangan.
5. Landslides
In 2012, heavy rainfalls caused severe landslides in Dusun Mojosari, a Sub-district
in Piyungan. It resulted in one house being damaged and several other houses
being left at risk of further landslides. In 2013, another landslide occurred in
Dusun Sriharjo, in the Sub-district of Imogiri, destroying two houses and displacing
11 families. Most landslides in the regency area were preceded by heavy rainfall.
In connection with the explanation above, the Government of Indonesia through BNPB
has prepared a multi-hazard risk index in all regions in Indonesia, and especially for the
Bantul area as shown in Figure 3.2. Multi Hazard Risk Index.
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Figure 3.2. Multi Hazard Risk Index
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3.1 An Overview of Disaster Case: The 2006 Yogyakarta Earthquake
According to the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) in Bantul Regency, a
number of earthquakes were recorded, but those occurring in 1867, 1943 and 2006
caused the most devastating impacts. On 27 May 2006 at 5.54 a.m. local time, a
medium-sized earthquake hit the Yogyakarta and Central Java Province. At the first
shake, the earthquake measured 6.2 on the Richter scale, while other sources claimed it
was 5.9 (Bantul Regency, 2008).
After a series of shakings, each of which lasted about 57-60 seconds, the greatest
intensity was recorded at 5.2 (Elnashai et al., 2006). The epicentre was estimated to be
about 30-35 km South of Bantul Regency in Yogyakarta Province. According to the
Indonesian Agency for Meteorology, Climatology and Geophysics (BMKG), this was
located at 8.03 Southern latitude and 110.32 Eastern longitudes. The site experiencing
the most intense shaking was estimated to reach a radius of about 200 km2.
According to the National Development Planning Agency’s (BAPPENAS) early rapid
assessment, more than 5,700 people were killed, while the numbers of those injured
exceeded 37,000. The areas worst affected included Bantul Regency, Yogyakarta
Province (4,121 people killed) and Klaten Regency, Central Java Province (1,057 people
killed). About 200,000 people were displaced, and the majority were classified as
homeless following the severe damage caused to many houses. It was noted that about
150,000 houses were completely destroyed, and 202,032 partly damaged, while
numerous essential public facilities were severely damaged. A large number of
hospitals and schools were wrecked, and the people also experienced hardship getting
clean water. Additionally, several towers (i.e. for power distribution), roads and bridges
urgently needed to be restored. Moreover, airport runways suffered cracks, and
terminal buildings partially collapsed. Fortunately, historical sites, such as Prambanan
Temple, suffered only minor damages, whereas Borobudur was reported to be intact.
To get an illustration of the damage caused by this earthquake, the details can be seen
in the Figure 3.3.
In terms of the economic impact, the agriculture sector, trade and tourism suffered
greatly, considering that Yogyakarta is a heavily populated, urbanized area with many
cultural and historical sites. As a result, at least 70,000 people permanently lost their
sources of income. Initial assessments revealed that the private sector suffered huge
asset losses of 90 percent, such as houses, buildings, vehicles and equipment, while the
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public sector lost only 10 percent. Total economic losses were estimated to
approximately come to a staggering $3 billion11, not to mention the potential reduction
of projected growth of the local economy from 5 percent to 1.3 percent in 2006
(Elnashai et al., 2006).
Figure 3.3. Damage to Housings and other Infrastructures
A. Housings B. Residential Area
C. Roads D. Agricultural Irrigation
E. Governmental Buildings F. Tourist Site
Source: Goverment of Indonesia (2006) and Elnashai et al. (2006)
The emergency response was supported by two battalions of the Indonesian military,
teams of medical staff and paramedics, and Hercules transport planes for logistics,
ensuring field hospital equipment, food, tents, and bedding, as well as water supply.
11 Numbers stated are cited from BAPPENAS report in cooperation with international partners, including
the World Bank and Asian Development Bank.
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The former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono arrived in Yogyakarta after the
disaster on 27 May and set up an office to personally monitor the emergency relief
efforts of the National Disaster Management Agency (at that time still named
BAKORNAS). In addition to this, BAPPENAS coordinated the Damage and Loss
Assessment (DaLA).
In order to rehabilitate the housing and promote the recovery of livelihoods, the
Government of Indonesia (GoI) handed out 30 million rupiah to those whose houses
were severely damaged, 10 million to those whose houses had suffered light structural
damage, and 250 thousand rupiah per month to the affected families for the duration of
one year. Moreover, the government provided additional impetuses by stimulating the
(1) rehabilitation of houses through block grants; (2) rehabilitation of public facilities;
and (3) revival of economic activity.
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Chapter 4. Methodology: A Case Study, Methods and
Framework
4.1 Introduction
In principle, a methodology maps the interconnection between research questions
which is identified by the gaps in knowledge, and the research design along with its
selected methods which are underpinned by relevant theories and assumptions (Hesse-
Biber, 2010). The research seeks to explore the following overarching questions: ‘to
what extent can disaster recovery be enhanced through collaborative governance
and social networks to significantly influence the revival of a local economy?’.
Accordingly, this chapter explains the case study rationale, the methods used and the
link between the intellectual framework developed in the previous chapter and the
empirical work.
This chapter is structured in three steps: the research design, methods and framework.
First, the chapter presents the rationale for selecting cases. Second, the chapter argues
for adopting a mixed-methods approach, and considers sampling methods, data
collection techniques, and tools of analysis. Lastly, the discussion turns to the research
process, and subsequently followed by reflecting on the field workflow and outlining
the adjustments and limitations of the study.
4.2 Research Design: Case Study Research
A case study approach is widely used in many disciplines, in particular studies in
business and management, law, medicine or psychology, political science,
anthropology, education and sociology. Harvard University uses this approach in many
learning activities as well as in the research processes (Flyvbjerg, 2006) and also made
it popular again in the 1980s after many researchers neglected it due to the rapid
development of the quantitative approach (Tight, 2010). Despite the increasing
popularity of case study research, the literature offers a non-rigid definition of ‘case
study research’. Some authors treat it as an approach (Punch, 2014), while others
construct it as a strategy (Verschuren, 2003), design (Hakim, 2000), method, or simply
as ‘a convenient label’ for one’s research (Tight, 2010).
A research design is defined as ‘the point where questions raised in theoretical or
policy debates are converted into research projects or programs that provide answers
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to these questions’ (Hakim, 2000, p. xi). A ‘case’ can be defined as ‘a phenomenon of
some sort occurring in a bounded context’ (Punch, 2014, p.144). Furthermore, a case
could take the form of an individual, community, social group, organization and
institution, or nation, as well as event, process, role, relationship, and policy (Hakim,
2000; Punch, 2014). Gerring (2007, p. 19) argues that a ‘case connotes a spatially
delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period
of time. It comprises the type of phenomenon that an inference attempts to explain’. In
spite of the broad and diverse ways in which the literature defines a ‘case’ , it can be
concluded that the main characteristics of a case study approach include (at the very
least) a temporal and/or spatial dimension, and/or defined boundaries, and/or
interconnectedness of phenomena (Tight, 2010; Verschuren, 2003).
In summary, there are five requirements for case study research: issue choice,
triangulation, experiential knowledge, contexts and activities (Verschuren, 2003; Tight,
2010; Yin, 2014). Within the context of this thesis, the ‘issue choice’ refers to the focus
of local economic recovery, while ‘triangulation’ is achieved by the use of a mixed-
methods approach. The practices of collaborative disaster recovery governance in
Indonesia generally, and in the chosen research sites of this study specifically, give rise
to ‘experiential knowledge’. The disaster governance policies and any other supporting
regulations in Indonesia set out the ‘context’, and lastly, the actions involving recovery
processes constitute the ‘activities’.
The thesis opts for a case study design in order to provide a richly detailed account of
the problems of disaster recovery governance with focus area on local economic
recovery. Social network analysis is employed to examine and illuminate the specific
cases, and the resulting findings are validated by juxtaposing them with other insights
generated from the other methods analysis. (For the mixed methods, see Section 3.)
In selecting a particular case for study, this research refers to Bradshaw and Stratford
(2000, p. 41), who highlight the importance of simple criteria, such as ‘practical’ and
‘appropriate’. With regard to the practicalities, they emphasize that a researcher must
have access and permission to do research on the selected case(s). Meanwhile,
regarding the second criteria, Gerring (2007, p. 89) elaborates that ‘appropriateness’
might refer to: (1) the typicality of a case (i.e. typical characteristics) with the aim to
provide useful insight into other contexts; (2) the extreme case (i.e. highly unusual
case) which seeks to understand a very distinctive issue; and (3) the ‘maximum
variation’ case (i.e. diverse variation) which illuminates the breadth and variation of
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the phenomena under investigation (for the complete list and explanation of different
techniques used to select case(s), see
Appendix C). Considering the overarching research question set out at the beginning of
the chapter, this thesis refers to all three views of ‘appropriateness’, including
‘maximum variation’, ‘typical’ and ‘extreme’ in order to select the case for study
accordingly. As a result, ‘maximum variation’ is examined by taking a comparative
study of a few Indonesian disaster recovery cases in Chapter 5, while the ‘typical’ and
‘extreme’ cases are exemplified by the events of the Yogyakarta earthquake and Bantul
Regency in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively.
In addition, the criteria that inform the selection of the case(s) for study also determine
whether it is a descriptive study or an evaluative study, which rigorously tests a well-
defined thesis. The descriptive case study is best suited to present occurrences of good
and/or bad practice, while an evaluative case study seeks to arrive at suggestions for
improving on a policy and/or theory, which underpin the policy itself (Hakim, 2000).
Ultimately, the purpose of the case study research is to gain more in-depth
understanding and to provide new insights into a complex phenomenon (Tight, 2010;
Punch, 2014; Yin, 2014), as well as to refine the existing knowledge (Hakim, 2000). In
line with this, the research project adopts a case study design, both for descriptive and
evaluative purposes, with the aim of developing a conceptual recovery model and
governance framework.
Since the proposed model/platform aims to accelerate the recovery process of people’s
livelihoods and the local economy of the impacted area as well as integrate them into a
more sustainable development, therefore according to Stallings (2002), it is necessary
to investigate the structure, relationship and process of disaster recovery, as well as to
uncover unexpected issues that occur during the process. Furthermore, Stallings
(2002) argues that disaster study is a unique research inquiry, given that a disaster
constitutes a complex phenomenon within certain circumstances, which may consist of
attributes, pattern, structures or process (Verschuren, 2003) of selected groups.
Stallings (2002) also argues that a disaster study is by default a case study because of
its unique and context-dependent problems, which arise from social, cultural, and
political as well as physical contexts (explained in Yin, 2014). By studying specific
cases, the thesis aims to gain insight into the actual recovery processes within a given
network; hence, Bantul Regency and the Yogyakarta earthquake are selected as
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appropriate case studies. That notwithstanding, there are additional reasons for
selecting the above-mentioned cases, which are further detailed below.
First, among the other regencies in the Province of Yogyakarta, Bantul Regency is
categorized as a high-risk zone (refer to Figure 3.2. Multi Hazard Risk Index). In 2013,
the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB, 2013, p. 91) placed Bantul Regency
in second place (score 187) among the high risk zones, just after Kulon Progo Regency
(score 203). Second, most of the area of Bantul Regency is classified as a multi-hazard
and high-risk area in terms of the index of affected communities and the calculation of
compound disaster risk index12 (see Figure 4.1 below).
12 The parameters used by government in the calculation of the disaster risk index in 2013 (i.e. IRBI 2013)
are as follows: 1) Hazard index; 2) Index of affected people; 3) Potential Loss index; 4) Environmental loss
index; and 5) Government capacity index (BNPB, 2013,p. 94-95)
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Figure 4.1. Risk Map Earthquake of Bantul Regency
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Third, the phenomenon of disasters had already occurred over the course of a decade,
so presumably the medium-term recovery outcomes are available for further research.
Fourth, Bantul Regency has achieved considerable growth in the micro, small and
medium enterprises sector (MSMEs) due to its well-known handicraft shopping
clusters and its role as a tourism destination, all of which have notably contributed to
boosting the local economy (see Figure 4.3). Lastly, based on the existing research,
Bantul Regency is seen to have significant social capital and cultural value (i.e. the
Javanese culture), in which interestingly, despite considerable challenges, the
government did not entirely collapse after the Yogyakarta earthquake in 2006, and was
able to transform those social resources to create the conditions for a community-
driven recovery process (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2).
4.3 Methods: the Mixed-Methods Approach
Triangulation, according to Hakim (2000), is one of the elements that makes a case
study a powerful research approach. Effectively, the multiple sources of evidence,
drawn from experiential knowledge, context and activities, allow a case study to
present ‘more rounded and complete accounts of social issues and process’ (Hakim,
2000, p. 61). Triangulation denotes ‘the combination of methodology’ in a research
project. The concept was introduced by Denzin in 1978 (Johnson et al., 2007), and
became a foundation of the development of a mixed-methods design. In this section, the
mixed-methods approach will be explained further.
Besides triangulation, there are other practical elements inherent in the mixed-
methods approach, which have contributed to its popularity. Other elements that form
part of undertaking mixed-methods research include triangulation, complementarity,
development, initiation and expansion (for more detail, see Appendix D).
In the social and human sciences, combining various methods in a single piece of
research had been done long before the terminology of ‘mixed-methods’ was coined, as
evidenced by sociological and anthropological studies published in the early twentieth
century (Johnson et al., 2007). Seemingly, most of these researchers were already
aware of the usefulness of both qualitative and quantitative methods in addressing
certain types of questions. A mixed-methods study is simply defined as the combination
of at least one qualitative and one quantitative method in its (research) process
(Bergman, 2008). To that effect, Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003, p. xx) define mixed-
methods as ‘a type of research design in which qualitative and qualitative approaches
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are used in type of questions, research methods, data collection and analysis
procedures, or in inferences’.
Within the context of this thesis, a mixed-methods approach is adopted in addressing
the thesis’ overarching research question: ‘to what extent can disaster recovery be
enhanced through collaborative governance and social networks to significantly
influence the revival of a local economy?’. The study considers a mixed-methods
approach as most suitable for its inquiry because, first, this research employs a case
study design, which theoretically involves ‘triangulation’ as an essential element, and
triangulation is, in a broad sense, already part of a mixed-method design. Second, the
overarching research question is derived into four sub-questions. Each of these sub
questions is rooted in different issues and/or disciplines; therefore, each of these
should also be addressed by the most appropriate method. In summary, the rationale
behind using mixed-methods in this thesis is to approach different problems with the
most appropriate methods. However, given that all sub-questions are tied to one
overarching research question, the overall interpretation will be the product of
integrating the multiple findings, generated through the qualitative and quantitative
methods.
As a consequence of the above-mentioned justification, the thesis uses a sequential and
layered approach. In this type of mixed-methods approach, a qualitative method is
essential to explore human experiences in certain contexts, especially with regard to
values, perceptions and social interactions (Hesse-Biber, 2010). The purpose is to
increase the validity of results by using the results from one method to help develop or
inform the other method (see Figure 4.2). Furthermore, the sequential and layered
design is chosen to unpack the complexity of the underlying problems in this case
study. The qualitative methods embedded in this approach are aimed at understanding
every respondent as an expert (Hesse-Biber, 2010), and using the results as input to
reformulate new insights and/or policy recommendations.
Figure 4.2 shows the way in which a mixed-methods approach has been employed in
this study. The method consists of a sequential pattern and layered process with a clear
connection between sub-questions. The sequential pattern implies that the previous
results become the input for, or influencer of, the next stages of analysis. Beginning
with a series of preliminary analyses (qualitative analysis, i.e. desk study, stakeholder
analysis, and focus group discussion), the process is then split into two different paths.
The upper path in the diagram explores the context established by regulations and
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policies as well as the interactions between actors in the disaster management cycle
(the upper path leads to sub-question 1), while the lower path examines the disaster
issues and the underlying problems in a recovery process (the lower path leads to sub-
question 2).
A dialogue between these two paths is established through the contribution of the
regulatory and policy-based institutional network, which offers input to identify the
recovery processes and its determinants (sub-questions 1 to 2), and then through the
confirmatory process of findings from social networks at the levels of macro-meso
(sub-question 2) and meso-micro (sub-question 3). The upper track involves
qualitative methods (sub-question 1) and ends up with quantitative methods (sub-
question 3). Meanwhile, the lower track starts with a qualitative method, followed by a
quantitative method, and then concludes with a qualitative analysis of the thematic
analysis to uncover the structure and underlying processes.
In addition, as can be seen in Figure 4.2, the flowchart is divided into four zones: (1)
experts and practitioners; (2) elites and government; (3) local stakeholders; and (4)
researcher. The first and second zones were dedicated to a preliminary analysis and an
intermediary analysis respectively, the third zone to an in-depth analysis and the last
one, the researcher’s synthesis zones, aimed at elaborating and interpreting the
empirical findings.
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Figure 4.2. Flowchart of the ‘Sequential and Layered’ Mixed-Methods Approach
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4.3.1 Sampling Method
4.3.1.1 Sample Location Units
The sample is a set of elements drawn from the population. However, choosing a
method of sampling depends on balancing accuracy against cost and feasibility
(Schofield, 2006, p. 29). In general, sampling techniques can be classified into two
groups: probabilistic sampling and non-probabilistic sampling. Probabilistic sampling
types include simple random, stratified and cluster sampling, while the non-
probabilistic sampling (or purposive sampling) can be divided into extreme case
sampling, typical case sampling, maximum variation sampling, snowball or chain
sampling, quota sampling, criterion sampling, opportunistic sampling, and convenience
sampling (Bradshaw and Stratford, 2000; Schofield, 2006). This research study opted
for purposive sampling by criteria and quota.
In order effectively to address the research question, the study employed purposive
sampling to choose the sample location units (sub-district level) within the Bantul
Regency, using the criteria of ‘high to low level’ of the following indices: 1) disaster risk
index of affected community; 2) compound disaster risk index; and 3) the
extraordinary progress of a cluster of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs,
see Figure 4.3). The latter criterion is gathered based on the comparison with other
handicraft clusters in Bantul Regency in relation to the existing tourism attractions, in
terms of the contribution to the revival of livelihoods and the local economy (this will
be explained further in Chapter 6).
The criteria were given a weight, and the upper lists of sub-districts were chosen. As a
result, the following sub-districts were selected as sample location units: Banguntapan,
Sewon, Bantul, Imogiri and Kasihan. These five sub-districts were then used as the base
locations for distributing the questionnaires to the respondents, interviewing local
leaders, and observing the handicraft clusters.
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Figure 4.3. Earthquake Impact on Industrial Economics
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4.3.1.2 Questionnaire Respondents and Interviewees
In this research, the respondents for the focus groups were the selected ‘experts and
practitioners’, according to certain criteria. The members of the focus groups included
individuals who had engaged, or still engage, in the process of disaster recovery
activities; who have background knowledge that is relevant to a disaster study; or who
represent the community of members in the selected disaster-prone areas. The
purposive sampling was based on certain criteria (criterion sampling) in order to
ensure the generation of insights from a few ‘right’ people. The people who were
selected to participate in the focus group discussions were expected to help surface
issues that are central to this study, as well as to demarcate the scope of the research
project. With regard to sample size, Bradshaw and Stratford (2000, p. 46) contend that
there are no rules as to the sample size, as it depends on the purpose, usefulness,
credibility and the available time and resources.
The study’s interviewees were identified based on the results of the stakeholder
analysis, which were subsequently confirmed through focus group discussions. The
interviewees included key persons at the line ministries, international agencies and
local governments. The purpose of these interviews was to collect as much information
as possible about the background and chronology of the phenomena, policies and
regulations relating to disaster recovery, which form the basis of post-disaster recovery
governance and collaborative network processes. In addition, the interviews also
served as a screening process to identify best practices, which were used in the next
stage of analysis in the form of a comparative study.
The stakeholder analysis not only contributed to identifying the actors’ involvement in
the processes, but also to clarifying their roles, why they behave as they do, and then
what the influence of the context and locus have over the way they behave now
(Bradshaw and Stratford, 2000). The above-mentioned questions were partly meant
for the interview process and could only be addressed systematically when the
stakeholders had been already identified. In short, the choice interviewees was based
on the stakeholder analysis and the criteria relevant to the aim of the research and
research questions, as well as the practical aspects that occurred during the fieldwork.
There are debates among scholars about whom or what stakeholders are exactly.
Freeman (1984, as cited in Reed et al., 2009) distinguishes stakeholders on the basis of
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‘who affects’ or ‘who are affected’. The matrix below shows how the concepts ‘affect’
and ‘affected’ in the stakeholder analysis are represented by ‘interest’ and ‘influence’.
The table depicting the complete stakeholder analysis can be seen in Appendix E.
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(IPB, UGM, KOBE University)
The first rule that applied for choosing respondents to complete the questionnaire was
‘no respondents will be either included or excluded on basis of age, gender, disability,
ethnic origin, religion, or sexual orientation’. All respondents were literate persons, and
thus able to understand the overall aims and objectives of the research study, and to
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assess the impact of the research on their personal lives. Nevertheless, surveyors stood
by to help respondents if they had difficulties understanding the questions. Given that
the topic of this study was not sensitive, there was no risk (i.e. physical, emotional or
financial) for the respondents. However, to avoid any risks that may arise, the default
approach was to anonymise the data when coding it into the database system, unless
the person was willing to be quoted.
4.3.2 Data Collection Methods: Quantitative and Qualitative Data
Quantitative data was collected from official documents published by government
agencies (secondary data, e.g. statistics, business/financial and network data) and
through questionnaires (primary data, e.g. social network and risk perception data). In
order to analyse the evidence relating to the recovery of the local economy in a case
study area, the official statistics were collected. Subsequently, the next step sought to
further explore the findings from these secondary data by analysing the questionnaires,
which were collected through purposive sampling limited by quota, and then
scrutinised and grouped on the basis of the possible themes (i.e. Thematic Analysis).
The purpose of these activities was to identify and investigate the underlying factors or
lessons within the network relevant to the case study’s aims. In Social Network
Analysis, a population of interest is bounded by the location, which was identified in
the previous section. The population included home-based industries, micro, small and
medium business entities, and professional organizations and NGOs within the selected
case study areas.
Meanwhile, qualitative data were collected between June and December 2015 from a
series of focus groups, semi-structured interviews and a structured literature review.
The focus groups were part of the preliminary research stage, while the semi-
structured interviews and the literature review formed an essential part of the next
stage of fact-finding and synthesis. With the mixed-methods approach, the purpose of
one data collection method might vary depending on, and relative to, the position of
another data collection method employed within the same study. To illustrate this
point, Cameron (2000, p. 87) offers different views on combining focus groups
(qualitative method) with questionnaires (quantitative method). When a questionnaire
is administered after the focus groups have been held, then it may serve the purpose of
validating the insights and understandings gained from the focus group discussions.
Conversely, when the questionnaire precedes the focus groups, then it can play the role
of a preliminary survey to surface key issues (a statistical reality) to be discussed and
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unpacked further in the focus group. For this research, the primary data were collected
sequentially, through the following procedures.
Focus Group Discussion (FGD) is defined as the meeting of a few people (between four
and ten people) to discuss a specific issue or topic presented by the researcher
(Cameron, 2000). The key characteristic of this data collection method is the dynamic
interaction between the researcher as a moderator or facilitator and the members of
the group, as well as between members within the group. It is said to be a dynamic
process, as the group discussions may develop in unforeseen ways driven by the
interactive communication among the group members, whereby ‘one comment can
trigger a chain of responses’ (Cameron, 2000, p. 84). Within the context of this study,
three series of focus groups were held. One served the purpose of piloting the
process13, and the other two formed part of the actual research process. Each of the
focus groups was made up of between four and six people. The focus groups were held
in Jakarta, at a venue that was neutral for the participants but offered sufficient
facilities to support the research activities. The time and place had been arranged in
accordance with all the participants’ preferences, and thus was convenient for
everyone. The focus groups took approximately one and a half hours.
Interview is ‘a data gathering method, in which there is a spoken exchange of
information’ (Dunn, 2000, p. 51). This study opted for a semi-structured interview,
which is also known as guided conversation (Dunn, 2000; Hancock and Algozzine,
2011). During the process, the interviewer has a list of prepared questions, although
there are no strict rules with regard to the wording and/or sequence of questions. The
strength of the semi-structured interview approach is that the interviewer is able to
gather data in a systematic and comprehensive manner, and has the flexibility to
manage potential gaps with a natural conversational flow. The semi-structured
interview is placed in the middle of the continuum between ‘interview as informal
conversation’ (unstructured) at one end and ‘interview as fixed responses’ (structured)
at the other (Dunn, 2000). The increased level of flexibility offered by semi-structured
interviews reduces the comparability of responses between respondents. However,
given that comparing and contrasting the interviewees’ responses was not an aim of
this study, such limitation can be disregarded. The interviews were held at locations
13 Piloting means doing small trials of the method, before the real investigation is conducted. This is meant
to assess ‘the adequacy of the research design and of the instrument to be used’. From Wilson, M. and
Sapford, R.J. 2006. Asking Questions. In: Sapsford, R.J. and Jupp, V. eds. Data collection and analysis.
London: SAGE.
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that were convenient to the interviewees, which was either in Jakarta or Yogyakarta.
All interviews were approximately completed in no more than two hours, which also
included the time taken to introduce the study.
Questionnaire was selected as a method because it facilitates the collection of
quantitative data in a structured and comparable manner. Since the purpose of
questionnaires is to collect data using the same type and order of questions without
any intention to uncover ‘motives’, hence administering this method of data collection
is far quicker than any other method, such as interviews. Here too, piloting is essential
in order to check the length of time taken by respondents to complete the
questionnaire, and to ensure whether the questions are unambiguous and easy to
understand. The process took approximately 30-40 minutes. However, the second
attempt or follow-up meeting was processed and carried out via telephone or Skype.
Surveyors to help administer the questionnaires were recruited based on their skills
and performances in conducting surveys and fieldwork over the last two years. All
surveyors underwent one day of training and briefing before going to the field, and
were required to follow a particular protocol during the fieldwork.
Desk Study is a systematic review of government reports, credible agency reports,
books, academic publications, and maps as well as documentary films. The review is
meant to gather information on policies, regulations and practices regarding livelihood
and the local economy recovery in the post-disaster period. Recorded practices were
scrutinized in order to extract the thematic lessons learned from benchmark case(s),
while documents on policy and regulation were analysed using discourse network
analysis and regulatory mapping.
4.3.3 Methods of Analysis
The mixed-methods approach is used to address the overarching research question of
this study, which has been divided into four sub-questions (see Research Framework in
Section 4). ‘As each method reveals its own aspects and parts of social reality’
(Verschuren, 2003, p. 131), each of the sub-questions also needs to be addressed by
employing a specific method. The qualitative methods that the study used for its
analysis included stakeholder analysis, regulatory mapping, comparative analysis and
thematic analysis. Meanwhile, the quantitative methods involved descriptive statistical
analysis and social network analysis. Below are the analytical tools used in this thesis.
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Stakeholder Analysis
According to Reed et al. (2009, p. 1933), a stakeholder analysis can be defined as a
process that (1) defines aspects of social and natural phenomena affected by a decision
or action; (2) identifies individuals, groups and organizations who are affected by or
can affect those parts of the phenomenon (this may include non-human and non-living
entities and future generations); and (3) identifies the priorities these individuals and
groups have for involvement in the decision-making process. Policy analysts view
stakeholder analysis as a tool ‘to understand how information, institutions, decisions,
and power shape policy agendas for interest groups in social networks’ (Ibid.). Some
sociologists maintain that stakeholder analysis is capable of empowering marginal
stakeholders, allowing them to influence decision-making processes. From a political
point of view, stakeholder analysis is used to facilitate the transparent implementation
of decisions or objectives, understand the policy context, and assess the feasibility of
future policy options (Reed et al., 2009, p. 1934). Thus, there is a tendency to focus on
issues around power dynamics and transparency, as well as equity in decision-making
processes.
Regulatory Mapping (RegMAP)
RegMAP is a method to map and assess various regulations and legal documents in
order to gain an in-depth understanding of the impacts and/or potential problems.
RegMAP also helps in defining the responsibilities of institutions and stakeholders, and
precluding duplication of responsibilities.
Discourse Network Analysis (DNA)
DNA is a method to map the network of actors relevant to particular policies or
strategies. It was derived from policy networks and advocacy coalition framework
theories, and was initially aimed at investigating the influence of political actors in the
legislative and policy-making processes (Leifeld, 2013).
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is a systematic way of studying the
configurations of cases. QCA is used when employing case-study research methods, and
constitutes a truly a mixed-methods approach to conducting research. Typically, QCA
analysts interpret data qualitatively, whilst also looking at the causality between the
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variables. QCA is best suited to small- to medium-N case-study projects with between 3
and 250 cases (University of Manchester, 2018).
Social Network Analysis (SNA)
Social network analysis is used widely in social and behavioural sciences as well as in
economics, marketing and industrial engineering. The social network perspective
focuses on relationships among social entities, and maps the patterns and implications
of these relationships. The focus on relationships is an important addition to standard
social and behavioural research, which is primarily concerned with the attributes of
social units (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Social Network Analysis includes matrices
that organize data according to relational ties that bind stakeholders (Reed et al.,
2009). SNA is useful for capturing different kinds of relations, as well as their strengths.
With the record being in a quantitative form, it is claimed that it is easier to summarize
and draw inferences from it. More about social network analysis can be seen in
Appendix F.
Descriptive Statistical Analysis
Descriptive statistics focuses on describing the data presented. In contrast, inferential
statistics enables the researcher to draw conclusions about the wider population from
the sample data, and to examine differences, similarities, and relationships between
different variables. Descriptive statistics include accounts of frequency, percentages,
means and standard deviation (Calder and Sapsford, 2006, p. 211).
Thematic (Content) Analysis
Thematic analysis is a tool that enables the deconstruction of different types of text,
such as text containing factual information, theoretical interpretations, methodologies
and much more, in order to reveal multiple meanings, ideologies, and interpretations
(Forbes, 2000). The process of comparing and contrasting data within certain coded
thematic categories offers an advantage to the researcher when reassigning and/or re-
scrutinising the original text (Boulton and Hammersley, 2006).
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4.4 Research Framework: Research Process and Reflection
4.4.1 Research Process
Prior to conducting field research activities, a series of preparations were conducted,
including drafting questionnaire, briefings for the surveyors administering the
questionnaires, piloting the various materials, and continuously conducting evaluation
and improvement.
The field research was conducted within five selected sub-districts in the Bantul
Regency. The selection process of these five sub-districts is described in Section 2 of
this chapter. The researcher scrutinised official statistics and secondary data
(including, for example, government reports) available on the sub-districts and regency
websites. Thus informed by multiple secondary data sources, the researcher set out to
develop the draft questionnaire. Prior to conducting the fieldwork, all research
surveyors participated in a half-day briefing. Each of them was asked to familiarise
him/herself with the questionnaire, and was also encouraged to raise technical
concerns or any inquiries they had.
Pilot tests were held to assure the quality of the FGD and the questionnaire. The first
pilot test for the FGD was conducted at one of the ministry offices in Jakarta in May
2015. The pilot test sought to examine the type of questions, the duration of time
required for the whole process, and the kind of information that each question
generated. The questionnaire was piloted in Yogyakarta in November 2015. The second
pilot test sought to assure the comprehensibility of the questions, the duration of time
required for respondents to complete the questionnaire, and to troubleshoot any other
issues that arose during the pilot test.
Following the pilot test, the FGD methods, process and instruments were improved
accordingly. Moreover, the researcher recognised the importance of securing a neutral
and comfortable place for the FGD participants. Similarly, after piloting the
questionnaires, the questions were adjusted to ensure the desired information was
elicited. There were also adjustments to the optimum duration of time for the
respondent, respondent validation process, and supporting tools required such as
cameras and recorders. Research surveyors distributed the questionnaires, helped to
communicate the questions, and input the answers on the online platform that had
been provided. The interview guide was not piloted, and the researcher conducted the
interviews by herself without any help from research assistants.
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The fieldwork took place in Indonesia and was conducted in the following two phases:
(1) The first phase involved seven months of fieldwork, starting at the end of May
2015. The first research sites were in Jakarta (the original plan was three months,
but this was extended up to four) and Yogyakarta Province and Bantul Regency (the
original plan was four months, but this was shortened to three). The researcher
stayed in the capital city of Yogyakarta Province, and then travelled to various
locations in Bantul Regency during office hours.
(2) The second phase involved two months of additional fieldwork in Jakarta, starting
early August 2016. During this period, the researcher conducted interviews with
stakeholders from the private sector and NGOs.
The research flowchart in Figure 4.5 depicts the timeline and location of the research,
the outline of the research process, the map and steps of preparation, preliminary
study, fieldwork (macro-meso-micro level respondents), as well as analysis, writing up
and synthesis. Each of the four sub-questions, which aggregate to form the overall
research question, is addressed by one empirical chapter. Accordingly, sub-question
one is discussed in Chapter 5, sub-question two is addressed in Chapter 6, sub-question
three is dealt with in Chapter 7, and sub-question four is considered in Chapter 8.
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Figure 4.5. Research Process Flowchart
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4.4.2 Post-Fieldwork Reflection
During the field-work, some adjustments were made, which are described in the
following sections.
4.4.2.1 Research Adjustments
The researcher’s position in this inquiry differed depending on the phase of the
research. During the focus group discussions, the researcher played the role of
facilitator, holding up cue cards showing various topics, in order to allow the process to
flow naturally. Here, the participants were the experts and practitioners.
During the semi-structured interviews, the researcher took on the role of a journalistic
investigator, who seeks in-depth information on a particular issue, based on the
preliminary data analysis, desk studies and the focus group results. The respondents
involved were government officers, local leaders, academics, practitioners,
international agencies and NGO officers, some of whom were interviewed at their
homes, others at their offices, and the rest during meetings arranged by the researcher.
The questionnaires and follow-up interviews were administered to local stakeholders,
mostly business managers or owners of MSMEs. In this context, the researcher
positioned herself as an outsider and a good listener in order to collect as much as
information as possible. The process was iterative and the researcher kept returning to
the informants for clarification and to reveal the actual process. This iterative process
was important, as the research result relied on a retrospective data (i.e. past
experiences).
4.4.2.2 Research Limitation
There are many debates and much criticism around ‘case study’ practices. Flyvbjerg
(2006) offers a complete summary of the issues, which is endorsed in parts by
Verschuren (2003), Ruddin (2006), and Yin (2014). The key criticisms include:
(1) Context-independent knowledge (general/theoretical) is more valuable than
context-dependent knowledge (concrete/practical) (Flyvbjerg, 2006)
(2) Lack of internal validation. It is argued that it is difficult to avoid a bias toward
verifications (Verschuren, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2006)
(3) For generating hypotheses. It is claimed that the case study is used for generating a
hypothesis rather than testing a hypothesis (Flyvbjerg, 2006)
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(4) Problem of generalizability. Case study research has a minimum level of results
generalizability (i.e. external validity and reliability) as a consequence of only a few
cases being explored (Verschuren, 2003; Yin, 2014; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Ruddin, 2006).
Therefore, it is claimed that it cannot contribute to the development of knowledge
(Flyvbjerg, 2006);
(5) Problem of developing a final proposition or theories (Flyvbjerg, 2006).
Bradshaw and Stratford (2000, p. 38) point out that ‘no single correct approach to
research design can be prescribed’. The arrangement of stages and order, and the ways
in which methods are combined in a case study are very specific; thus, it depends on
the focus of the study and the research aims. In designing a mixed-methods study,
Johnson et al. (2007, p. 127) suggest that a researcher ought to fulfil the two
fundamental principles of the mixed-methods research: (1) complementary strength,
and (2) non-overlapping weaknesses. The ‘complementary strength’ principle means
all data and information gathered should be relevant to the aims of the research. In this
case, Johnson et al. (2007) refer to any or all the list of purposes made by Greene et al.
(1989), i.e. triangulation, expansion, complementarity, development and initiation. The
second principle, ‘non-overlapping weaknesses’, underlines the importance for the
researcher to reduce the potential (design) weaknesses by integrating methods that
have different weaknesses.
Whenever these principles are met, then the dialogue between the qualitative and
quantitative methods would indeed become an invaluable point of strength. Under
these circumstances, the dialogue would foster an in-depth understanding and uncover
novel insights and relevant findings. To dialogue does not mean to converge with the
final results, as the dialogue must be seen as a process to apply interpretation on
‘multiple levels and in multiple realities that inform one another’ (Hesse-Biber, 2010).
In other words, a coherent set of methods and procedures is essential in order to
generate complete findings, including qualitative meanings and numerical data, out of
which the overall results can be constructed. In this thesis, the researcher has applied
the mixed-methods in a comprehensive and appropriate way, to which Figure 4.3 is
testament. The biggest limitation might be the retrospective data provided by
respondents, given that the disaster in question occurred a decade ago.
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Chapter 5. Understanding Disaster Recovery Governance:
Indonesian Regulatory Framework and
Institutional Network
5.1 Introduction
Disasters and their impacts are unexpected, hazardous, and cause complex problems.
Increases in human population, along with the effects of climate change, mean that
disasters are becoming ever more complex, frequent and uncertain. This empirical
chapter proposes that, in order to deal with disasters, there should be a paradigm shift
from government to governance, thus placing more emphasis on inter-organizational
arrangements (Peters, 2013). A focus on the governance regime has been chosen to
enable the anticipation of various problems in the public sector that cannot be handled
solely by one organization (Huxham et al., 2000). Hitherto, terminologies such as
‘coordination’, ‘cooperation’, ‘partnership’, ‘joint-working’, ‘alliance’, ‘collaboration’,
and ‘network’ have all been part of the governance discourse, and are continuously
discussed by many proponents of this regime. Unfortunately, case study investigations
of collaborative governance practices, especially in unexpected and uncertain
situations, such as disasters and their associated recovery phase, remain the least
explored (Kapucu, 2014).
This chapter explores the following research question: 'How is the regulatory and
institutional framework in the recovery phase organized so as to revive the local
economy?'. Accordingly, the chapter seeks to investigate the regulatory framework and
institutional network at a national level and, on that basis, analyse the comparative
policies of Indonesia’s disaster-recovery governance, and their implementation,
between 2005 and 2015. Local and international scholars have undertaken
considerable research into Indonesian disaster governance (Lassa, J., 2011; Djalante, R.
et al., 2011; Djalante, R., 2012; Seng, 2013; Kusumasari, 2014a; Grady et al., 2015), with
the number of publications in this field constantly increasing, especially after the 2004
tsunami disaster. However, most of the literature only focuses on specific locations
and/or occurrences instead of discussing the issue from a macro-policy and/or
governance perspective.
The chapter consists of six sections. Following the introduction, the research approach,
including theories and methods, is laid out within the context of an overview of
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Indonesian disasters from the end of 2004 to 2015. The third to fifth sections present
the study’s analysis and findings based on (1) the regulatory framework of Indonesian
disaster-related regulations from 2005 to 2014; (2) the institutional arrangements
mainly in accordance with the Medium Term Development Plan 2014 to 2019 and Law
24/2007, as well as some of its derivative regulations; and (3) the comparison of
disaster recovery policies and their implementation in Indonesia during the period
from 2005 to 2015. Finally, the sixth section offers concluding remarks.
5.2 Research Approach
The following sub-sections describe the research approach, including underpinning
theories and methods. They also provide an overview of the disasters that occurred in
Indonesia between the end of 2004 and 2015, which serves to map out the background
and contextualise the analysis in the subsequent three sections.
5.2.1 Underpinning Theories
In general, governance can be defined as ‘the attempts of the state, and its allies in the
private sectors, to steer the economy and society’ (Peters, 2013, p. 78). Governance
may involve activities that utilize resources and create more consistent and
coordinated policies (Peters, 2013), and through interaction among actors despite their
conflicting objectives (Duit et al., 2010).
Concepts of collaborative governance are mainly influenced by policy network theory
(Enroth, 2013), institutional theory (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, 2005; Peters, 2013),
organizational theory (Williamson, 1995; Christensen, 2013), the economics of
transaction costs, and rational choice theory (Williamson and Masten, 1999; Dowding,
2013). From an institutional perspective, the new governance approach is based on the
assumption that ‘the conventional institutions of government are no longer capable of
providing effective steering on their own and must be supplemented, or supplanted, by
social actors’ (Peters, 2013, p. 78). In short, collaborative governance emphasizes the
inter-organizational arrangements across institutional boundaries (such as public
agencies, levels of government, and/or public/private/NGOs/CSOs) that are ‘involved
in working relationships with each other in the pursuance of common purpose’
(Huxham et al., 2000, p. 341). Huxham et al. (2000) argue that this new concept of
governance emerged in the face of the challenges of ‘complexity and diversity’.
Meanwhile, Frederickson and Smith point to the fact that ‘governments have become
less hierarchical’ (2003, as cited in Silvia, 2011, p. 66). In addition, there is a tendency
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to form collaborative networks to govern, given that the boundaries of responsibility,
authority and activity across different levels of government have become blurred
(Silvia, 2011).
By definition, a (social) network refers to the ‘ties and networks (that) constrain
resource flow by keeping it within ties and networks’ (Jiang and Carroll, 2009, p. 52). In
this context, resources may exist in the form of information, economic, intellectual or
emotional resources (Moody and Paxton, 2009). The collaborative network
environment can be complicated given the differing objectives each network member
has for the outcome of their combined effort. Therefore, it is essential in collaborative
governance to ensure agreement regarding the network’s target and strategy. Another
critical foundation is to establish a clear playing field in the form of roles, norms,
regulations and legitimacy among the network members (Silvia, 2011).
5.2.2 Methods
This chapter adopts a mixed-methods approach including regulatory mapping
(RegMAP), discourse network analysis (DNA), and comparative analysis based on a
series of focus group discussions (n = 3), interviews (n = 20), and government
documents and regulations (n > 30) as well as official reports. The focus groups and
semi-structured interviews were targeted at policymakers and professionals in the
disaster governance field in order to collect information from relevant stakeholders,
especially from experts, practitioners (local/international NGOs), and government
officers. The official reports came in the form of policies, regulations,
manuals/guidelines and statistics.
RegMAP is a method to map and assess the various regulations and legal documents in
order to gain an in-depth understanding of the impacts and/or potential problems.
RegMAP also helps in defining the responsibilities of institutions and stakeholders, and
in precluding duplication of responsibilities (applied in Section 3). DNA is a method to
map the network of actors in relation to particular policies or strategies (applied in
Section 4). Derived from policy networks and advocacy coalition framework theories,
DNA was initially designed to investigate the influence of political actors in the
legislative and policy-making process (Leifeld, 2013). Thus, both methods aim to assess
the playing field of collaborative processes among stakeholders, and their influence
towards outcomes. In addition to this, qualitative comparative analysis is employed to
facilitate comparisons between some selected cases (applied in Section 5), in order to
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reveal the general underlying structure which generates or allows such a variation. In
this chapter, the comparison is between various disaster recovery policies, and their
respective implementations, used to inform justifications of the choice of case study in
Chapter 6 and 7.
5.2.3 Indonesia Disasters Overview (end of 2004– 2015)
Geographically, Indonesia is a vast archipelago (17.508 islands), located on a Pacific
ring of fire and the fault line of four tectonic plates, between 6°08’ north and 11°15’
south latitudes and between 94°45’ west and 141°05’ east longitudes, and is home to
75 percent of the world‘s active volcanoes (122 volcanoes). Located between the Asian
and Australasian continents, Indonesia is bound by the South China Sea in the North,
the Pacific Ocean in the North and East, and the Indian Ocean in the South and West.
Administratively, Indonesia consists of provinces, and within each province there are
regencies and/or cities. According to data published in 2010, there are 33 provinces
and 497 regencies and cities, covering a total area of approximately 1.9 million km2
(BPS, 2010).
According to the Disaster Risk Reduction Global Review (2007), Indonesia is among the
top ten most at-risk countries in the world, and ranked 12th highest for multiple
hazards (International Organization for Migration, 2011). In terms of the population’s
exposure to earthquakes and tsunamis, a recent statistical study drawing on 100 years
of historical data (EM-DAT/CRED International Data Base, from 1900 to mid-2012), has
calculated that the average lengths of inter-occurrence periods for earthquakes and
tsunamis in Indonesia are 1677.77 and 490.71 days respectively (Parwanto and Oyama,
2014, p. 128). On 26 December 2004, an earthquake followed by tsunami waves struck
Aceh. At the time of writing, it remains the greatest disaster recorded in Indonesian
history. According to the EM-DAT/CRED International Disaster Database, this tsunami,
which killed 226,408 people, is classified as the third largest disaster in the 30 years
between 1975 and 2005. It is only surpassed by the 1983 drought in Ethiopia and
Sudan, which killed 450,000 people, and the 1976 earthquake in China, which took the
lives of 242,000 people.
In the area around Indonesia, the earthquake caused a tsunami that swept along 800
km of the coastal area of Aceh. In addition to the 130,000 people killed, as many as
37,000 people disappeared and 500,000 people were displaced. Only a few months
later, on 28 March 2005, an earthquake shook the area offshore of Sumatra near Nias
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Island. As many as 900 people died and 40,000 were left homeless. While the disaster
recovery in Aceh and Nias had only just begun, disaster struck again, but this time in
Yogyakarta and Central Java. On 27 May 2006, an earthquake that measured 5.9 on the
Richter scale occurred, resulting in a death toll of 5,760 people with 388,758 houses
being either mildly, moderately or severely damaged. Still in the same year, on 17 July
2006, a 6.8 on the Richter scale earthquake followed by a tsunami struck the
Pangandaran area, Kabupaten Ciamis, West Java. As a result, the coast from Garut to
Yogyakarta was damaged and the death toll reached 641 people, with 44 missing.
Following this, on 6 March 2007, another earthquake (6 on the Richter scale) hit West
Sumatra in Sumatra Island. This earthquake caused the deaths of 52 people and
thousands of homes were damaged. In Bengkulu, on 12 September 2007, an earthquake
(7.9 on the Richter scale) damaged parts of West Sumatra. The total number of
damaged buildings reached 64,609 housing units.
According to the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), Indonesia is
listed among the top 10 of the most disaster-stricken nations, so it is not surprising that
disaster incidents have continued in Indonesia to this day. The entire history of disaster
events, as extrapolated from various government reports (BAPPENAS, 2010;
BAPPENAS, 2014a), can be summarized as follows. In the period between the end of
2004 and 2015, various disasters hit Indonesia: among others, the earthquake and
tsunami of Aceh-Nias (2004), the earthquake of Yogyakarta and Central Java (2006),
the Jabodetabek flood (2007), the West Sumatra earthquake (2007), the earthquake of
West Sumatra and Bengkulu (2007), the earthquake and tsunami of Mentawai (2010),
the eruption of Mount Merapi (2010), the Wasior flood (2010), the cold lava of Mount
Merapi (2011), the Jabodetabek flood (2013 and 2014), the eruption of Mount
Sinabung (2013 and 2014), the eruption of Mount Rokatenda (2013), the Manado flood
(2014), the Jakarta and Pantura flood (2014), the eruption of Mount Kelud (2014) , and
the land and forest fires of Riau (2014).
The above incidents have caused severe damages and losses, in the form of human
casualties, economic losses, and the destruction of natural resources and the
environment (BAPPENAS, 2014a). By definition, disaster strongly correlates with
economic cost (Hallegatte and Przyluski, 2010), and in fact, the losses have been used
as common indicators to classify whether incidents are disasters or not. The table
below illustrates the major disasters that occurred in Indonesia from the end of 2004 to
2015, and their implications for disaster recovery financing.
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Earthquake & Tsunami: Aceh &Nias Dec 2004 41,400
Earthquake: Yogyakarta & Central
Java
May 2006 29,150
Tsunami: Pangandaran July, 2006 1,300
Flood: Jabodetabek Feb, 2007 5,184
Earthquake: West Sumatera March, 2007 1,080.7
Earthquake: Bengkulu & West
Sumatera
Sept 2007 1,790.9
Flood: Jabadotabek Feb 2007 5,184
Earthquake: West Sumatera Sept 2009 20,867
Earthquake: West Java Sept 2009 6,900
Flood: Wasior, Papua Barat Sept 2010 28,0.58
Earthquake & Tsunami: Mentawai
Island & West Sumatera
Oct 2010 34,892
Volcano Eruption: Yogyakarta &
Central Java, Mount Merapi
Oct 2010 3,628.71
Flood: Jabodetabek Jan 2013 8,340
Earthquake: Aceh Tengah & Bener
Meriah
Jul 2013 13,566
Flood: Manado Jan 2014 15,699
Volcano Eruption: Mount Kelud Feb 2014 12,550
Source: BAPPENAS (2014a)
5.3 Disaster Governance Regulatory Framework (2005–2015)
A rapid change in the DRR regulatory framework took place between 2004 and 2006
with the international Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) as one of the external
driving forces, and the series of catastrophic occurrences in Indonesia as the foremost
internal driving force behind the national reform (INT6, as documented in BAPPENAS,
2015b). Three years after the Hyogo Declaration, and following public consultations
involving professionals, academics and communities, as well as a series of debates
within the legislative forum, the GoI finally ratified the Disaster Management Law (Law
24/2007). Since then, all projects relating to disaster management implementation in
Indonesia refer to this law (BNPB, 2008). The law is expected to legally frame and
govern disaster management, as well as to encourage clearer and more effective
coordination among stakeholders in order to assist the government as the primary
actor in the field of disaster management (The House of Representatives of Indonesia).
Accordingly, the paradigms within disaster management practice shifted: 1) from
responsive to preventive; 2) from sectoral to multi-sectoral; 3) from government
initiative to shared responsibility among stakeholders; 4) from centralized to
decentralized; and finally 5) from merely mitigation to comprehensive disaster risk
reduction. In addition to the law and its derivative regulations, the GoI also endorsed
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the formulation and implementation of the National Plan on Disaster Management
(Rencana Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana/Renas PB) and the National Action Plan
on DRR (Rencana Aksi Nasional Pengurangan Risiko Bencana/RAN PRB) (BNPB, 2006;
BNPB, 2010a; BNPB, 2010b). In line with the aforementioned regulations, there are
other relevant laws that complement and supplement one another.
Table 5.2 shows the regulatory milestones of the disaster management framework,
which evolved over the period of two National Medium-Term Development Plans
(Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional/RPJMN) from 2004 to 2009 and
2010 to 2014 (BAPPENAS, 2014b).
Table 5.2. Milestones of Disaster Regulatory Framework (2004 – 2014)
Year Key regulations
2004 Disaster-Related Law: Law 25/2004 on National Development Planning System
2007 - Disaster Regulation: Law 24/2007 on Disaster Management (DM)
- Disaster-Related Law: Law 26/2007 on Spatial Planning; Law 27/2007 on the
Management of Coastal Areas and Small Islands
2008 - Government Regulations (i.e. Peraturan Pemerintah/PP) 21/2008 on Disaster
Management (DM); PP 22/2008 on DM financing and aid assistance; and PP 23/2008 on
DM External Supports (International Agency and Non- Governmental Agency)
- Presidential Regulation (i.e. Perpres) 8/2008 on the establishment of National Disaster
Management Agency (known as BNPB)
- Regulation of Minister of Home Affairs 46/2008, (i.e. Permendagri) on Organizational and
Management of Local Disaster Management Agency (i.e. BPBD)
- Regulation of the Head of BNPB 3/2008, (i.e. Perka BNPB) on the establishment of Local
Disaster Management Agency (i.e. BPBD)
- And many other Regulations of the Head of BNPB/Minister
2009 - Disaster-Related Law: Law 31/2009 on Meteorology, Climatology and Geophysics; Law
32/2009 on the Protection and Environmental Management
2014 - Disaster-Related Law: Law 23/2014 on the Regional Government; Law 6/2014 on Village
The next sub-sections set out to analyse these regulations in detail, particularly disaster
regulations and other supporting ones. The key findings are that Law 24/2007 has
some confusing components, especially in terms of disaster status, budget allocation
and cooperation between regions as well as vulnerable groups. In addition to this, the
analysis highlights the importance of integrated spatial data and regulations, as well as
harmonious cooperation between various ministries, especially involving the
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Geospatial Information Agency (Badan Informasi Geospasial/BIG) and National Bureau
for Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik/BPS).
5.3.1 Key Issues in Indonesia’s Disaster Regulatory Framework
Law 24/2007 includes some unclear, ambiguous and confusing contents (BAPPENAS,
2008; UNDP, 2008b). It is unclear in what way an ‘occurrence’ can be interpreted as a
disaster and then categorized as a national, provincial or local disaster. Therefore, more
clarity is needed with regard to 1) the size of an occurrence that can be categorized as a
disaster; 2) the region's ability to deal with the impact of the disaster; 3) the number of
people affected; and 4) the extent to which a fair and objective decision will avoid
hidden interests.
The ‘status’ is directly related to the resources made available to address the
destructive impacts of a disaster, and has implications for whether to use the funds
from the state budget, local budget and/or from any additional resources. As a
consequence, if the status has not been well defined by the law, the government could
spend money arbitrarily or might not issue a budget at all. In addition, although
according to Article 60 of Law 24/2007 the GoI and local governments should allocate
disaster management funds adequately, and according to Article 4 of the Government
Regulation 22/2008 there should be budget sharing between GoI and the local
governments (Goverment of Indonesia, 2008b), the law does not oblige them to execute
the budget. As a result, many local governments do not consider it necessary to allocate
a budget for disaster management.
Importantly, budgets should be in line with development plans; however, the law does
not stipulate that the disaster plan should be integrated with national and local
development plans. Furthermore, no explicit responsibility is placed on the GoI and
local governments to set up a joint management plan with other related parties.
Although Government Regulation 21/2008 has identified the possibility of involving
various stakeholders (Goverment of Indonesia, 2008a) – for instance, in preparing the
national action plan – the GoI does not specify a mechanism to engage relevant
stakeholders and ensure community participation. In addition, there are no special
regulations for vulnerable groups, such as people with special physical or psychological
needs, women, children, the elderly, the indigenous population, refugees and migrants,
persons with disabilities, minorities and people with language barriers.
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In addition to this, there is a lack of clarity about the ways in which regions ought to
cooperate in achieving effective collaborative governance around disasters. The
government’s regulation offers no information or guidance on how these regions
should work, coordinate, or cooperate with nearby regions during an emergency
response, especially in the case of unavailable and inadequate human resources,
equipment, and logistics in the specific province/regency/city, or how local
governments in the affected regions may request assistance from other local regions
nearby.
5.3.2 Interconnecting Regulations in Indonesia Disaster Governance
Law 27/2007 on the Management of Coastal Areas and Small Islands explains disaster
mitigation in legal terms (Goverment of Indonesia, 2007b). However, the role of the GoI
and local governments in implementing programmes of disaster mitigation in coastal
areas and small islands has not yet been detailed. Similarly, Law 32/2009 on Protection
and Environmental Management fails to encourage the integration of environmental
protection plans into a disaster management plan (Goverment of Indonesia, 2009).
Although there have been initiatives to synchronize coastal and environmental risk
management with disaster management, the fact remains that, up until now, climate
change adaptation (CCA) and disaster risk reduction (DRR) have been used as separate
tools in managing risk. The push for integration is designed to avoid budget
inefficiencies due to the duplication of activities, and to ensure the effective use of
human resources and technology. In addition, it is expected to drive interconnected
actions at the local and community levels in order to achieve the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) targets (BAPPENAS, 2015a; KLHK, 2015; Widjaja, 2015).
The unavailability of appropriate large-scale maps is seen to be the reason for local
government’s inability to obtain specific hazard maps and/or a zoning plan for coastal
areas and small islands. Law 25/2004 on the National Development Planning System
has mandated that planning should be based on data and information that is accurate
and reliable, including geospatial data and information (Goverment of Indonesia,
2004). In addition, Law 26/2007 on Spatial Planning has mandated the need for
geospatial data and information in formulating a spatial plan, whether national,
provincial or for regencies/cities (Goverment of Indonesia, 2007a). Accordingly, the
spatial plan (Rencana Tata Ruang/RTR) should be aligned with the rules of other
sectors and vice versa. Hitherto, RTR has not been consistently used as a guideline for
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the development of sectoral and regional development plans. As a result, land use
arrangements and their control may not be carried out effectively.
The aforementioned issues indicate the importance of harmonious cooperation
between various ministries and the Geospatial Information Agency (BIG). Although Law
4/2011 on Geospatial Information describes the essential role of geospatial
information in managing natural resources as well as disaster management in the
territory of the Republic of Indonesia, there must be a strict command from the GoI to
refer to the same source maps and an appropriate scale for development (Goverment of
Indonesia, 2011). The same principle should also be applied to statistical data from the
National Bureau for Statistics (BPS).
5.4 Disaster Governance Institutional Network
Disaster policy change in Indonesia was driven by a hybrid process of local and
international interaction (Lassa, J., 2013). Furthermore, the political atmosphere
following the enactment of Law 22/1999 (especially in terms of decentralization and
local autonomy) also influenced the decision of the GoI to devolve more responsibility
to the regions in managing various issues (including disasters) within their jurisdiction
(Kusumasari and Alam, 2012a). Moreover, the governance trends in Indonesia have
evolved towards a more fluid cooperation with non-governmental actors, resulting in
national government no longer being recognized as the hegemonic power in the
process of disaster governance and policy-making.
Historically, the institutional arrangements for disasters prior to 2008 were less
focused on DRR issues due to their ad-hoc organizational character, which was suited
more to ‘reactive’ than ‘preventive’ or even ‘proactive’ in their responses (Lassa, J.,
2013). The rehabilitation and reconstruction process following the Aceh Tsunami
(through the establishment of BRR Aceh-Nias) is a case in point (see also Sub Sections
5.2.3 and 5.5.2). At that time, the GoI was responsible for determining whether it was
necessary (or not) to establish a special agency addressing the post-disaster recovery
process (Kusumasari and Alam, 2012a).
However nowadays, supported by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
at the request of the United Nations General Assembly, the Sendai DRR Framework
(SFDRR) was ratified on March 18, 2015 by more than 100 countries. This aims for the
following results: ‘The substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives,
livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental
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assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries’ (SFDRR, UNISDR, 2015, p.
12). The Sendai Framework is a 15-year period, voluntary and non-binding agreement
that recognizes that states have a key role to reduce disaster risk but those
responsibilities must be shared with other stakeholders including local governments,
the private sector and other stakeholders. The priorities focus on disaster risk
reduction, as follows:
Priority 1. ‘Understanding disaster risk’. In this case, the policies and practices must be
based on a comprehensive understanding of all relevant elements of disaster risk
reduction;
Priority 2. ‘Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk’. The
emphasis of this priority is on the vision, plans, guidelines and coordination framework
between stakeholders, both at local, national and global levels;
Priority 3. ‘Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience’. In this case, the focus on
the collaboration of public and private investment, can be both in the form of structural
and non-structural measures, in aspects but not limited to: economic, social, health and
culture;
Priority 4. ‘Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to "Build Back
Better" in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction’. This priority implicitly states
the importance of identifying preparedness and recovery governance that is relatively
effective to be applied at all levels. In addition to this the recovery phase is understood
as the critical opportunity to ‘Build Back Better’, including integrating them into
development plans.
The following analysis in principle has elaborated on the values contained in the
SFDRR, where the Government of Indonesia has mapped this into the National Medium-
Term Development Plan (RPJMN) 2015-2019 along with related actors. This can be
observed in the following sub-sections, which further analyse the institutional aspects
at the national level, through national policy-based institutional network analysis, and
at the sub-national level by examining the local institutional framework.
The key findings are that at the national level, BNPB remains the core actor among
other key players due to its mandate to coordinate the implementation of disaster
management policies in Indonesia. The main actors at the local level for disseminating,
coordinating, and implementing the disaster-related agenda, including the DRR agenda
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and the post-disaster recovery targets, are BPBDs and BAPPEDAs. Both these actors are
operating at the frontline of concerted efforts to integrate the DRR and community
resilience agenda into regional development policy. Non-governmental actors, such as
universities, NGOs and a few international agencies, also play an important role in
translating government policy into practice at the community level.
5.4.1 National Policy-Based Institutional Network
In accordance with the National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) 2015-2019
(Goverment of Indonesia, 2015), the disaster management programme is no longer
classified as a development priority. Instead, it is the supporting policy for the seventh
priority of the Jokowi President in ´Nawa Cita´, which is to create economic
independence through environment and disaster management investment in an effort
to protect the sustainability of strategic sectors of the domestic economy (Soetiarso et
al., 2014).
With the target to reduce disaster risk in growth centres at high and medium risk, as
per the Indonesian Disaster Risk Index (IRBI) (BNPB, 2013), the GoI set up the
following strategies for disaster management policy: 1) integrating DRR within the
sustainable development framework at national and local levels (five sub-strategies);
2) reducing vulnerability to disasters (eight sub-strategies); and 3) strengthening the
capacity of central government, local government and communities (eight sub-
strategies). The focus of RPJMN 2015-2019 lies on the 136 regencies/cities which are
located in an economic growth area, consisting of 120 regencies/cities with a high
index of risk, and 16 regencies/cities with a moderate risk level. The spatial
distribution of those 136 regencies/cities is as follows: Papua (10 regencies/cities),
Jawa-Bali (36), Kalimantan (18), Maluku (12), Nusa Tenggara (15), Sulawesi (24), and
Sumatra (21).
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Figure 5.1. The National Policy-Based Network (Based on the Sub-Strategies)14
14 The national policy refers to the DRR Policies in Presidential Regulation 2/2015 on RPJMN 2015-2019 (National Medium-Term Development Plan), and is complemented by
interviews with some actors from the national level.
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Figure 5.1 shows the network map of the key actors based on the sub-strategies at the
national level. More than 20 ministries/agencies, as well as local governments,
universities, NGOs and the donor community, are connected in support of the disaster
management agenda, which represents 90 percent of actors with a disaster
management agenda. After classifying sub-strategies into main strategies, Figure 5.2
clearly highlights the seven key players in governing the disaster and DRR-related
agenda: BNPB, the Ministry of Home Affairs/MoHA (Kementerian Dalam
Negeri/Kemendagri), the Ministry of Public Work and Housing/MoPW (Kementerian
Pekerjaan Umum dan Perumahan Rakyat/KemenPUPera), BPBDs, BAPPEDAs (i.e. Local
Development Planning Agency), NGOs and universities.
Figure 5.2. The National Policy-Based Network for the Disaster-related Agenda
BNPB remains the core actor among the other key players due to its role in
coordinating the implementation of disaster management policies in Indonesia.
Nevertheless, collaborative governance is compulsory for the disaster and DRR-related
agenda (BNPB, 2016), as illustrated by the following: the BNPB budget capacity in 2013
was 1,045 billion Rupiah, but after collaborating with more than 30 line ministries and
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agencies, the budget for disaster management reached 9,500 billion Rupiah (Widjaja,
2014, p. 11). In addition to this, the DRR strategy should also reflect the priorities and
perspectives salient to regional development, ensuring that there is cooperation
between the regions in managing common risk and maintaining local and national
development goals (Soetiarso et al., 2014; INT1, documented in BAPPENAS, 2015b).
However, from the network analysis, the low level of coordination between BNPB and
the Ministry of Environment and Forestry/MoEF (Kementerian Lingkungan Hidup dan
Kehutanan/KLHK) is glaringly evident. Based on strategies in RPJMN 2015-2019, MoEF
involvement was only mentioned in the strategy for ‘reducing vulnerability’ and
building ‘institutional capacity’, although in fact the responsibility to integrate CCA and
DRR lies within both organizations, BNPB and MoEF, as well as with the network,
particularly with regard to mainstreaming the concept into the formal development
strategies and practices, and cascading it from national to local level. The interviews
revealed that the formal engagement between BNPB and the National Council for
Climate Change (Dewan Nasional Perubahan Iklim/DNPI), which was initiated by MoEF,
was seen to be insufficient and ineffective for the purpose of performing a coordinating
role (INT2, documented in BNPB, 2016). For instance, the BNPB is not a formal member
of the DNPI Adaptation Group, while DNPI is also not part of the National Platform for
DRR (Djalante, R., 2013).
In addition to this, wider use of the formal data published by the Geospatial
Information Agency (CNNIndonesia, 2015) and National Bureau for Statistics
(Antaranews, 2008; Gatranews, 2016) should be encouraged, though there has been a
collaboration network concerning data with the Agency for Meteorology and
Geophysics. This is in line with the presidential directives given to all line ministries
and other government offices during many cabinet sessions. Unless there is an issue of
insufficient or unavailable data, this rule also applies to the Indonesian Institute of
Sciences (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia/LIPI), the Agency for the Assessment
and Application of Technology (Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi/BPPT) and
university research activities.
At the meso level, the actors that function as a bridge and can work directly at the
grassroots level are universities, NGOs and a few international agencies (Djalante, R.,
2013; INT3, documented in BAPPENAS, 2015b). They are more flexible with regard to
the budget and the types of activities (INT4, documented in Dompet Dhuafa, 2015;
INT5, documented in Mercy Corps, 2016), the implication being that they can better
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adapt to the inherent uncertainties associated with disaster management (Djalante, R.,
2013) and directly partner up with the community. However, these actors may or may
not have a similar agenda to the national agenda. In fact, some of them have been
working towards goals beyond the GoI development framework (INT6, documented in
BAPPENAS, 2015b; INT2, documented in BNPB, 2016). Importantly, the international
agencies and NGOs, both at a local and international level, have played a critical role in
initiating new global concepts, such as Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) and DRR
integration, and community-based DRR, and have successfully integrated and
implemented them through projects at the local level (Djalante, R., 2013; INT5,
documented in Mercy Corps, 2016).
Apart from the aforementioned non-governmental actors, the national platform for
DRR (Platform Nasional untuk Pengurangan Risiko Bencana/Planas PRB) has also been
a useful forum for integrating insights, aspirations and interests as well as bringing
together the various stakeholders of DRR in Indonesia (INT2, documented in BNPB,
2016). In addition to this, government officers, professionals, NGOs and academics have
also been connected under the auspices of the Indonesia Disaster Experts Association
(Ikatan Ahli Kebencanaan Indonesia/IABI), enabling them to exchange ideas and build
understanding in order to translate GoI policies into practice or propose new
knowledge-based policy. Moreover, both have significantly contributed to facilitating
the annual gathering of DRR stakeholders at two national events – the
‘Commemoration of DRR’ and the ‘Indonesian Disaster Expert Conference’ – where
disaster-related issues are discussed in depth.
5.4.2 Local Institutional Framework
At the local framework, the main actors are BPBDs and BAPPEDAs. Nevertheless,
implementation still requires the coordination and support from other agencies acting
within their jurisdiction. The next explanation discusses in more detail the BPBD´s role
as a core actor at the sub-national level.
In 2015, the majority of BPBDs (90 percent) at regency/city level were established and
operationalized (BAPPENAS, 2015c). The next challenge is to strengthen the BPBDs
with regard to their duties and responsibilities in relation to two regulations: namely,
the Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs 46/2008 and The Regulation of the Head
of BNPB 3/2008. The BPBDs have three functions: coordination, command and control.
Coordination is based on the Head of BNPB Decree 3/2008, which directs the
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collaboration between other line ministries or other government offices, as well as the
cooperation between other countries, both in emergency response and post-disaster.
The command function relates to the status of disaster emergencies. Lastly, the control
function focuses on the use of technology, which might pose a risk or potentially
become a hazard, and/or for controlling the exploitation of natural resources, which
might gradually endanger humans and the environment (Goverment of Indonesia,
2012).
While all provincial BPBDs produced a provincial Disaster Management Plan in 2012,
only about 15 percent of BPBDs at regency/city level had prepared a Disaster
Management Plan for their respective regency/city (BAPPENAS, 2015c). The role of a
Disaster Management Plan is important not only in signalling commitment by local
governments to carry out systematic and comprehensive disaster management, but
also in preparing for the possibility of future disaster occurrence. Lack of a budget for
disaster management practices also poses considerable challenges (Kusumasari and
Alam, 2012a; INT7, documented in BPBD Bantul Regency, 2015). Low budget allocation
may lead to chronic and systemic problems, especially for regions exposed to hazards
on a regular basis, such as Jakarta’s floods. In Jakarta’s case, although the Disaster
Management Plan has been integrated into the RPJMD and an annual development
programme (i.e. RKA-T), it was noted that the BPBD of Jakarta had only set a minimum
target for budget allocation, representing about 1 percent of the total provincial budget
plan for every fiscal year (Intarti et al., 2013, p. 18).
In addition to budgeting issues, the enabling mechanism for grassroots participation is
worth exploring further. There needs to be a greater focus on policies that facilitate the
reduction of vulnerability and risk at the community level through active participation
(Hadi, 2014; INT8, documented in Local People, 2015). This could be achieved through
educational and training programmes in schools or at the village level, which could help
to increase the communities’ capacity to deal with disasters, and turn them into
disaster resilient villages (INT9, documented in The Ministry of Village Disadvantaged
Regions and Transmigration, 2015).
5.5 Disaster Recovery Governance: Regulatory Framework and
Implementations
In Indonesia, the recovery process does not always follow the textbook standard. Some
stages of a strategy or activities may be skipped, or be invisible, as a result of the
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overlapping processes. The variety of the recovery processes is highly dependent on
the magnitude and impact of disasters. As set out by Law 24/2007 on Disaster
Management, recovery is defined as a series of activities seeking to restore the
conditions of affected communities and the environment by re-building institutions,
infrastructure and facilities for conducting rehabilitation (Government of Indonesia,
2007).
The following sub-sections further investigate the legal basis of disaster recovery
regulations in Indonesia, thus laying the ground for the comparative analysis coming up
in Sub-section 5.2 and the further analysis in subsequent chapters. The key findings are
that the majority of respondents and official documents recognise the case of Bantul-
Yogyakarta as an example of the fastest precedent of disaster recovery, in comparison
to other selected cases. Accordingly, the next two chapters (Chapters 6 and 7) set out to
explore the Bantul recovery in depth.
5.5.1 Disaster Recovery Regulations in Indonesia
Recovery is a very contextual, dynamic and non-linear process (Olshansky et al., 2012).
Nevertheless, the recovery process based on regulations in Indonesia can be
summarized as follows. The recovery process begins with an early recovery, which is a
multi-dimensional process sequence that begins in the aftermath of a crisis aimed at
restoring stable and normal conditions.15 In general, the early recovery stage is
intended to (1) strengthen the ongoing emergency response and foster the
independence of affected communities; (2) promote disaster recovery initiatives by
affected communities; and (3) serve as transition from the emergency response period
to the subsequent recovery phase (e.g. rehabilitation and reconstruction, etc.).
Early recovery is not a part of humanitarian activities, so the initial recovery activities
related to the efforts of strengthening the emergency response and fostering
community self-sufficiency include, but are not limited to, the following:
 The provision of basic services, including health services, sanitation and basic
environmental assets, such as roads and transport
 The provision of appropriate transitional shelters
 The normalization of livelihoods, for example by providing temporary jobs for cash-
for-work communities
15 Bureau for Crises Prevention and Recovery United Nations Development Programme, February 2009
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 Keeping the environment clean and conditioning the environment for the people to
be able to return to their previous livelihoods/jobs
 Performing basic governance functions
 Maintaining security and law enforcement
 Maintaining social conditions, so that order can be achieved and further risks, such
as conflicts, can be minimized
To promote community-based recovery initiatives, activities are aimed at: making
room for community involvement in the recovery planning and programming;
encouraging local knowledge and practices; and the development of community-based
recovery approaches; as well as building strategic alliances between communities and
local government. It is necessary, however, to ensure that these activities do not create
discriminatory or secondary risk practices by identifying mechanisms of mitigation
that have negative or adverse effects.
In an effort to ensure a smooth transition from the emergency response period to the
next stage of the recovery process, the activities are aimed at assessing initial needs, as
well as planning and mobilizing resources for recovery by taking into account
community needs, resources and vulnerabilities. Also at this stage, it is advisable to
first, reinforce the local system in order to restore government capacity to lead and
manage the next stage of development, and subsequently, identify and cultivate a
system with clear stakeholder roles and responsibilities that facilitate the integration of
recovery in the development process.
Entering the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, as set out in Law 24/2007 Article
57 (Government of Indonesia, 2007), the recovery seeks to meet medium- and long-
term goals by tailoring activities to the post-disaster conditions and to accelerate the
recovery. Rehabilitation is the restoration to a sufficient level of all aspects of public or
community services in post-disaster areas, with the primary objectives being
normalization and the proper running of all aspects of governance and community life.
In the same vein, reconstruction is the rebuilding of all infrastructure, facilities, and
institutions in post-disaster areas, both at the governmental and community levels,
with the main target being growth and development of economic, social and cultural
activities, the establishment of law and order, and active community participation.
According to Article 56, Government Regulation 21/2008 on Disaster Management
(Goverment of Indonesia, 2008a), the scope of rehabilitation embraces a number of
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activities: improving the disaster area environment, including the restoration of public
facilities and infrastructure; providing assistance to enable the reconstruction of
community houses; facilitating social psychological recovery; providing health services;
driving reconciliation and conflict resolution; stimulating social, economic and cultural
recovery; securing the restoration of security and order; and normalising government
functions. Furthermore, as set out by the Regulation of the Head BNPB 17/2010 on
General Guidelines for the Implementation of Post-Disaster Reconstruction and
Rehabilitation (Indonesia, 2010), the implementation of reconstruction and
rehabilitation generally requires:
1. Planning
 The implementation of reconstruction and rehabilitation requires a planning
document, called the action plan for reconstruction and rehabilitation, covering
a maximum period of three years.
 The preparation of action plans for reconstruction and rehabilitation is carried
out at the end of the emergency response period and the early recovery period
by taking into account the results of the post-disaster needs assessment, local
priorities, resource allocations, and the implementation time.
 The reconstruction and rehabilitation action plan consists of national,
provincial, and regency/city reconstruction and rehabilitation action plans.
 The content of the reconstruction and rehabilitation action plan covers aspects
relating to human development, housing and settlements, infrastructure,
economy, social and cross-sectoral issues.
2. Budgeting
 The key funding resources for the implementation of reconstruction and
rehabilitation are regency/city budgets for disasters at the regency/city level,
provincial budgets for disasters at the provincial level, and state budgets for
disasters at the national level.
 Other funding resources, such as insurance, international participation
(including donor community funds), trust funds, and other community aid
funds
 Regency/city governments may request assistance from provincial and central
government with financing reconstruction and rehabilitation.
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3. Institutions
 The institutions responsible for rehabilitation and reconstruction include the
BNPB at the national level and/or provincial/regency/city level, and the BPBD
at the regional level.
 The establishment of an ad hoc coordinating body will be determined on the
basis of the scale of the disaster and its impact.
4. Implementation
 The substantial technical implementation shall be led by local government units
(i.e. SKPD) in the province/regency/city.
 The technical implementation personnel for rehabilitation and reconstruction
preferably shall be recruited from the pool of professionals hailing from the
disaster area.
 International agencies, international non-governmental institutions and non-
governmental organizations involved in reconstruction and rehabilitation shall
coordinate officially with the BNPB and its staff.
5. Monitoring and Evaluation
 The BNPB and BPBD coordinate the implementation of monitoring and
evaluation activities.
 The monitoring and evaluation activities must link back, and add value, to the
document of action and the goals of regional and national development.
The most urgent needs to be met during the early recovery process revolve around
housing and livelihoods (Mercy Corps Indonesia, 2014). During the early recovery
period, there will be a demand for the provision of housing in the form of transitional
shelters – not an emergency shelter – followed by the provision of permanent housing.
Subsequently, there will be a demand for the recovery of livelihoods, and then for the
recovery of economic aspects. Finally, at its advanced stage, the recovery strategy
focuses on re-vitalising economic community activities and institutions within the area
of disaster. These activities and economic institutions include the production,
distribution and consumption of economic goods. In principle, the economic recovery
activities are aimed at reviving those economic activities that existed before the
disaster. The simplest indicator of economic recovery is the level of production and
distribution activities of economically valuable goods, the occurrence of economic
transactions both in the market and beyond the market, an increase in production and
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distribution, and the number of community members and economic institutions
involved in such production and distribution activities.
Based on various disaster-related studies published in international journals, Jordan
and Javernick-Will (2012) have classified some of the most widely used indicators for
measuring recovery processes. In assessing the economic aspects, the three main
indicators are the number of businesses (8.91 percent), employment (7.92 percent),
and income level (7.43 percent). With regard to gauging supporting aspects, such as
infrastructure, the key indicators include housing (19.31 percent), supporting facilities
(18.32 percent) and transportation (11.88 percent). Housing is the most widely used
indicator to measure recovery due to the ease of obtaining and measuring data.
At the annual event of the disaster risk reduction commemoration in 2015, the BNPB
presented and disseminated a policy study on the formulation of the Post-Disaster
Recovery Index (called INA-PDRI). INA-PDRI is an evaluation tool for post-disaster
rehabilitation and reconstruction implementation, which robustly measures and
assesses the implementation of rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes and
activities. In gauging the economic development, the selected indicators include (1) the
productive economy of households indicated by purchasing power parity (PPP); (2) the
regional economy indicated by gross regional domestic product (GRDP) per capita; (3)
employment, indicated by the labour force participation rate (LFPR) and
unemployment rate; and (4) poverty, which is appraised by counting the number of
people living below the poverty line. The complete range of aspects and indicators for
the preparation of disaster recovery indices, as prepared by the government, can be
found in Appendix G. However, not all indicators in the appendix are used in the INA-
PDRI index. The guiding principle in compiling the INA-PDRI composite index is
simplicity and measurability, in other words it must be easy and quick to measure, as
well as low cost in the implementation.
Another way to measure the recovery of disaster-affected communities is through a
longitudinal study, which collects periodic information on households and communities
in disaster-affected areas – as first mandated by Presidential Decree 16/2011 on the
Action Plan for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction after the eruption of Mount Merapi.
This longitudinal study undertaken at the request of the national government, and
supported by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), uses welfare
indicators, such as income, expenditure, asset ownership, basic services, nutrition,
health, education, but also other indicators measuring additional outcomes ranging
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from community resilience to disasters. In contrast to previous methods, which use
existing government data published by the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS), the
longitudinal study gathers its own primary data through surveys.
In addition to the need for monitoring and evaluating the progress of disaster recovery
implementation, regular surveys can be conducted to capture the changes in the
dynamic short-term and long-term impacts of disaster recovery on communities and
their livelihood. Moreover, if data is collected on a regular basis, it will make it easier
for the government to implement the recovery programme in an informed and
responsive manner, and/or to re-plan with flexibility and promptness as needed.
5.5.2 The Comparison of Disaster Recovery Cases in Indonesia
A series of catastrophic events in various parts of Indonesia, especially those occurring
over the last decade from the end of 2004 up until 2015, have taught the Indonesian
Government valuable lessons in identifying best practices and effective mechanisms for
disaster governance and recovery. While each region had its own approach, the most
noticeable recovery processes are those of the post-earthquake and tsunami recovery
of Aceh-Nias (2004), and the post-earthquake recovery of Yogyakarta (2006), West
Sumatra (2009), and West Java (2009).
Following the catastrophic earthquake and tsunami, Aceh and Nias suffered massive
destruction that required cross-sectoral contributions to ensure post-disaster recovery.
Fourteen regencies on the Western and Eastern coasts of Aceh were utterly devastated,
including wrecked houses, buildings and physical infrastructure. The disasters not only
caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, but also paralysed the local
government system for a certain period of time. This massive impact gave rise to the
government's policy of establishing the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency
(BRR) as an ad-hoc institution with 'special' authority to implement rehabilitation and
reconstruction (BAPPENAS, 2010). Formed as a ministry-like agency, BRR covers a
broad range of responsibilities with considerable powers to coordinate other strategic
partners or ministries, including coordinating the work of donor agencies and NGOs. In
other words, BRR is able to stand in as a 'temporary government’ that operates with
reference to the Master Plan for Regional Rehabilitation and Reconstruction prepared
by the central government.
In Aceh’s tsunami recovery phases, the rehabilitation and reconstruction process took
about five years to meet the housing needs of the majority of the survivors; and even
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longer to improve the region’s socio-economic conditions. In December 2008, four
years after the disaster, it was only possible to register land ownerships for 211,839
land tenures out of the targeted 600,000 land formalizations. The efforts of the Aceh
and Nias post-tsunami recovery correlated with the magnitude of the estimated losses.
Aceh’s tsunami damaged 20,000 hectares of coastal fish cultivation, destroyed 60,000
hectares of agricultural land, and disrupted the operations of 100,000 small and
medium enterprises and businesses. In addition to direct livelihood losses, such as
damaged fishing boats, many livelihoods were also indirectly affected through the
destruction of the fragile coastal ecosystem.
According to the Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Report, the economic
recovery programme was implemented in various sectors over the course of three
years (2005-2008): agriculture, stockbreeding, plantation, fishery, forestry and
environment, as well as trade and employment. In the trade sector, cooperatives and
MSMEs received revolving capital for wholesale, market traders and traditional
markets; cooperatives and MSMEs were empowered through micro-finance institutions
(MFIs) in each sub-district; Aceh and Nias MFIs were strengthened; MFIs received
training; cooperatives were developed; and potential areas and stimulant investment
were promoted. Meanwhile, in the employment sector, the programme ensured the
provision of employee training, labour training, and business support facilities.
In contrast, in Yogyakarta and Central Java, the impacts of the earthquake were not
severe enough to paralyse the local governments. Therefore, the respective local
governments were able to manage and oversee interventions around rehabilitation and
reconstruction. Here, the government positioned itself as a director and supervisor, and
took credit for promoting self-reliance rooted in local wisdom. With the Yogyakarta
earthquake disaster, the GoI divided the recovery into two parts: long term and short
term. The short-term interventions were implemented in the immediate aftermath of
the disaster, with the aim of stabilizing the lives of those affected and preparing the
area for re-establishing living conditions following the disaster. The long-term
interventions referred to the efforts of rehabilitating and rebuilding housing, culture
and economy (Tim Teknis Nasional, 2007).
Bantul Regency in Yogyakarta Province became the regency most severely damaged,
followed by Klaten Regency in Central Java Province. However, the high level of
community engagement resulted in accelerated post-earthquake recovery in both
areas. Encouraging self-reliance and the use of local wisdom, local governments
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successfully provided opportunities for citizens to reconstruct their houses and restore
village facilities. In this case, the role of government is to facilitate the process in
financial, technical and supervision terms (BAPPENAS, 2010). The self-managed
housing reconstruction projects not only aimed to help communities empower
themselves economically, but also triggered the re-emergence of social capital, called
‘gotong-royong’.
In addition to addressing housing and settlement rehabilitation, the general policies for
disaster recovery following the Yogyakarta earthquake also included the restoration of
public facilities and infrastructure, and the revitalization of livelihoods and regional
economies. The recovery of the public facilities and infrastructure aimed to restore the
function of community services, which in turn supported the revitalization of social life
and economic activity. The revitalization of livelihood and regional economies
subsequently worked to revive the local economic activities that enabled the
generation of income for community members.
The earthquake recovery assessment in West Java Province offers another insightful
case study (Sunarti, 2013). The findings indicate that the disaster caused long-term
economic disruption for families, and ultimately also disrupted the function of the
family as an institution itself. This is mainly because the support for economic
resources at the level of families is very limited. Moreover, there were not many other
options existed in terms of possible income sources, since the livelihoods in the affected
areas were not diverse. Most people still depend on the primary sector that has not yet
developed added value. Drawing on data provided by 500 families in the four regencies
(Bandung, Ciamis, Garut and Tasikmalaya) that were most severely damaged on 2
September 2009 (Sunarti, 2013, p. 7), analysis found that psychosocial problems linked
to the economy and food security as well as family relations and communities were still
unsolved up to a year after the disaster.
In order to address the psychosocial problems, a programme was launched to provide a
stimulant to foster togetherness and mutual cooperation (i.e. gotong-royong). The
activities funded through this programme included, among others, activities to improve
public facilities and environmental sanitation. In addition, the programme also included
activities around livelihood recovery assistance, such as training, condition mapping
and needs analysis, business clinics (i.e. management, production techniques and
inputs) and evaluation of successes. Performance indicators were focused on
measuring the improvement of business productivity, management outputs/outcomes
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(i.e. company profile, organizational structure and work procedures), and capabilities
in online (website) marketing and employment. The most valuable lesson from the
West Java earthquake is the importance of relying on the key sectors of the affected
area, which in the context of West Java Province included agriculture, rural industries
and services and trade.
Lastly is the 2009 earthquake in West Sumatra Province. In the aftermath of the
disaster, the Province prioritised the recovery of social, economic and productive
economic activities, and focused on the restoration of basic public services and meeting
the needs of poor and vulnerable groups. The productive economic sector was rebuilt
by re-energising the sub-sectors of cooperatives, industry and SME, agriculture (food
crops), marine and fishery, stockbreeding and plantation. Three of the programmes
related to the sub-sectors of cooperatives, industries and MSMEs: MSME capital
assistance, market development and a temporary place of business. A total of 2000
MSMEs in seven regencies received capital assistance, which was distributed through
groups stipulated by the Head of Regency’s decree.
According to a recent study in Indonesia, social vulnerability is influenced by
socioeconomic status (Siagian et al., 2014). Cutter and Emrich (2006, as cited in Siagian
et al., 2014) defined social vulnerability as the (pre-existing) incapability of a
community to bounce back, to be resilient and to recover from the impact of a disaster.
As seen in various cases of disaster recovery, the impacts of disasters can be worsened
by the (existing) poverty conditions, which may become a great barrier to the long-
term recovery process. In other words, the combination of multi-hazard exposure and
social-economic vulnerability has considerable potential to hamper the pace of
development (Sunarti, 2013; Siagian et al., 2014).
Nevertheless, among the above mentioned cases, the recovery of Bantul Regency post
the Yogyakarta earthquake in 2006 is considered to be ‘the quickest post-disaster
recovery in the world’ (Development Advisor for the Governor of Yogyakarta, as cited
in International Organization for Migration, 2011, p. 7). The handicraft production
sector was one of the sectors most severely affected by the 2006 earthquake; however,
most of these sectors have now recovered and new businesses continue to grow
(Sekretariat JRF, 2011). In addition, other economic sectors are significantly improving,
such as agriculture, manufacturing and industry, trade and the service industry. Based
on data of GDP growth in 2010, 2011 and 2012, it can be seen that Bantul’s economic
conditions have been relatively stable. The GDP growth rate of Bantul Regency in 2010
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(based on constant price) was 4.97 percent, 5.27 percent in 2011, and 5.34 percent in
2012 (BPS Bantul Regency, 2017).
The former head of Bantul Regency was successful in leading the recovery of the
Regency following the disaster (Kusumasari, 2014a), especially considering that the
recovery progressed smoothly as a result of social capital interacting with leadership
effectiveness (Sunarti et al., 2013). Furthermore, disaster management in Indonesia
was said to be faster and more effective than in China or even in the United States. This
finding was presented by Prof. Anthony Saich, Director of the Ash Center for
Democratic Governance and Innovation, Harvard University, within a discussion
entitled, 'Leadership in Disaster Management, seeking formulation for Indonesia'
organized by the Office of Special Staff of the President for Social Assistance and
Disaster Relief (Goverment of Indonesia, 2010, p. 27). In addition to this, according to
respondents (INT10, as documented in BAPPENAS, 2015b) the recovery in Bantul
provides an insightful case study to be explored, both for its good practices as well as
its bad ones, as explained by the respondent:
In the context of Yogyakarta's recovery, housing development is very fast, approximately two years.
This is allegedly due to the implementation of community-based disaster recovery, where local
governments become the driving organization with the direction of central government assistance
For that reason, the next two chapters (Chapter 6 and 7) are focused on examining the
processes underlying the aforementioned Bantul – Yogyakarta recovery case.
5.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter’s findings, using the mixed methods of RegMAP, DNA and comparative
analysis, can be summarized as follows:
First, collaborative governance emphasizes the inter-organizational arrangements
across the boundaries of organizations and institutions, which are aimed at pursuing
common goals, despite conflicting interests. However, following the regulatory
framework analysis, this chapter concludes that there is still ambiguous and ineffective
content in some regulations; among others, disaster status, budget allocation, data
integration, and affirmative policy for the marginal groups. Improved synchronization
and harmonization of laws and their derivative regulations is required in order to
achieve an equal level of understanding of the disaster management framework among
the relevant ministries or agencies. Any conflicting regulations are bound to have an
impact on optimising the functions of the institutions and cooperation networks, which
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is why good coordination between agencies and between regions (i.e. disaster-affected
and non-affected regions) must be supported by a synergistic regulatory framework.
Second, from an institutional perspective, the National Disaster Management Agency
(BNPB) remains the key player in optimizing coordination and collaborative
governance among stakeholders. BNPB is in charge of coordinating the implementation
of disaster management policies in Indonesia. The main actors at local level for
disseminating and implementing the disaster-related agenda are BPBDs and
BAPPEDAs. Both these actors are at the frontline of concerted efforts to integrate and
mainstream the disaster-related agenda, including DRR and community resilience into
regional development policy.
Finally, this chapter provides a ‘bench mark’ of an ideal network based on policy and
regulatory framework. Furthermore, having considered the recovery policy and
implementation, and having compared a few selected cases, the chapter confirms that
the recovery process of Bantul Regency following the Yogyakarta earthquake in 2006
progressed unusually promptly, and primarily as a result of the social capital and
cultural values that interacts with leadership effectiveness. Therefore, in the next
chapters, this ‘bench mark’ will be compared to the real situation in the Bantul disaster
governance case study, as well as being the input material elaborated in Chapter 8 (i.e.
Synthesis).
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Chapter 6. An Aggregate Approach for Disaster Recovery
Governance: A Multiphase and Multilevel Analysis
for Bantul Regency – Yogyakarta Province
6.1 Introduction
Emergency response has received significant attention from disaster researchers and
practitioners (Kapucu, 2008; Kapucu et al., 2010; Kapucu and Garayev, 2013; Kapucu
and Garayev, 2016; Kapucu and Hu, 2016; Kapucu and Ustun, 2017). However, research
on disaster recovery is very limited and has been considered to be often ignored when
analysing existing disaster knowledge. To date, there is a lack of systematic research
that unpacks the underlying structures and processes underpinning the recovery
process (Olshansky, 2005), especially that which uses an interdisciplinary lens and
mixed methods. In fact, applied research that examines this matter is seriously lagging
behind in comparison to what is required today (Kapucu, 2014).
Referring to this, Kapucu has argued that government agencies at all levels have
committed more resources to disaster response or relief efforts but less to recovery,
largely because the short-term investments involved in disaster emergency response
are logically much more acceptable and easier for the policymakers. Consequently,
today there is an urgent need to share responsibilities for restoring and redeveloping
communities in the form of an effective inter-governmental and cross-sector
collaboration and cooperation within the long-term recovery framework (Kapucu,
2014).
As a result, the following research question is explored in this chapter: ‘What were the
multiphase governance and multilevel networks that operated during the economic
revival in Bantul after the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake?’. Accordingly, the chapter aims
(1) to explore the disaster recovery governance during the recovery phase in Bantul
after the Yogyakarta earthquake; (2) to analyze the existing networks on the aggregate
level and to explore the mechanisms underlying those networks; and (3) to understand
and unpack the principles of facilitating disaster recovery governance and the revival of
the local economy.
This chapter consists of six sections: in addition to the introduction and a discussion of
the research approach, there are three empirical sections, followed by a conclusion. The
first empirical section covers the phases, mechanisms underpinnings and
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implementation of recovery governance. The second section analyses the recovery
process, using network and qualitative analysis, to uncover insightful mechanisms and
lastly, the underlying principles in the recovery governance.
6.2 Research Approach
6.2.1 Underpinning Theories
The troika of sociology, political science and economics, according to Svendsen and
Svendsen (2009), represent the three disciplines that heavily influence social capital
theory. Furthermore, those disciplines recognize, ‘the power inherent in network
cooperation – invisible, but arguably with highly visible effects’ (ibid., p. 1). The
influence of a network in the recovery process in particular, and the betterment of
development policy generally, could be in the forms of development assessment,
institutional analysis, local development networks, accountability improvement,
knowledge exchange, and the integration process (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000, pp.
242-3, see also Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3).
Ostrom, a 2009 Nobel Laurate in Economics, argued that social capital is the very basic
underpinning theories of governing the commons (Ostrom, 1990) and collective action
(Ostrom and Ahn, 2009): ‘social capital provides a synthesizing approach [to] how
cultural, social and institutional aspects of communities of various sizes jointly affect
their capacity of dealing with collective-action’s problems’ (Ibid., p.22). Thus, there are
three types of social capital that are particularly important in the study of collective
action: (1) trustworthiness, (2) network, and (3) informal rules or institutions (ibid., p.
20).
The actions that relate to disaster recovery are the most diverse of all phases in
disaster management. Therefore, this phase requires many more resources than others
and involves working with individuals, organizations and groups from across affected
communities in an attempt to rehabilitate their lives (Kusumasari and Alam, 2012b). In
communities, ‘bridging’ is characterized by open network across social groups,
inclusion, and generalized trust, whilst ‘bonding’ has closed and inward-looking
networks, exclusion and particularized trusts, with the primary network of bonding
represented by network of family and close friends (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2009).
However, networks are not the only condition required for stakeholder collaboration,
as there need to be additional conditions without which collaborative governance will
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be difficult to sustain. These include leadership (usually led by the key governmental
agencies), deliberative engagement, organized structures, publicly-concerned dialogue
and consensus, and shared goals (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Ansell and Torfing, 2015).
Consensus and shared goals are also influenced by the norms and availability of
information, as trust as the influencing element of cooperation can be either inherited
from historical norms and/or through rational choice based on an open and
transparent information system (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2009). However, they
underline that strategies and plans - including also strategies in the context of
recovery- cannot be carried out in a strictly rational manner as they are better
embedded in complex cultural ‘games’ (ibid., p.6).
6.2.2 Methods
Chapter 6 is an exploratory case study that concentrates on the Bantul Regency. The
study was conducted in Bantul Regency because this regency suffered the most damage
in comparison with other regencies in the 2006 earthquake. On the other hand, it has
been illustrated as one of the most successful recovery processes in Indonesia (see
Chapter 4). The field studies were conducted for 7 months, from the end of May until
late December 2015. An additional two months of fieldwork was carried out in the
following year, starting in early August 2016.
The research method used in this chapter is the mixture of qualitative analysis with the
support of data and quantitative analysis (primarily from Social Network
Analysis/SNA). It is then finally completed by qualitative analysis in order to unpack
and synthesize the underlying processes beneath the network (i.e. a sequence of
qualitative – quantitative – qualitative methods; see Chapter 4, Figure 4.2.). Both
primary and secondary data were gathered. Primary data were collected through in-
depth interviews, and secondary data were collected from relevant documents, such as
books, academic articles, government and non-government agency reports, and official
websites for online data sources. The interview respondent sampling was undertaken
based on a preliminary desk study, which was selected through stakeholder analysis
(see Chapter 4). This took place prior to the researcher entering the field site.
6.3 Disaster Recovery Governance: Phases, Mechanisms and
Implementation
Towards the end of the emergency response, there will be a transitional period (i.e.
early recovery), leading to a recovery phase. Some scholars use terminology such as
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‘rehabilitation and reconstruction’ to refer to ‘recovery’; however, in this sub-section
recovery will be explored in depth, with an emphasis on more than just physical
reconstruction. Recovery activities include post-disaster decisions and actions with a
mission of restoring or improving the pre-disaster living conditions of affected
communities. Recovery activities vary according to the scope of the individuals,
organizations and groups involved. At the same time, these activities should encourage
and facilitate the adjustments necessary to reduce disaster risks (Tim Teknis Nasional,
2007, p. 30). Thus the role of government in the recovery phase remains vital to
defining a strategy, especially at the local level and in specific cases (Kusumasari,
2014b). In the case of the Yogyakarta earthquake in 2006, problems that emerged can
be identified as follows (Bantul Regency, 2008, p.140):
 The decline in life spirits due to trauma and psychological disorders associated with
the number of fatalities and injuries among families or in the immediate
neighborhoods.
 The declining quality of life. This is related to decreasing purchasing power of daily
needs because of major loss of property or damage to dwellings and settlements.
 The declining quality of public services due to damage to facilities and
infrastructure, including public service office buildings and public facilities, such as
schools, community health centers, markets and village halls. On top of this, civil
servants and their families were also victims, meaning that public services had to
be delivered under emergency conditions.
 Disruption to livelihood; the economy was paralyzed for some time after the
earthquake occurred.
Because of an aggregation of the above problems, production largely stopped and the
market ceased to function because of damaged buildings and the absence of economic
activity. Agriculture, handicrafts and traditional markets, which are the lifeblood of the
Bantul people's economy, were affected after the earthquake. With that in mind, the
Indonesian Government (Tim Teknis Nasional, 2007, p. 37) emphasized three
important recovery aspects: 1) the rehabilitation of housing and earthquake affected
settlements; 2) rehabilitation of public facilities; and 3) normalization of livelihoods
and the local economy. The first priority was the rehabilitation of housing and
reconstruction of human settlements. This priority was chosen because the earthquake
had the biggest impact upon homes, which were often also the work spaces for home-
based industries. It was believed that rapid housing rehabilitation would spur on the
economic sector. Under the government program, support activities through the
131
project also followed this path, including support to meet the needs of the community
and a focus on economic recovery (Sekretariat JRF, 2011).
In this sub-section, five themes concerning the various stages of disaster recovery for
economic revival in Bantul Regency, Yogyakarta were discussed. These were: basic
need provision as part of early recovery; housing rehabilitation and reconstruction;
livelihood recovery; infrastructure redevelopment; and local economic redevelopment.
All these stages of the recovery phases were conducted concurrently, and some
overlapping activities were indeed intended to strengthen subsequent processes.
6.3.1 Phase I: Basic Needs Provision
Disruption to family life due to disasters, especially economic disturbances, causes
families to adopt coping strategies in the form of adaptation and adjustment, one of
which is a family expenditure adjustment for the fulfillment of food needs. Coping,
according to Sunarti (2013, p. 79), refers to attempts to deal with disruptive,
dangerous, threatening and/or challenging conditions when routine or automatic
responses are insufficient. Generally, coping strategies carried out by family survivors
are related to food needs, including seeking out lower quality food, buying cheaper
food, reducing food portion sizes, reducing consumption diversity, buying food using
credit, and prioritizing the feeding of children over themselves. Food insecurity,
malnutrition and poverty due to debt lead to new problems after the disaster.
Accordingly, GoI accelerated the fulfillment of basic needs and sought to normalize
people's lives. The government was greatly helped by incoming assistance, either
directly to the community, or through coordination with local government. However,
the unpredictability of the aid continuity and the limited amount of assistance provided
caused unequitable aid distribution. Therefore, the assistance of living costs was
initiated by the government, as part of an equitable strategy and simultaneously as a
symbol of Bantul’s revival (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 142).
Data is a crucial point; without good and reliable data, it will be difficult to initiate the
rehabilitation and reconstruction stages. Thus, one main step taken by the government
was to conduct a thorough survey, including improving casualty data and other related
data relevant to the disaster impact. Without good and reliable data, it will be difficult
to run the entire process of the rehabilitation and reconstruction stage. Data collection
was carried out through a governing approach throughout neighborhood associations
(i.e. Rukun Tetangga/RT) in Bantul Regency. Furthermore, the Government of Bantul
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issued Head of Regency Decree No. 169/2006, dated 2nd June 2006, which established
the sub-districts classification as the foundation for the provision of money for food for
earthquake survivors in Bantul Regency. Based on the aforementioned decree, the
classification of sub-districts as the basis for giving money for food was categorized as
follows (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 116): (1) Sub-district with very severe classification;
(2) Sub-district with critical classification with social vulnerability, and(3) Sub-district
with medium classification.
This was initiated by a directive issued by the coordinating Minister for People’s
Welfare on the 30th May 2006, wherein the Minister had assigned the Head of Bantul
Regency to provide a living allowance and other financial support. The provision was
also supported by a letter from BAKORNAS No. 1/PBP/VI/2006, dated 2nd June 2006 on
General Guidelines for Emergency Response. There were several categories of
assistance; one was financial support of 2 million rupiah for families who had lost their
members in the disaster. This support was paid after claims were verified by
neighbourhood associations and sub-district heads. On top of that, there was money for
food, widely known as ‘Jatah Hidup/Jadup’ (i.e. living allowance guarantee). A living
allowance of 3,000 rupiah per day per person and 10 kg of rice per person were given
every two weeks. In addition, survivors were also given cash to buy home appliances
and kitchen utensils. This amounted to 100,000 rupiah per head of family. Assistance
for purchasing clothes worth 100,000 rupiah per person was also offered. If a surviving
family consisted of four people, the family would receive the following compensation
(Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 121):
Food = IDR 3,000 x 14 day x 4 people = IDR 168.000
Clothes = IDR 100,000 x 4 people = IDR 400,000
Kitchen Utensils = = IDR 100,000
Total = IDR 668.000
The distribution of this living allowance was implemented gradually, starting on 7th
June 2006, across the 17 sub-districts and 75 villages. A total of 72,252,360 rupiah was
allocated to 796,766 people from the national coordinating body for disaster
management (known as BAKORNAS before the BNPB was established), central
government, provincial government and local government. However, the money
allocated was not fully disbursed (there were 543,420,000 rupiah remaining), given
that some people were registered in two sub-districts, some were dead, some had
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relocated their families to another city and, interestingly, some decided not to accept
the money due to their solidarity with those who did not receive on account of not yet
being registered as the recipient of a living allowance (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 122).
The government’s financial mechanism for disaster relief and early recovery in Bantul
and Yogyakarta took place in accordance with existing laws and regulations (i.e. Law
17/2003 and Law 1/2004) (Kusumasari and Alam, 2012b, p. 359). In a crisis situation,
the government and the legislative budget approval process should be able to speed up
the disbursement of funds for government-initiated goods and service procurement
(refer to Chapter 4). The disbursement process was quickened because activities
funded were either undertaken directly by the government or by donor agencies.
Nevertheless, there were also financial sources granted from donor agencies that were
used in the recovery phase.
6.3.2 Phase II: Housing Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
Based on data collected by local governments at the regency level, by the 7th June 2006,
housing damage was as follows: 71,763 houses were totally destroyed, 71,372 houses
were severely damaged, and 73,669 houses were lightly damaged. Most of the affected
houses were aged between 15 and 25 years old, and less than 3 percent were houses of
traditional design, that is, constructed of wood or bamboo and more resistant to the
earthquake’s tremors (Kusumasari and Alam, 2012b). In addition, BAPPENAS
estimated that losses from this earthquake reached 29.1 trillion rupiah. Of this total
loss, around 15.3 trillion rupiah was experienced in the housing sector (Goverment of
Indonesia, 2006; Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 116). As an illustration, in the Sub-district of
Bantul, 4,708 houses were totally destroyed, 7,338 heavily damaged, and 3,301 slightly
damaged. Most of those houses that were damaged or which collapsed usually had
these damage combinations: roof damage (32 percent), wall damage (36 percent), and
problems with the foundations (32 percent) (Indah et al., 2008, p. 963-4). Furthermore,
the three biggest causal factors were that houses did not meet earthquake resistant
standards, used traditional cement materials, and did not use foundations (Indah et al.,
2008, p. 967).
According to a survey conducted by the Bank of Indonesia (BI, i.e. Central Bank of
Indonesia), housing is generally the main economic asset for the poor and the most
urgent need post-disaster (Tim Teknis Nasional, 2007, p. 12). Houses do not just
provide protection and security for family members, but are also a place of family
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business and livelihood. As a result of earthquake damage, many residents were forced
to live in refugee shelters and temporary tents, which caused economic shock. The local
economy was shaken by the corresponding decline in economic activity, destruction of
home-based businesses and loss of family income (Indah et al., 2008, p. 966). Losses
from damaged homes and other assets also increased the need for home improvement
funds, which greatly disrupted the family economy. The faster the houses were
reconstructed and the sooner the earthquake survivors occupied their houses, then
finally, the quicker the recovery of the economic sector would take place.
Thus the government realized that housing rehabilitation and reconstruction was the
most important step after the early recovery period. However, to implement this was
not easy. It required good preparation, with prudent calculation and planning, and
great financial support to build hundreds of thousands of homes in a short period of
time. Implementation techniques, where government plans intersected with the
aspiration of citizens, often led to social conflict. GoI had allocated funds of 2.7 trillion
rupiah from the state budget, excluding donor assistance from within and outside the
country (Tim Teknis Nasional, 2007, p.15). In order to rebuild the destroyed and
severely damaged houses during the recovery phase, housing rehabilitation and
reconstruction was initiated in August 2006. In this phase, the government played the
role of facilitator, whose job was to ensure that the rehabilitation and reconstruction
process ran smoothly by maintaining: price and stock stability of raw materials used in
construction, the availability of manpower’ and the technical requirements of
earthquake-resistant buildings.
To support the rehabilitation and reconstruction of permanent housing, the provision
of temporary housing assistance preceded the program. Most temporary housing
projects were conducted by non-government organizations, or by charity organizations
and donors. The temporary housing program was deemed beneficial to the recovery
process, because with a temporary home people can continue with their household
activities whilst waiting for permanent houses to be built (Sekretariat JRF, 2011, p. 26).
Though this temporary housings was claimed to speed up the economic recovery of the
affected areas (Sekretariat JRF, 2011, p. 48), there are also circumstances where the
waiting period for temporary housing construction was much longer than the
construction of permanent housing itself. Finally, these semi-permanent buildings were
utilized as small shops by the beneficiaries (BAPPENAS, 2010). Meanwhile, the
construction of permanent houses, in addition to being supported by international
NGOs and agencies, was mainly carried out by the Ministry of Public Works, through
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REKOMPAK, with a community engagement scheme. REKOMPAK provides earthquake-
resistant core houses that can be modified and completed according to individual
households’ needs (Sekretariat JRF, 2011, p. 27). The community-based approach to
housing reconstruction (called REKOMPAK) was initially developed after the Aceh
tsunami (i.e. Aceh reconstruction through the Multi Donor Fund Facility/MDFF Project)
which proved to be beneficial to the reconstruction of Java. It has also been adopted by
GoI as a model in other post-disaster housing reconstruction projects (Sekretariat JRF,
2011, p. 43).
REKOMPAK focused on rebuilding lives in line with an effort to build a community
(World Bank, 2012, p. 17). At first, it situated beneficiaries as those responsible for
rebuilding their own homes, which was a new idea and seemed to be much more risky
than the usual approach, which gives contracts for housing reconstruction to
contractors (World Bank, 2012, p. 9). Nevertheless, it was claimed that this approach
would help the recovery process by empowering affected communities and allowing
them to assume responsibility for their own recovery. Thus existing social capital in
affected communities was deployed in order to manage reconstruction resources
(World Bank, 2012, p. 17).
In a coordination meeting on the 6th September 2006 (Bantul Regency, 2008, p.127), it
was agreed to immediately form a small community group (PokMas). PokMas consisted
of 8 to 15 members, who were representative of the heads of families and which
included: one chairman and concurrent member, one secretary and concurrent
member, and one treasurer and concurrent member. It was decided that a facilitator
would be recruited who would serve as the Management Consultant of the Regency
(Konsultan Manajemen Kabupaten/KMK). This typical community-based approach
places responsibility for the rebuilding process, including management of funds,
directly into the hands of small community groups in affected communities (World
Bank, 2012, p. 8).
In addition, through this community-based approach, beneficiaries built a sense of
ownership and transparency; almost two thirds of Bantul Sub-district residents joined
in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of houses through mutual assistance (i.e.
gotong-royong) (Indah et al., 2008, p. 963). In Yogyakarta Province, approximately 70
percent of households affected were given IDR 15 million per household to construct or
renovate their house. Households were expected to manage the reconstruction
themselves using the funds provided. Technical audits conducted by two leading
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universities, UGM and UNDIP, reported that the houses were of good quality and built
in accordance with acceptable earthquake standards, resulting in a 99% occupancy rate
(Sekretariat JRF, 2011, p. 27).
Through this community-based approach, GoI also promoted three stages of the
rehabilitation and reconstruction programme (Kusumasari and Alam, 2012b, p. 359).
The first stage is preparation, which relies on consultant procurement, facilitator
recruitment and early outreach. The second stage is community organisation, to
identify victims who are entitled to receive assistance, to set up community groups and
to engage in the participatory planning, wherein housing rehabilitation proposals are
developed. The final stage is the development of houses by people based on the
priorities they themselves set. Those whose houses were considered to be only
minimally damaged were not given any housing support, while a few others were given
new houses constructed by donors (or non-governmental agencies). The regulation
regarding this was stated more comprehensively in Head of Regency Letter No.
413/3772, dated 9th September 2006 concerning the Implementation of Post-
Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (referring to the Yogyakarta Provincial
Governor Regulation No. 23/2006 on the Operational Guidance for Post-Earthquake
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Yogyakarta Province in 2006). This was
addressed to all Heads of Sub-Districts and Villages in Bantul Regency (see Appendix
5.1).
6.3.3 Phase III: Livelihood Recovery
The economic disruption experienced by disaster survivors is varied. Generally, it is
due to an increase in household needs that cannot be met by existing income, either
because of a decrease in income or loss of livelihood. It has been shown that the loss
experienced by a family is proportional to the amount of debt it has (Sunarti et al.,
2013). This was not only felt by the survivors of the Yogyakarta earthquake, but also by
many survivors in other disasters. The following phenomena can be seen in almost all
catastrophic events in Indonesia: (1) an increase in expenditure due to the need to
repair houses and buy new furniture; (2) a decrease in asset ownership; (3) an increase
in debt; and (4) loss of income or loss of livelihood (Sunarti et al., 2013).
The GoI’s over-focus on housing sector reconstruction was considered to be a factor
inhibiting economic recovery, as it was claimed that the economic recovery then got
less attention from the government. Nevertheless, it was well known that the
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restoration of homes had also restored places of business, especially for micro-
enterprises (Tim Teknis Nasional, 2007, p. 18; Sunarti, 2013, p. 98). Furthermore, the
delay in disbursement of housing development funds caused disaster victims to use
assets or savings to repair houses, and consequently delayed the economic recovery.
However, the delay in handling disasters, which was directly related to livelihood, had
also added to victims’ psychological trauma and life pressures. According to local
government, until about a month after the earthquake, psychosocial and psychiatric
units of DR. Sardjito Hospital, Yogyakarta had found 53 patients, among 853
earthquake casualties. requiring psychiatric care interventions (Tim Teknis Nasional,
2007, p. 6).
According to the government, through the special staff of the President for Social and
Disaster Relief, the post-earthquake recovery of Yogyakarta focused on housing
assistance and rebuilding damaged infrastructure, but in 2008 the focus shifted to
economic development through the provision of capital assistance to MSMEs
(Goverment of Indonesia, 2010, p. 20). In general, the program aimed to provide
financial support, in cash or in kind, linked to technical assistance for micro and small
enterprises, to support defaulting lenders to develop effective strategies for viable
enterprises, and to establish soft-loan mechanisms to rehabilitate damaged medium-
sized business infrastructure and capital equipment (JRF, 2008; as cited in
Resosudarmo et al., 2012, p. 237). Furthermore, the government also continuously
strove to encourage the economic sector to run immediately, among others, by
encouraging farmers back to the paddy fields, craftsmen to return to their production
activities and traditional market traders to return to the market. To balance the spirit
of the people, the government strove to provide assistance to farmers through: 1)
assistance in the form of seeds, pumps or the acceleration of irrigation repair; 2)
provide assistance to craftsmen in the form of handicraft tools and machinery, business
capital access, and acceleration of other facilities to support Bantul handicraft
production; and 3) assisting emergency market operations and accelerating
improvement of market facilities, so that economic transactions can fully recover
(Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 143): 1).
On top of that, with full awareness that the economy will not recover within a short
period of time, the government put forward efforts to reduce the burden faced by
individuals (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 143), such as land and building tax exemption,
free building permit fees (IMB), free ID cards, free market levies, free medical
treatment in government clinics (Puskesmas) and third-grade hospitals, and a removal
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of the obligation that students wear uniforms to school. According to a survey
conducted between March and November 2007 in 20 building material shops in Bantul
Regency, there was an increase in the cost of housing construction due to the rising
price of building materials and a shortage of local construction workers, which meant
that it was necessary to bring in outside workers at a higher price (Nurhadi, 2015, p.
114). Using their existing capabilities, the government also strove to control the price
of cement and fertilizer through cooperation with factories, alongside other efforts. In
essence, efforts were introduced to reduce the burden faced by individuals to the
lowest point possible.
There was also a community development program introduced in order to increase
poor people’s income in accordance with their expertise. The source of funding for this
program originated from the Bantul Regency budget (APBD) in 2006. The goal of this
village-based program was to strengthen the ability of the poor to create and seize
productive business opportunities and expand their marketing to increase revenue
while creating new jobs. The target of this program was poor families, who formed
groups as a requirement to obtain initial capital assistance, totaling 10 million rupiah.
This capital then became the group's wealth, taking the form of fixed capital, business
capital, wages for labor and depreciation. The proportion was agreed by the group. In
the implementation of these activities, the group was accompanied by facilitators,
communicators and mediators (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 126).
By June 2008, the government had spent approximately 5.4 trillion rupiah (US$ 570
million) on housing. Alongside this, the Java Reconstruction Fund16 (JRF) had spent as
much as US$60 million on various activities (mostly housing). The JRF had allocated
approximately 20 percent of its total commitment to livelihood recovery programs.
More than 40% of the beneficiaries of JRF-IOM's technical assistance activities and
microfinance loans through the JRF-GIZ project were women. Much of the assistance
was in the form of training, which ultimately provided jobs that gave additional income
to women. In late 2008, JRF-IOM's livelihood restoration project began its asset
replacement activities, which included: replacement of productive physical assets, such
as equipment, livestock, and facilities damaged or destroyed, as well as the
implementation of technical assistance. Meanwhile, the JRF-GIZ project started
16 The Java Reconstruction Fund is a multidonor reconstruction fund pledged by the European
Comission, the Netherlands, the UK, Canada, Finland and Denmark. It is governed by a Steering
Committee and co-chaired by the Government of Indonesia and the European Commission, with
the World Bank as Trustee (see also Appendix I).
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technical assistance activities and facilitation of access to financing in May 2009. The
JRF-GIZ’s technical assistance program includes production, entrepreneurship, and
sales and marketing skills (Sekretariat JRF, 2011, p. 29-30).
6.3.4 Phase IV: Infrastructure Redevelopment
In the infrastructure sector, damage and loss in terms of transportation had reached 90
billion rupiah. For all infrastructure, the total was 397 billion rupiah (Goverment of
Indonesia, 2006, p. 11). Therefore, besides priorities given to the energy sector, the
government also prioritized the restoration of roads and bridges and irrigation
facilities (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 123). The total damage and losses can be seen in
Table 6.1.














Housing 13,915 1,382 15,296 15,296 0
Infrastructure: 397 154 551 76 476
Transport &
Communication
90 0 90 0 90
Energy 225 150 375 0 375
Water and
Sanitation
82 4 86 76 10
Productive Sectors: 4,348 4,676 9,025 8,854 170
Agriculture 66 640 705 700 5
Trade 184 120 303 138 165
Industry 4063 3899 7962 7962 0
Tourism 36 18 54 54 0
Social Sectors 3,906 77 3,982 2,112 1,870
Cross-Sectors 185 110 295 48 247
Total (Billion
Rupiah)
22,751 6,398 29,149 26,386 2,763
Total (Million US$) 2,446 688 3,134 2,837 297
Source: Goverment of Indonesia (2006, p. 12)
The sector worst affected was energy, with damage to electricity transmission and
distribution facilities estimated at a total of 225 billion rupiah. In the transport sector,
there was widespread but minor damage to roads, mainline railway tracks and
associated infrastructure. Meanwhile, damage in the water and sanitation sectors was
mostly due to shallow wells, which serve as the main source of water in Bantul.
Telecommunication and postal services suffered very limited damage; such damage
was principally to base stations for mobile and fixed wireless access phones and to
some of their offices. However, the main public services, such as the water supply,
drainage and electricity system, continued to operate, although with supply shortages
in the heart of disaster-affected areas.
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The local government had given priority to the rehabilitation of public facilities that
support the local economy and encourage the rebuilding of people’s well-being, such as
market rehabilitation. For that purpose, the Bantul local government and the local
parliament agreed to revise the 2006 budget and allocate funds for post-earthquake
recovery. The government provided assistance with funding ranging from 20 to 200
million rupiah, depending on the level of destruction (in up to 75 villages) for the
purchase of bamboo, materials and cleaning tools. Total funds allocated were 7.8 billion
rupiah. In addition, the budget also provided 70 billion rupiah for road construction,
water management, and other recovery efforts (Kusumasari and Alam, 2012b, p. 359).
6.3.5 Phase V: Local Economic Redevelopment
After the 2006 earthquake struck Bantul, its economy slowed down by 23 percent
compared to pre-disaster projections (Kusumasari and Alam, 2012b, p. 355). The
decline in economic performance resulted in the loss of a large number of jobs, with
most stemming from what were previously the most productive sectors, i.e. trade,
industry and tourism (Subagyo and Irawan, 2008). BAPPENAS also noted that the
damage and losses to private sector buildings and productive assets was around 8.8
trillion rupiah, which resulted in the loss of future potential revenue (Goverment of
Indonesia, 2006, p. 12). Most of this revenue was attributed to the damage experienced
by MSMEs, which have always been the backbone of the regional economy of Bantul
and Yogyakarta (Tim Teknis Nasional, 2007, p. 8-10). Furthermore, based on
investigations at the regency level, in the economic sector, there were 1,328 craftsmen
and 10,781 traders who needed additional capital due to a loss of business assets.
Since, for instance, the pottery industry clusters in Kasongan or leather-based
handicraft clusters in Manding were conducted on a household scale, damage to houses
brought about disruption to the productive output of MSMEs. Approximately 65,000
workers lost their jobs, 90% of whom were in MSMEs (World Bank, 2012). On top of
this, as many as 30,000 companies experienced disruption, such as difficulty sourcing
raw materials and the blocking of trade routes (Tim Teknis Nasional, 2007, p. 10). In
addition to this, 29 traditional markets were destroyed, which resulted in additional
economic downturn (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 116).
The earthquake also caused damage and losses for banks and non-bank financial
institutions (NBFIs). Damage to all infrastructure and banking facilities reached 37
billion rupiah, while damage and losses in the non-bank financial sector was estimated
to be around 190 billion rupiah (this stemmed from defaults on loans to more than
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1,785 microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Yogyakarta) (Tim Teknis Nasional, 2007, p.
12). Bank of Indonesia (BI) quick survey conducted a month after the earthquake
showed that the disruption of business activities in Yogyakarta brought about a market
loss of 34% (Tim Teknis Nasional, 2007, p. 12), which resulted from building damage
and a lack of raw materials, facilities and production tools. Furthermore, BI has
predicted that efforts to rejuvenate business activity could have been implemented
within a period of 6 months. With this in mind, the government prioritized the
revitalization of the regional economy and the economic activities of communities in
the following ways (ibid., p. 12):
 Recovery of the production and service sectors that have the greatest employment
potential
 Recovery of market access for MSMEs
 Recovery of financial institutions and banking services
 Management of natural resources and environment to anticipate excessive
exploitation of natural resources
 Restoration of security, order and judicial services
 Recovery of community food security
However, when the National Technical Team (Tim Teknis Nasional/TTN) completed its
mandate in 2008, most of the reconstruction and rehabilitation activities - including
most of the housing reconstruction - had been completed. According to its two year
monitoring and evaluation report (2006-2008) on post-disaster rehabilitation and
reconstruction in Yogyakarta, the recovery of the regional economic sector in
Yogyakarta Province got a lack attention, which implies that further assistance was
needed to accelerate the economic recovery (Tim Teknis Nasional, 2007). This was
particularly true in the handicraft sector, which was one of the most severely affected
sectors (Sekretariat JRF, 2011, p. 23).
We can see from the above list that what needed to be addressed quickly was the loss
of potential markets, which would affect the growth of various industries of all sizes in
the long run. A loss of markets has been one of the most significant factors impacting
businesses, alongside rising production costs, debt repayments and damaged facilities
(Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 111). To restore the market, most MSMEs needed capital
injections (Tim Teknis Nasional, 2007, p. 12). In May 2009, by providing access to
financing livelihood recovery projects, JRF-GIZ channeled assistance to 26 microfinance
institutions (MFIs) as part of a revolving loan to rebuild businesses. The project actively
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sought out MFIs who were able to provide group loans, for example Rural Credit
Enterprises (i.e. BUKP) in Yogyakarta, to reach marginal beneficiaries outside the
formal banking sector who were unable to meet standard potential debtor
requirements (Sekretariat JRF, 2011p. 30). Furthermore, PT. Permodalan Nasional
Madani (PNM; i.e. National Civil Capital) was selected as the top institution for the
revolving loan scheme because of its mandate to support MSMEs and its experience in
managing revolving loan funds after project closure and the JRF (Sekretariat JRF, 2011,
p. 30). Institutional arrangements with PNM took time, but since mid-2010, revolving
loan funds have been channeled to various MFIs, including rural banks (i.e. BPR) and
cooperatives. Furthermore, local governments were expected to monitor the
sustainable use of their funds after the project officially closed (Sekretariat JRF, 2011, p.
31). These topics are broadly discussed in Chapter 6, where we can see that the
problems of market and capital access were perceived to be very important by MSMEs
and entrepreneurs.
6.4 Disaster Recovery Networks: an Aggregate Approach
The next sub-sections explore the networks and recovery mechanisms just after the
Yogyakarta earthquake and during the recovery period. The first sub section explores
the recovery network from multiphase and multilevel perspectives. The key finding in
this section is that the core actors involved in the governance of recovery at the
multilevel and multiphase were still dominated by central government actors (44.4
percent) supported by across level leaderships, local governments units, and relevant
activities (e.g. coordinating organizations, national programs and ad-hoc projects). The
second explores the mechanisms beneath the network according to six themes:
empowering through leadership, local government response, solidarity within the
network, local opinion leaders, togetherness and mutual cooperation, and collaboration
amongst stakeholders.
6.4.1 Multilevel and Multiphase Networks Analysis
In the first few weeks after disaster, BAKORNAS (red node 22) duties were fully
supported by the military (i.e. TNI, red node 25), the police (red node 26) and
BASARNAS (i.e. Search and Rescue, red node 24). Several hours after the disaster
struck, a military plane flew over the affected areas and took aerial photographs that
would later be used in the distribution of aid and in the assessment of damage (Tim
Teknis Nasional, 2007). The President (red node 1) himself monitored the situation,
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and relocated his office temporarily to Yogyakarta for several days. However,
SATKORLAK PB of Yogyakarta Province (black node 32) and SATLAK PB of Bantul
Regency (red node 33) experienced difficulty in mobilizing and coordinating cross-
sectoral local government units (red node 35, 36, 37, and 38) (BAPPENAS, 2010),
mainly due to many officials themselves being injured or involved in helping relatives
and the neighborhood. The role of NGOs and non-affected community (some part of red
node 78 and 79) substantially filled the gap of the lack of local government presence
during the early (days) aftermath. Some of the INGOs (e.g. red node 64 and grey node
62) that have placed nearby the earthquake location -due to the anticipation of the
eruption of Mount Merapi- were also helpful.
In terms of the capacity of local government to respond the crisis situation, the local
governments’ capacity needs to be further improved by among other things, upgrading
knowledge and skills through regular drills. Most noticeable was when government
units carried out a response in accordance with their mandated roles and functions,
with limited collaboration and without appropriate analysis of available resources and
survivors’ needs (Subagyo and Irawan, 2008). Those knowledge and capacity gaps
happened during the emergency response; however, approaching the early recovery
period, the local government adapted. This governmental shock was partly
understandable since the emergency period was not fit for the structures of
bureaucracy. The former head of the regency (red node 31) took a lead on tackling this
issue, and some quick decisions and rapid actions were made through his leadership
(Kusumasari and Alam, 2012a). In addition, two weeks after the earthquake, the
governor (red node 30) greeted and reminded his people about the values of
togetherness, solidarity, family strength and fighting spirit, to ‘forget bitter memories,
and revive soon to improve upon the fate’ (The Goverment of Yogyakarta Special
Province, 2008, p. 25).
The recovery effort had been heavily focused on rebuilding houses and public
infrastructures damaged by the earthquake (back node 73). At the end of 2007, a
substantial number of surviving households had completed rebuilding their house.
However, insignificant resources and a less coherent strategy were provided to the
livelihood restoration and local economic development (Tim Teknis Nasional, 2007). A
joint study by United Nations Development Program (UNDP, blue node 54) and United
Nations Coordination Center (UNCC) shows that although small and medium
enterprises have restarted business, sales still remain low (Subagyo and Irawan, 2008).
Furthermore, it was explained that there needed to be local economic policies that
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could prevent more people from falling into the trap of poverty. This issue was then
addressed by governmental national program (red node 69 and 70) and supported by
ad hoc livelihood project (red node 72).
The President formed a national coordinating team (red node 90) in July 2006. The
coordinating team was chaired by the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs (red
node 6) and the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare (red node 7) as its deputy.
This coordinating team whose members consisted of the main government bodies was
supported by a national technical team (i.e. Tim Teknis Nasional/TTN, red node 27).
TTN, which consisted of academics and bureaucrats and was domiciled in Yogyakarta,
acted as a liaison between the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs and the
affected regions (i.e. Bantul, red node 36; and Yogyakarta Province, black node 34) and
supported the roles and functions of the national coordinating team.
The support provided by the TTN for the national coordinating team was very
important; among others, oversaw the implementation of the recovery and especially
brought together various stakeholders at monthly co-ordination meetings until the end
of their work in 2008, before finally their duties were then taken over by BAPPENAS
(red node 19). The monthly meeting held by the TTN was meant as an important
reference for stakeholders to find out the progress of the recovery, what
recommendations needed to be addressed, and what programs which were not yet
optimal in their implementation could be fulfilled by other stakeholders. The
coordination was also undertaken with many international agencies, donors and NGOs
involved in the recovery process. There were approximately 546 organizations
providing assistance to the post-earthquake recovery program (both Yogyakarta and
Central Java), contributing to 20 percent of the total recovery budget, and consisting of
248 national NGOs, 127 international NGOs, 15 international agencies, 16 UN family
organizations, 17 donors, 24 universities, 14 military units and 85 commercial
companies and other organizations (BAPPENAS, 2010, p. 135). In line with this fact,
the most influential actors (according to ‘in-degree’ and ‘betweeness’ nodes) within the
inner circle network were TTN (normal in-degree = 16.532; normal betweeness =
15.820) and BAPPENAS (16.943 and 9.844 respectively). During the recovery period,
BNPB and BPBD were not established yet, therefore, TTN and BAPPENAS were meant
to substitute their roles in governing the recovery process.
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Figure 6.1. Inner Circle Network Analysis
The actors’ network was derived from data obtained in interviews, questionnaires, the
legally formal duty and responsibility as reported on the official websites, as well as
official reports of government programs and ad-hoc projects. Using K-Core analysis and
then standardized by iterative multidimensional scaling (MDS), the clear visualization
of the inner circle network is produced (see Figure 6.1). The core actors are located in
the inner circle of network, and mostly shown by core group of red nodes. As has been
explained earlier, the member of inner circle network are mostly central governmental
actors (44.4 percent) supported by many others actors totaling of 45 actors. The result
was based on two complementary analyses: K-Core and Core-Periphery Class. The
description of inner circle network composition can be seen in the Table 6.2.
From the Table 6.2 below, it can be inferred that the collaboration between
governments, international agencies, donor communities, NGOs, universities and the
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private sectors is the key to the integrated disaster governance. Together with the
communities, non-governmental organizations positioned themselves as the
governmental partners and contributed assistance significantly. Often community
groups, NGOs and universities were quicker to deliver assistance and donations to the
survivors, because they did not experience bureaucratic procedures, for instance, the
motor trail communities distributed food and aid to people domiciled in the heavy
terrain. However, such sporadic assistance should not be expected to be distributed
equally to the vast area of Bantul. Apart from its limited funds, the range of their
networks also cannot reach the remote areas. Through observations, the establishment
of coordination, partnerships and collaboration with local governments remained
essential since the government has bureaucratic connections down to villages or
perhaps smallest neighborhoods (i.e. RT/RW) (INT3, as documented in BAPPENAS,
2015b). Furthermore, the respondent explained that socio-cultural factors may play an
important role in the recovery process in Yogyakarta, but the most critical point during
his observation was the commitment of local governments in implementing the agreed
programs.
Table 6.2. The Composition of the Core Network Actors




(including: central, local and
local opinion leaders)
6 Node 1, 2, 30, 31, 39, 40 Node 1, 2, 30, 31, 40
Central Government
20 Node 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21,
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 94
Node 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21,
22, 23, 25,
Local Government 5 Node 33, 35, 36, 37, 38 Node 33, 36, 37, 38
National Program 3 Node 69, 70, 71 Node 69, 70
Ad hoc Governmental Actors 3 Node 27, 28, 90 Node 27, 90
Ad hoc Project 2 Node 72 Node 72, 73




4 Node 75, 75, 78, 79 Node 75, 76, 78, 79
Total 45
From the Figure 6.2 below, one can see that apart from the inner circle network there
are also few outer networks. Some of these networks can be easily identified based on
the characteristic of their activities, such as yellow nodes’ network for charity or
donations activities or blue nodes’ network for housing and shelter provision activities.
However, most of them are actors with overlapping activities and duties; therefore, the
characteristic may not be seen homogenous within the network. For that reason, the
next sub-section will explain further the mechanism undergone beneath the networks.
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Figure 6.2. Outer Networks Grouping Analysis
6.4.2 Insight Mechanisms of the Recovery Networks
6.4.2.1 Empowering through Leadership
The former head of Bantul Regency, Dr. HM. Idham Samawi, in his reflective memoir,
stated that the statistical data on the number of casualties, damage and loss was only a
small part of the effort to understand the hardships faced by the people after the
earthquake (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 139): ‘the numbers (of damage and losses) will
not be able to describe the sadness of the survivors, who were forced to separate from
the loved ones, or lost property that has been collected little by little over the years’. He
further explained that how one understood disasters would influence how the disaster
itself is managed. The comprehensive view on the problem should also be fully oriented
towards reducing the burden of disaster victims, and would be best rely on field
observation, with special consideration of local wisdom and cultural values, that is
‘gotong royong, saiyeg saeka praya’ (i.e. mutual cooperation and sharing in good and
sad, Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 139).
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He, together with Governor of DIY Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, played a significant
role in reviving the spirit of Bantul’s people in particular and the people in Yogyakarta
in general (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 19). Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono X, in a forum
with the Head of Regency, community leaders, cultural figures, citizens, and others,
reminded that for the people of Java (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 113), ‘the loss of
property means to not lose anything, losing (members of) family means to lose a half of
himself, losing of faith means to lose everything’. However, in this case, it cannot be
denied that Bantul and Yogyakarta benefited from the monarchy system in Yogyakarta,
in which it would be implicitly easier for the leaders to instruct their people to be more
engaged in the recovery process (Kusumasari, 2014a, p. 107).
The ‘Bantul Bangkit’ movement triggered by these leaders was an important part of the
recovery process. Through a variety of community activities, whether facilitated by the
government or purely community-driven, the spirit to bounce back from the crisis was
introduced, and essentially, meant encouraging people (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 143)
to: 1) get up immediately, and wipe out grief by working hard; 2) not rely on aid,
because assistance is limited and temporary; and 3) increase cooperation based on
local wisdom. The socialization of this movement was achieved through various means,
such as ‘rembug’ and ‘musyawarah’ (i.e. local regular citizen meetings), the creation of a
‘Bantul Bangkit’ song, community media, as well as the installation of evocative
banners. Banners and posters were installed in a number of strategic places to
strengthen the psychological power of the community. It was expected that local people
would optimize their own savings and property and that they would not depend on
temporary and limited assistance (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 111), particularly if the aid
was a binding agreement that would implicitly burden future generations, such as loans
(Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 113).
As part of his leadership style, Dr. HM. Idham Samawi obliged all office unit heads to get
involved and respond to any aspiration from the community, and at the same time the
community had the opportunity to report to the Head of Regency any officer who did
not appropriately respond to such needs. This approach aimed to change the mindset
of the bureaucracy, which must serve the people and not be served by the people. In
terms of disaster response and recovery, from public talks by the Head of Bantul
Regency17, it was revealed that the government acknowledged the power of public
17 The former head of Bantul Regency, Dr. HM. Idham Samawi, gave a public talk on the DRR
Commemoration Day in 2015, in which the researcher participated.
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participation to support the recovery programmes and ensure that they ran smoothly
(Kusumasari and Alam, 2012b, p. 360).
The Bantul Regency head has shown responsive leadership qualities by providing
adequate assistance to the victims (Kusumasari, 2014a). Through a crisis situation, the
leadership qualities of local leaders were tested by the capability to take the right
decisions in a short period of time. This capability is important, especially to avoid
further disasters emerging, such as social conflict. In addition, the coordination of small
units such as villages has shown how the bureaucracy can work together, not only in
terms of different government departments working together, but also government and
society working together. In addition, meetings between stakeholders and
organizations involved in helping the community were also routinely performed.
Structural barriers between the Head of Bantul Regency and Governor were almost
nonexistent (Kusumasari, 2014a, p. 107), since the Governor of the Province of
Yogyakarta gave away a wide range of mandates and authorities, meaning that
innovative and progressive policies could be enacted immediately by Head of the
Regency.
6.4.2.2 Local Government Responses
In terms of disaster management capacity, including earthquake and other disasters,
Bantul Regency has been shown to have a low level of capability (Kusumasari and
Alam, 2012a; Kusumasari, 2014a). In the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake, Bantul Regency
suffered the most severe damage. In the Provincial Disaster Management Plan (2013-
2017), Bantul Regency - along with the city of Yogyakarta and Sleman regency - were
even placed in a priority zone of earthquake disaster management. Accordingly, this
sub-section will discuss the local government response with regards to its disaster
management capability.
The locality aspect of a region becomes a consideration of the post-disaster recovery
process. Therefore, local government plays an important role in disaster management
(Kusumasari, 2014b; Mardiah, Andri N. R. et al., 2017). However, in the aftermath of the
earthquake, due to a lack of government preparedness in such uncertain times, the
government implemented a 'panic management' plan (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 108).
Disaster is a critical situation that generally leads to a lack of adequate resources.
Although the government was not completely paralyzed, the coordination system,
which relied heavily on office facilities, was disrupted in the aftermath of the
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earthquake. The government was not functioning optimally and, as a result, the
coordination effort was run on an emergency basis that ultimately lowered the quality
of public services. This generally caused delays to the entire development agenda
(Bantul Regency, 2008).
Even so, public officers and apparatus whose housings were also damaged were still
willing to help overcome the impact of disasters, for example by providing and
distributing food and medicines. In principle, the government was keen to cooperate
and to create synergies, especially with various parties that channel aid (e.g. external
communities, groups and even other countries). However, in channeling the aid, the
problem facing the government at that time was a difficulty in obtaining accurate data.
In a situation of uncertainty and panic, data continually changed and evolved according
to the latest findings. Inconsistencies in data that was always changing caused mistrust
and potential inaccuracies in aid disbursement (Bantul Regency, 2008).
The recovery phase in Bantul comprised both short-term and long-term goals. In
principle, the approach taken in Bantul’s disaster governance situated survivors as
subjects; a whole person whose rights and obligations as disaster sufferers must be
respected (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 141). However, the complexity of the problems
faced by the local government grew with the increasing diversity of internal and
external public views, which later influenced people’s attitudes and actions in Bantul.
The local government claimed to have coordinated and communicated the programs in
order to reduce misunderstandings. In addition, the local government sought to
harmonize the interests of various parties, including survivors, central government,
international agencies, donor communities, NGOs, corporate bodies, universities,
community organizations, and so on, all of which required certainty that the assistance
channeled was really on target and met the needs of survivors (Bantul Regency, 2008,
p. 141). Thus the main duty of the Bantul Regency government in addressing post-
earthquake problems was to build synergy, awareness, mutual trust and mutual
respect in order to help ease the burden faced by those suffering and speed up the
recovery process.
To speed up the recovery process, a stimulus fund for disaster survivor groups was also
established to increase the value of togetherness and mutual cooperation (Sunarti,
2013). The determination of the types of activities and businesses funded was carried
out in a participatory manner together with the community and government
representatives, taking into account various mutually agreed upon terms. The local
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government also established community development programmes which consisted of
a group of poor communities, each of which had been given initial capital of 10 million
rupiah to run small businesses (Kusumasari and Alam, 2012b, p. 359). Disaster
management lessons from Bantul and a few other cases contributed to institutional
arrangements for post-disaster revolving funds, implemented through the National
Community Empowerment Program (i.e. PNPM) and PNM (Sekretariat JRF, 2011, p.
43), so that the program can readily respond to people’s needs, especially when
disasters strike in the future.
6.4.2.3 Solidarity beneath the Networks
The revival spirit was influenced in part by high levels of solidarity inside and outside
Bantul. In fact, solidarity in the community groups greatly influenced the recovery
process in Bantul, starting from the rescue of victims, the provision of temporary
shelter, program information, basic social services, mental rehabilitation, housing
redevelopment, basic facilities and infrastructure improvements, and local economic
recovery (Badri et al., 2008, p. 67). In the 2006 earthquake, solidarity was started by
local people who were unaffected or who had only been partly affected by the
earthquake (Shakuntala, 2007, p. 71). This group of people then attempted to rescue
those who were affected by using their available resources. Following their efforts,
local government, and local and international NGOs set up information desks at the
Head of Regency’s office to organize coordination of healthcare and provide logistical
support (Kusumasari and Alam, 2012b, p. 360).
Local government, which holds prime responsibility for recovery, has the greatest stake
and authority to positively and directly influence the decision-making and action-taking
that encompasses the recovery process. As a consequence, local government is
ultimately accountable for the physical, social and economic outcomes of the recovery
process (Schwab, 2014). However, usually, in addition to the existing community group
(i.e. neighbourhood group and business community), there always will be many more
new actors and organizations that join after a disaster which function to fulfil the
information gaps and provide more resources, primarily in the form of labour, technical
assistance, and donation (Schwab, 2014, pp. 134-5). In Bantul, this was felt and lasted
for the first few weeks. Well-known as an educationally- and culturally-oriented city,
Yogyakarta got more than enough, if not said abundant attention, not only from central
government but also from many organizations based outside its territory. Assistance
that came from networks far outside the region, such as university alumni associations
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of most universities in Yogyakarta, or even migrant’ workers originating from
Yogyakarta and its surroundings had shown a high form of solidarity.
Furthermore, the response from local, national and international donors to help people
affected by the earthquake was overwhelming, and Yogyakarta Province was inundated
with humanitarian organizations within a few hours of the disaster. It is argued that
one of the factors influencing the successful disaster management in Bantul was the
fact that it was close to Jakarta; people thus had greater access to aid and greater
political influence (Kusumasari, 2014a, p. 106). The proximity of Jakarta and
Yogyakarta may also be seen from a historical perspective, particularly prior to the
independence of Indonesia, when Yogyakarta was once the capital of Indonesia during
the war (The Goverment of Yogyakarta Special Province, 2008).
Preparations for early recovery activities began in the second week after the disaster.
Initially, there was not much coordination among organizations involved, since, as was
previously explained, the local government’s capacity during the crisis was relatively
low. However, the local government began to cooperate with the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), which registered all participating organizations and
grouped them into several clusters, each cluster dealing with a number of activities.
The snowball of solidarity generated a kind of confidence amongst survivors, meaning
that they felt they were no longer alone (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 150). The social
support provided by governments, international agencies and NGOs had been more
than adequate. Therefore, what was next to be addressed was how survivors outside
the reach of government aid networks, or who were otherwise marginalized, could
access aid and financing schemes.
Bantul Regency government defined disaster victims in broad terms to include all
residents who were living in Bantul, whether they were registered as residents of
Bantul or not. This approach was used because in reality many people who live in
Bantul had not formally registered themselves (i.e. they lacked formal ID cards)
(Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 117). For example, students who came from out of town and
went to universities around Yogyakarta, students of Islamic boarding schools, traders
and migrant workers, residents of newly developed housing settlements, and so on.
Togetherness is sustained by caring; therefore the expansion of the definition was
based on the spirit of inclusiveness within post-disaster recovery and was primarily
aimed at avoiding social conflict, because injustice may arise if some received help and
others did not. In Javanese culture there is a principle: ‘ojo menange dhewe, ojo benere
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dhewe, ojo butuhe dewe’ (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 144). The meaning is the principle
stressing the importance of others, and prohibits putting oneself above others and
acting egotistically.
6.4.2.4 Local Opinion Leaders
Opinion leaders played an important role in the initial recovery process in Bantul. The
opinion leaders were drawn from amongst the people of Bantul and included political
figures, religious figures, youth leaders, women activists, public or social figures,
academic figures, and formal and informal leaders at the lowest levels of government,
including villages, hamlets and neighborhood communities (i.e. RT/RW).
Just after the disaster, uncertainty prevailed, mainly as a result of unclear information,
disrupted communication and poorly coordinated actions (Bantul Regency, 2008, p.
108). At this point, the role of opinion leaders was to communicate survivors’
aspirations, whilst at the same time communicating the government disaster
management programs in order to support community recovery. Furthermore, it has
been claimed that there is a significant relationship between the communication
empowerment of opinion leaders and the community group's performances (Badri et
al., 2008). The opinion leader is a source of information or opinion for his/her
followers. In disaster, they can thus help to optimize community participation, mediate,
and even help reduce community upheaval (Badri et al., 2008, p. 56).
Initially, the implementation of the government's program was marred by an
atmosphere of disappointment after the government broke a promise to give aid of
thirty million rupiah to earthquake survivors (Widyanta, 2007). This disappointment
then turned into a feeling of suspicion and distrust. The process of community-based
reconstruction, which was expected to improve the sense of togetherness amongst
citizens, was in fact accompanied by conflict that stemmed from miscommunication up
to the problems that led to the lawsuit (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 144). In addition,
disappointment arose due to dynamics in the preparation of data and data collection,
which involved economic and political interests (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 129).
Governments and the majority of international agencies and NGOs that have disaster
management programs had taken advantage of the role of opinion leaders so that
disaster management programs would be on track to meet targets and in line with
community aspirations. The local leader’s personality, the intensity of meetings and
group cohesiveness would have an effect on recovery activities and on what had been
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implemented in the provision of temporary or permanent housing programs (Badri et
al., 2008).
A positive perspective is needed when viewing the growing problems. A negative
outlook, arising from disbelief, suspicion, and the like, will be an impediment to the
recovery process. Data collection involving citizen participation will, of course, be very
risky if a negative perspective prevails. A positive outlook is needed, especially when
differences arise in the calculation and presentation of data, so that any problem can be
immediately addressed. It should be understood that the process of data collection was
conducted in a crisis atmosphere, where every citizen strove to save themselves and
their family (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 118).
This was where the role of opinion leaders became important. Someone is affirmed as a
local opinion leader by the community because of their empathy and social
participation, meaning that the role has a real effect on social services. They may have
access to communication with and information from officials involved in disaster
management (Badri et al., 2008, p. 65). In addition, through the assistance of local
opinion leaders, who also acted as program facilitators, decision-making and planning
was carried out openly using a transparent process. This involved determining the
beneficiaries and procedures for handling complaints and resolutions. This process
ultimately resulted in increased accountability, community participation and a sense of
community ownership of the recovery program (Sekretariat JRF, 2011, p. 27), which
then finally accelerated the process and the potential success of recovery (Badri et al.,
2008, p. 68).
6.4.2.5 Togetherness and Mutual Cooperation
Parents, elders and religious leaders can certainly be a reference to re-examine the
history of the community, especially to find out how togetherness was built in the
community. From what has been going on in Bantul, such as ‘musyawarah’ (local
meetings), ‘gotong royong’ (mutual cooperation), mutual respect, and so on, it can be
seen how predecessors tried to build, maintain and develop togetherness such that it
became a cultural value embedded into the social capital of society.
The characteristics of rural communities in Yogyakarta and Central Java uphold values
of mutual cooperation, solidarity and tolerance as essential forces in the
implementation of rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. The community as a whole
was the party who best knew the social character and environmental needs of its
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citizens (Tim Teknis Nasional, 2007, p. 15). Social problems, such as whose houses
were built first or the pattern of direct aid distribution was decided by members of the
community. The government in this case only acted as a facilitator who, amongst other
things, was in charge of keeping the rehabilitation and reconstruction process on the
right track, for example by maintaining the price and stock of raw materials and the
technical principles of earthquake-resistant houses. In principle, community-based
rehabilitation and reconstruction programs involve the broader community. This gives
space for the community to determine the form of recovery that suits its needs.
Community involvement starts from the regency, sub-district, village and hamlet level.
Through this, there will be a sense of togetherness, mutual ownership and tolerance
within the community. Despite its shortcomings, the concept will be more
participatory, as it relies heavily on local wisdom as the main strategy of post-
earthquake redevelopment (Kusumasari and Alam, 2012b). In this case, togetherness
and mutual cooperation become key words (Tim Teknis Nasional, 2007, p. 38).
Post-disaster recovery in Bantul required the engagement of community members who
were also victims of the earthquake. Especially in the case of Yogyakarta, the local
government was still functioning, such that the active role of citizens might still be
expected (Tim Teknis Nasional, 2007, p. 15). Public participation in the recovery
phases in Bantul not only included the local community, but also multiple stakeholders,
such as national and international NGOs, emergency services, religious groups,
corporate bodies, associations, voluntary organizations, social activists, political parties
and universities. However, it is local communities who should actively participate in
disaster management efforts. This is the key to the success of the disaster recovery
programme in Bantul (Kusumasari and Alam, 2012b, p. 360); cooperation and hard
work became the foundation for recovery. Hard work was instilled with an
understanding that assistance is temporary and limited, so to recover from the crisis
required a productive work ethic and independence (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 150).
After the earthquake, some survivors returned to live on their own land, while others
lived in the village areas that had been designated as relocation sites (Sekretariat JRF,
2011, p. 20). In the process of reconstructing their homes and using government
assistance or other sources of relief, the earthquake survivors often used roof tiles,
door frames and even building materials from the houses they left behind. With a
strong spirit of mutual help, some residents also donated their own resources to the
more needy survivors in their neighborhood. For example, a public figure in Wonolelo
Village, Pleret Sub-district, Bantul Regency, said 'for those who cannot complete their
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wall construction, I allow them to cut my bamboo plant for them to use as a wall-
making material' (Sekretariat JRF, 2011, p. 20). A sense of togetherness also emerged
among disaster victims in their assistance to one another in rebuilding their houses.
After one house was built, it was then another person’s turn to have their house built.
The high level of caring among survivors in the recovery phase minimised the potential
for conflict in the community and hastened recovery (Kusumasari and Alam, 2012b, p.
361). The ‘togetherness’ idea was a series of voluntary collaborative actions which
simultaneously emerged after the powerful earthquake (The Goverment of Yogyakarta
Special Province, 2008)
6.4.2.6 Collaborative Work amongst Stakeholders
In Bantul, it was shown that efforts in the response and recovery periods were mainly
supported by strong working relationships among the community, local government,
and other institutions such as NGOs, religious groups, universities and the private
sector (INT1, as documented in BAPPENAS, 2015b). These relationships did not
emerge instantly during or after the earthquake. Hence building trust between the
governments, public, private and non-profit organizations should have taken place
prior to the crisis situation (Kusumasari and Alam, 2012b, p. 361), for the purpose of
ensuring that information is shared, ensuring the development a willingness to
collaborate, and so that shared values exist in the network.
The first collaborative work was started on the day of the earthquake. The head of
Bantul Regency had already involved many international and national NGOs and donor
agencies. Under the coordination of the United Nations, these stakeholders supported
local government with efforts directed towards health, nutrition, shelter, water and
sanitation, telecommunications, logistics, education and farming. Gradually, when all
the local government units had been coordinated, the disbursement of aid became
more effective. By that time, all donations within the emergency period were
coordinated by the Regency Unit for Disaster Management (i.e. SATLAK). Since then,
integration and mobilization have been managed effectively between all stakeholders.
This integration and public participation continued even after the recovery stages were
complete (Kusumasari and Alam, 2012b, p. 362).
Since 2000, the government has made a great effort to involve the community in
Bantul’s development. For Bantul’s local government, community participation can be
understood as the willingness of the public to express their opinion and provide
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recommendations to the government, as well as get involved in local government
programmes; local government in turn uses that advice to consider how to enhance the
quality of public services. Okazaki and Shaw (2003) have stressed that participation
and ownership by local people can bring about a sense of achievement; furthermore,
their research shows that the importance of public participation is the increasing
acceptance of disaster recovery programs amongst survivors as beneficiaries of the
programs. In the case of Bantul, the existing community groups, which possess a high
level of solidarity, sense of togetherness and shared goals, made collaboration in
support of the recovery process very crucial (Badri et al., 2008, p. 69). In addition, the
persistent support of local opinion leaders for the government recovery program has
been shown to smooth and accelerate the recovery process.
Volunteers, community-based organizations, and other non-governmental
organizations can also be instrumental in leading community transformation following
disaster; in particular, they can assist vulnerable populations whose needs are not met
by more conventional disaster-assistance programs (Schwab, 2014, p. 135). By placing
the local community at the forefront of the recovery process, Bantul has aided the
success of the rehabilitation and reconstruction process (Kusumasari and Alam, 2012b,
p. 362). Furthermore, this approach has also minimised the potential conflict and risk
that may arise between the community and the government. In terms of disaster
response and recovery, the former head of Bantul Regency stated that the government
has acknowledged the power of public participation in ensuring the smooth running of
disaster response and recovery programmes (Kusumasari and Alam, 2012b, p. 360).
6.5 Discussion of the Essentials of Disaster Recovery Governance
Based on our analysis, we can see that leadership, solidarity, togetherness and mutual
cooperation, local opinion leaders, local government capability, and collaboration
among stakeholders in Bantul were determinants of success and accelerated the
recovery programmes that the local government and other actors had implemented.
Most of these were worked out under the concept of network and social capital, for
instance gotong royong, which means cooperation within and between social networks.
These social capitals, along with cultural influence and man-made systems, such as
communication systems, transparency and accountability, have strongly encouraged
the community to become an essential part of disaster recovery programmes. For that
purpose, the following section is dedicated to unpacking the underlying principles of
the abovementioned network and mechanisms within Bantul’s recovery process.
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6.5.1 Social and Cultural Resources
The Bantul government has realized that disaster response and recovery tasks are
immense and are beyond their capacity as an organization. Therefore, the presence of
social resources in society is very beneficial, especially for implementing government
programs. In this case, the social resources in communities have supported the
government in obtaining competitive benefits and accelerating the disaster recovery
process. The social resources referred here consist of local cultural values and local
wisdom rooted in Javanese culture (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 30). The Javanese people
of Bantul in particular and the people of Yogyakarta in general, both long before and
after the earthquake, have lived with a sense that life’s burdens are shared, an
acceptance of overwhelming situations (in Javanese: nerimo), a sense of trust and
obedience to leaders or community leaders (in Javanese: nerimo ing pandu) and also
have a sense of togetherness, kinship, mutual sharing and cooperation (i.e. gotong
royong). According to Putnam (2000), the existence of these kind of resources in a
community can facilitate large-scale, coordinated actions. Interestingly, most of the
social and cultural resources of the Bantul people have been owned and run for
hundreds of years, since the era of the Sultanate of Yogyakarta, which was influenced
by Hindu-Buddhist belief and culture and then replaced by the period of Islamic
civilization until now (Kumara and Susetyo, 2008, p. 131). Thus, since then, the value of
culture and local wisdom has become the main modality in the dynamics of the lives of
Bantul and Yogyakarta people.
After the earthquake, at every crossroad, the local government placed many banners
containing statements of local wisdom (Kumara and Susetyo, 2008, p. 131). At that
time, the local government had been fully aware that social resources were a valuable
thing that should be fueled and used as the driving forces of the recovery process. As
an illustration, the villagers of Wonolelo Village in Pleret Sub-district, automatically
applied the tradition of mutual cooperation (i.e. gotong royong) when solving problems
affecting their village after the earthquake (Sekretariat JRF, 2011, p. 20). With the
tagline 'Bantul Bangkit' (Bantul Revive), the government of Bantul Regency emphasized
the recovery of the victims’ productivity, so that lives and livelihoods could continue as
normal. The concept of ‘Bantul Bangkit’ was not derived from other theoretical
concepts but from within the community itself, embedded as local wisdom for
hundreds of years, since the early Hindhu-Budhist civilizations in Indonesia. Therefore,
in this case, it is worth mentioning that the local government have benefited from this
social resource and used it as a means to remind people to get up and stand on their
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own two feet. A common understanding that the government tried to build was that the
assistance received should be seen as an initial stimulant to encourage sustainable
actions by the community; at some point the recovery needed the involvement of the
people themselves, who should thus be willing to strive and work hard in order to rise
up from their grief (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 122).
On the other hand, based on recent research (Nurhadi, 2015, p. 115), the social capital
of the poor has been increasing, as shown by, amongst other things, the stronger social
ties between community members and the widening of social networks with local
decision makers.
Neighbors, relatives and friends are increasingly concerned and show greater solidarity, offering
assistance to lighten the burden of reconstruction of the house. As a result the practice of mutual
cooperation is getting stronger (ibid.)
This condition illustrates the importance of the social capital that already exists in
society. When the crisis happened, social capital could be reactivated and became a
cost-reducing factor which accelerated the recovery process. In this regard, the right
choices from the government in determining and implementing the portfolio of
programs and activities were very influential. In short, in the disaster recovery period,
these social and cultural resources were very important, since the local community
knows best. The government’s role was to re activate this embedded capital in society,
and to use it to smooth the delivery of information and the implementation of
programs. Furthermore, these aforementioned resources have not only accelerated the
recovery in Bantul, but also minimised potential conflict in the community (Kusumasari
and Alam, 2012b, p. 361).
6.5.2 A Well-Connected Community
The impact of the disaster was not felt equally and evenly by all victims. Some groups in
the community suffered a bigger impact than others. One of the causes behind this is
poverty. According to a recent study in Bantul (Nurhadi, 2015, p. 103), the richest
people suffered fewer disasters because of their ability to reduce the impact of
disasters by strengthening their home structures and because they could use their
assets. On the other hand, the poor can reduce the impact of disasters by maximizing
networks and working together to minimize the cost of building a house (gotong
royong). The most vulnerable are those in between these two groups, having no
sufficient assets to be spent on their home or business improvement, and no social
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networks to be accessed either. Unlike the poor, who can save on labor costs related to
housing reconstruction by relying upon voluntary reciprocal assistance, the middle
classes found it difficult to minimize costs because all costs must be paid in cash.
In a study of fishermen in West Java, Sunarti et al. (2013) suggests that proximity to
social networks was an indicator of economic vulnerability. Other indicators include:
the number of family dependents, the number of sick family members, per capita
income, access to capital, access to business opportunities, education level, access to
information and the need for social assistance. Activities that may be helpful to expand
social networks, include participation in local associations, including professional
associations, businesses and cooperatives. The higher the involvement in local
organizations, the more open the opportunity to get assistance (Sunarti, 2013).
A well-connected community in Bantul consists of strong ties within groups and
networks between groups of communities. The performance of groups of communities
in Bantul, according to Badri et al. (2008) is influenced greatly by participation, division
of labor, communications and cooperation. The level of information disclosure and
cooperation within these groups reached 75.1 percent and 65.7 percent, respectively
(Badri et al., 2008, p. 62). This is in line with the claim of the respondent (INT6, as
documented in BAPPENAS, 2015b), as follows:
Yogyakarta communities have a great sense of kinship and ownership (towards the program). If we
provide the same funding to build, they can move forward in such a cooperative way. So the impact
of the policy can be different, I believe it would ultimately depend on the community itself.
Although the presence of assistance has helped to reduce the burden of victims, the
most important thing is building the solidarity that allows for the mobilization of the
social energy of the community (Bantul Regency, 2008, p.32). The solidarity embedded
in a well-connected community has provided communities with access to other
available resources (i.e. those of other members), either in the form of private
donations, assistance or access to other financing (Sekretariat JRF, 2011, p. 20). As an
illustration (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 113), on the fourth day after the earthquake,
Maryono, the head of the neighborhood association of RT 5, Ngibikan, Canden, Jetis,
assisted by architect Eko Prawoto, coordinated the community to build 65 houses
worth 650 million rupiah with assistance from KOMPAS (i.e. CSR fund from newspaper
company). In this case, residents who were connected to one another were able to
enjoy the resources that were sought or obtained through other members’ networks.
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6.5.3 Partnership and Empowerment
Given their complexity, in crisis situations conventional mechanisms cannot be
deployed. It takes solid teamwork, partnership and networks based on trust and
mutual respect. In the context of disaster management and recovery, the Bantul
government sought to form a solid working team that was willing to work based on a
vision and mission oriented towards improving the quality of services to the survivors
and to accelerate the recovery process (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 141). Therefore, the
partnership approach was used in order to create synergies and avoid new problems
along the way.
Lessons learned from the Aceh tsunami disaster recovery were the low level of
partnerships between BRR - as the ad hoc institution appointed at the time- with local
governments (INT6, as documented in BAPPENAS, 2015b). As an organization with full
authority, BRR neglected to engage the local governments in the recovery programs. As
a result, the local government’s sense of ownership of these central government
recovery programs was relatively low, and finally ended with a less smooth transition
process (i.e. exit strategies) from BRR to local governments in regard to the post-
disaster development programs and the assets maintenance of the infrastructure built.
The same should be of concern to international agencies and the donor communities in
carrying out their temporary project in the local context.
In addition, the involvement of various parties, beside bringing understanding and
support, also meant that groups could supervise each other, for example when it came
to the use of funds and quality of activities (Sunarti et al., 2013). Furthermore,
participatory planning is recommended because it can accommodate the views,
considerations, interests and needs of the community, many of which became the
consideration of all stakeholders when implementing activities in the communities,
villages and sub-districts. Partnerships that places the community as a key partner
means that the problems that arise throughout the process can be anticipated and
responded to thoroughly, in accordance with agreed upon timelines and the
achievement of agreed upon targets. Community participation and initiatives were also
essential for the recovery process in order to strengthen and rely upon local strengths.
The government in this case was required to be more flexible to the situation and needs
of the people, for example in the effort to empower poor families after the disaster
politically, economically, socially and culturally (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 143).
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Participation should also be meaningful, such as the empowerment that was
implemented by a group of women in Imogiri. It was claimed that they had successfully
demonstrated toughness as pioneers in the post-disaster recovery process. Through
patience and diligence and various innovations, the women were able to channel
positive energy to the surrounding environment such that they were able to
immediately rise from adversity (Yusuf, 2014). The community empowerment
approach focuses on the importance of an autonomous local community as a system
that organizes itself and is positioned as the subject of development (Setiana, 2005, as
cited in Badri et al., 2008). Furthermore, this can be seen in a survey of a 'resilient
women strategy’ (Yusuf, 2014), which described the role of women survivors after the
earthquake in Bantul. They were active, creative and innovative and were gradually re-
establishing their lives by resuming their economic activities, either through
independent enterprise or collective business. Many either intended to open new joint
businesses or continue with old ones.
The government was fully aware that the main driver for recovery is the people, not the
government. The restoration of the people's ability, by itself, would become an engine
in the process of accelerating recovery. Thus it was the obligation of the government to
provide programs and activities that could facilitate and support the process of
recovery through people empowerment. This has been implemented in earthquake
resistant housing support schemes through community-based schemes (i.e. PokMas).
Besides intending to provide economic benefits to the people, this effort actually has
other strategic aims: 1) as a vehicle to strengthen social capital, such as mutual
cooperation and togetherness; and 2) as a means to form a 'new family' (i.e. PokMas), to
improve the quality of the social network, offer mutual help and mutual sharing and
provide protection to the weak (Bantul Regency, 2008, pp. 142-3).
6.5.4 Communication, Transparency and Accountability
Sociologically, disasters disrupt people’s lives and livelihood, or even change the
existing social capital in communities. As disaster strikes, fear and distrust may exist
between survivors in a society, and between the survivors and the government
regarding the ability of the government to protect its citizens (Maarif, 2010). An
illustration is the implementation of the recovery program, which started in an
atmosphere of disappointment, especially after the government broke a promise to
offer assistance of around thirty million rupiah (later decreased by 50 percent)
(Widyanta, 2007). This caused distrust, which partly turned into suspicion. In addition
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to this, in terms of data preparation, there was a difference in the results of the data
collection process, which eventually caused a conflict of interest at the community
level. In addition, the differences occurred because of perceptions regarding aid
distribution: who got priority, who benefited and who got harmed because of decisions
made. In the context of disaster, one may focus on how distrust emerges between the
disaster victims and the government's ability to protect its citizens in the event of a
disaster. However, distrust also appeared in the midst of society regarding which
negative views might be dangerous and cause internal conflict, for example, when a
person with his/her network capability controls assistance for his or her own group
(Maarif, 2010, p. 2). This asymmetric information caused distortion in the recovery
implementation and, as a result, victims who had little access to resources lived in
poorer conditions.
In principle, communication is the transfer of information from the sender of the
message to the recipient of the message with the aim of achieving mutual
understanding between the two parties (Badri et al., 2008). Communication is
influenced by clarity and consistency, and has five elements: communicator, message,
media, communicatee, and effect (Effendi, 2004, as cited in Badri et al., 2008). The
government has tried to be present to give answers to any questions raised in the
society. In the event of a disaster, the existence of social capital facilitated information
flow between and amongst individuals (Lin, 2002). However, not all people's problems
can be solved by the government. That is why an open attitude from the government
was required, so that the people could understand the limits of the government's
ability, which in turn would encourage self-reliance through the cooperation of citizens
(Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 142).
According to a study of 80 respondents in Bantul (Kumara and Susetyo, 2008, p. 147),
the respondents generally (70 percent) interpreted and correlated the disasters with
divine (god) matters and destiny. One form of coping with the recovery phase is to trust
the direction of religious and community leaders, as they brought peace of mind and
viewed the disaster event in a positive light (Kumara and Susetyo, 2008, p. 146).
Therefore, the role of communication can be effective if supported by the role of
respected figures from the religious community. In addition, opinion leaders may also
take the form of public figures, community leaders and informal leaders, and they all
have the ability to influence others.
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Furthermore, the people needed adequate socialization, which was conducted several
times in various circles, either in the circles that could support the process, or in the
circles that could inhibit the implementation of planned activities. Besides face-to-face
meetings in community groups, other effective means for socialization were through
newspapers, radio and television broadcasts. Most respondents of Bantul (50 percent)
admitted that the information regarding aid disbursement was received from radio
broadcasts, while information regarding disaster management policy and updates on
the progress of rehabilitation and reconstruction was widely received from
newspapers (51.9 percent) and television (26.2 percent) (Badri et al., 2008, p. 61).
After socialization, there is a need for careful planning and measurable targeting with
the resources available, as well as a strict, consistent and persistent monitoring and
evaluation (Sunarti et al., 2013). Thus, from the very beginning, the principle of
transparency should be placed as the foundations, which later on becomes a means to
achieve accountability among stakeholders.
For a program that was large in scale, it was certainly difficult to ensure that the
guidelines set were actually met in reality. Therefore, after the reconstruction program,
the Bantul Regency government launched a reconciliation program on February 16th
2008. Reconciliation is, ‘the way of building togetherness or building a life based on
mutual respect and trust, as well as humanitarian values’ (Memoir of Drs. HM Idham
Samawi, as cited in Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 131). The determination of the Bantul
Regency government to immediately develop reconciliation and build social
reintegration can be seen as awareness that the Bantul revival was unlikely to be
achieved, much less sustained, without social resources mobilized in or between strong
social networks. It was not a pseudo-harmony to be built, or a compulsion towards
togetherness, but a kind of harmony for progress or mutual cooperation between
people based on a spirit of humanity, mutual trust and respect.
6.6 Concluding Remarks
According to a calculation of damage and loss conducted by BAPPENAS, defective
public assets totalled 2,763 trillion rupiah, or 11.3% of all assets (Goverment of
Indonesia, 2006, p. 12). The rest was comprised of damage suffered by personal assets
or individuals. This means that earthquake damage is not necessarily the sole
responsibility of government as a whole, but individuals should be given major roles
and responsibilities. Communities should be prepared to be at the forefront of disaster
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risk reduction, management and recovery. The network analysis shown in Figure 6.1
and 6.2 demonstrates the robustness of the underlying network.
Actors’ collaboration as identified in Table 6.2 provides a glance of the insight
mechanisms found in this chapter: leadership, solidarity, togetherness and mutual
cooperation, local opinion leaders, local government capability, and collaboration
among stakeholders. All of these mechanisms were explained in depth according to the
four underlying principles of (1) social and cultural value; (2) a well-connected society;
(3) partnership and empowerment; and (4) communication, transparency, and
accountability.
However, the results of a rapid evaluation at the beginning of this chapter indicate that
the economic recovery received less attention than the restoration of housing and
infrastructure (Sekretariat JRF, 2011). In late 2008, it was claimed that there were still
many businesses that were not as fully operational as before the earthquake
(Resosudarmo et al., 2012). Some of the contributing factors, among other things,
include the need for capital, damage to production facilities, damage to building
premises and a breakdown in access to the market. These conditions require a strategy
to accelerate the economic recovery of communities and the local economy through the
active involvement of the business community so that the interventions remain on the
right track. This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.
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Chapter 7. In-Depth Analysis from Individual-Local
Perspectives: Risk Perceptions, Implementations
and Strategies to Revive the Bantul Regency
Economy
7.1 Introduction
The histories of disaster occurrences have shown that one of the most demanding
aspect of the recovery process is that of restoring the economic losses (Flynn, 2007).
From this point of view, losses refer to the loss of development investment, by the
government, the private sector, and society in general (Sunarti, 2013). This is because
the catastrophic events eliminate some of, or even entire, livelihood assets which then
require a relatively long time to be gathered again. Furthermore, experiences of loss are
also interpreted as the decline of the community’s capacity level, and on the other hand,
represent an increase in the vulnerability of the community (Sunarti et al., 2013).
When an earthquake, measuring 5.9 on the Richter scale, wreaked havoc on the Bantul
region on 27 May 2006, it caused an economic downturn (International Organization
for Migration, 2011). The data shows that the damage to economic and infrastructure
facilities in Yogyakarta and Bantul reached a value of more than US$ 3 billion
(Goverment of Indonesia, 2006; Sekretariat JRF, 2011, p. 15). This equals more than
half of the Regional Gross Domestic Product (RGDP) of the preceding local government
financial year (Goverment of Indonesia, 2006). Based on investigation at the regency
level, it was recorded that there were 1,328 craftsmen and 10,781 traders who needed
additional capital due to loss of business assets. In addition, there were 29 traditional
markets damaged, causing a slowdown of local economic development (data recorded
per 7 June 2006, Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 116). As is widely known, Bantul’s craftsmen
and small business enterprises are part of the Yogyakarta tourism industry, due to
most of the handicraft in Yogyakarta Province being supplied by Bantul’s craftsmen
(Bantul Regency, 2008).
The tourism sector is widely recognized as one of the engines of economic growth in
developing countries and is highlighted as one of the strategies for reducing disparity
between regions (Jenkins, 1980). With its complex characteristics, the tourism industry
is a considerably labour-intensive industry which provides many opportunities for
various local organizations and small businesses to grow (Dredge, 2006). Tourism has a
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multiplier effect and links to many other sectors within a nation’s economy, with one of
the links being between tourism and shopping behaviour. Shopping is indeed the
essential activity in the tourism industry and has significantly contributed to the local
micro and small retail businesses (Coles, 2004; Timothy, 2005). Furthermore, the
existence of micro and small enterprises has also been described as the backbone of a
developing economy (Tambunan, 2009).
Interestingly, the Bantul and Yogyakarta provinces managed to recover within a period
of two years (i.e. 18 months, Tim Teknis Nasional, 2007), with good signs of recovery
identifiable much earlier. The government reports (Bantul Regency, 2008; Goverment
of Indonesia, 2010), together with international agency reports (Sekretariat JRF, 2011;
International Organization for Migration, 2011), noted this tremendous progress. The
activities indicating local economic restoration include, among others, livelihood
recovery, re-establishment of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs),
facilitation of access to finance, upgrading of work premises, and redeveloping sector
bases of the local economy.
The dynamics of Bantul's economic development resulted in the structural
transformation of the Bantul economy. Along with this, there is also a shift in
livelihoods in Bantul Regency with the greatest strengthening among the MSMEs (see
also Chapter 3, Sub-section 2.3.). Based on data from Industry, Trade and Cooperatives ,
the establishment of MSMEs alone from 2010 to 2012 has added value and investment
worth up to 500 billion rupiah (Bantul Regency, 2013). Starting from these facts, we
believe Bantul Regency and Yogyakarta Province offer many lessons to be explored.
This chapter explores the following research question: ‘How did the local community
actors in Bantul Regency–Yogyakarta Province, initiate, cooperate and network to
revive the local economy, at the level of micro, small and medium enterprises (i.e.
MSMEs)?’. Thus the chapter aims to uncover the recovery process required after a
disaster strikes and to investigate the MSMEs on the platform of the tourism industry
and their expectations for future challenges. Although there have been many studies
conducted on the economic impact of disasters (Skoufias, 2003; Flynn, 2007), research
which focuses on micro and small businesses and their interconnections with the
tourism sector in the post-disaster context is still very rare: in particular, research
focused on the internal view of how they actually recover, their expectations and the
implications for future challenges.
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In addition to the theoretical overview of shopping tourism and its links with MSMEs,
methods, and an overview of the case study, this chapter will be presented in three
content sections, as follows: (1) the landscape of MSMEs in Bantul Regency and
Indonesia; (2) post-disaster recovery governance for MSMEs and the local economy of
Bantul Regency, including discussion of the network and findings regarding risk
perceptions and implementations; and (3) local economic recovery in Bantul Regency,
including discussion of the lessons and strategies for a local economic revival. Lastly,
the sixth section contains concluding remarks.
7.2 Research Approach
In the following sub-sections, the research approaches will be further described:
underpinning theories, methods, and finally, an overview of handicraft clusters, which
serves as the background context of the analysis in the next three sections.
7.2.1 Underpinning Theories
In many cases, the disruption caused by the disaster to local people’s lives was
devastating (Arendt and Alesch, 2015), resulting in fundamental problems for people’s
livelihoods and for many sectors within the affected regions (Phillips, 2009), including
the tourism sector (Schwab, 2014). Learning from a series of past disasters, one type of
loss that requires serious anticipation – in addition to the death toll and injuries – is the
loss and/or destruction of economic assets or livelihoods. This is important because the
economic disruption will have other impacts and prolong the post-disaster recovery
process. Subsequently, the longer the recovery time, the more expensive the recovery
cost (Flynn, 2007).
MSMEs have a strong influence on many economies in the world. It is claimed that they
contribute significantly to job creation, social stability, and the economic welfare of
regions (Tambunan, 2009). The existence of MSME clusters within a region is also
believed to encourage the formation of tourism patterns, since clustering is believed to
be a requirement for innovation and community capacity building (Dredge, 2006). This
is in line with Porter’s (2000) clusters concept, in which industries tend to agglomerate
in one area to get the benefit from the connection of spatial locations. His work, in
particular, explains a cluster as a geographical concentration of industries or business
entities interconnected within a specific location.
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There have been many studies exploring the interconnected ideas between shopping
behaviours and tourism (Coles, 2004; Timothy, 2005; Swanson and Timothy, 2012;
Azmi et al., 2016). Buying souvenirs from handicraft shop clusters or shops near tourist
destinations has indeed become the essential activity of tourists. Swanson and Timothy
(2012, p. 490) define a souvenir as a ‘symbolic reminder of an event or experience’, or
it can be described as tangible proof of the intangible experiences of leisure sensations.
Although the shopping clusters still need to integrate with other tourist attractions (e.g.
historical or natural attractions), they have begun to be considered a tourist destination
in itself (Getz, 1993). This is because most tourists’ trips are considered incomplete
without a shopping activity; furthermore, buying things that represent the place they
visit has been assumed to be taking home mementos of vacations (Timothy, 2005).
Shopping tourism clusters, which are developed in a particular small geographical area,
are called tourist shopping villages (Getz, 1993). However, Getz (1993) further explains
that this small cluster retailing activity could be within a small town or village, though
usually located near other tourist routes. Today, tourists might buy many other things
besides handicraft; however, a unique handicraft item remains one of the favourite
souvenirs bought while travelling (Swanson and Timothy, 2012). The items chosen by
tourists include arts and crafts, gemstones and jewellery, antique products, leather
goods, housewares, pictures or statues of landmarks of tourist destinations, collectible
items (e.g. mugs, key rings, fridge magnets, postcards), food originating from the
destination area, and local clothing products (Timothy, 2005; Swanson and Timothy,
2012; Azmi et al., 2016).
Souvenirs can also be viewed as commodities within the tourism industry which are
produced and distributed through supply chains (Coles, 2004; Swanson and Timothy,
2012). This, accordingly, will surely involve MSMEs as the prime movers of shopping
tourism. As is widely known, most tourism is based on a network of small and medium-
sized tourism enterprises and local organizations which provide all types of tourism
products, services and supporting policies (Dredge, 2006). In addition to this, Lanfant
(1980, as cited in Nash, 1996, p. 103) strongly believed that tourism as an industry goes
beyond the network of local, regional and even national boundaries or territories.
Hence the tourism industry, including many MSMEs, is indeed a social fact worldwide
(Nash, 1996).
The development of tourist destinations has also been said to facilitate the growth of
MSMEs. It is claimed that tourism offers an opportunity for people to start-up
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businesses which will ultimately benefit the development of the destination regions,
because the shopper will stay longer, meaning a higher per capita spend (Getz, 1993).
To sum up, the tourism industry is complex and involves the tangible and intangible
experiences of a tourist destination; in this case, the intangible tourism could take the
form of sensations of shopping during travelling. Although the shopping preferences of
tourists might vary across different places, shopping has already been broadly
recognized as a part of leisure activities (Getz, 1993; Timothy, 2005).
7.2.2 Methods
Chapter 7 focuses on Bantul Regency, especially on the sub-districts that have
handicraft industries and shop clusters. The analytical unit used in this research is
micro and small-scale business entities (called MSMEs), and almost all of them are
home-based industries. This decision is based on the fact that the local economy has
been heavily influenced by small-scale economic activities (which will be explained
further in Sections 2.3 and 3.2). The sub-district samples were chosen by a purposive
sampling method. Sub-districts were selected that are located at high and medium risk
level areas but at the same time included more developed handicraft industrial clusters,
namely the Sub-districts of Bantul Sewon, Kasihan, Banguntapan, and Imogiri ( refer to
Chapter 3).
This study applies a mixed-methods approach of descriptive statistical analysis (using
questionnaires), social network analysis (using UCINET and Netdraw), and thematic
content analysis (desk study and interview), from the following data: 1) interviewing
key actors in the related fields; 2) a questionnaire survey of 100 respondents in the
selected sub-districts; complemented by 3) a literature survey of government policy
documents and non-governmental disaster-recovery related project reports. All the
questionnaire respondents are micro and small-scale business entities that were
chosen by random sampling within the selected sub-district samples.
7.2.3 An Overview of the Case Studies: Handicraft Clusters
Bantul Regency is part of the Special Province of Yogyakarta which covers four
regencies and one city. Bantul Regency has an area of 506.85 km2 and administratively
it is divided into 17 sub-districts (kecamatan), 75 villages (kelurahan) and 933 hamlets
(dukuh) (Bantul Regency, 2008). Based on population registration data, the population
of Bantul Regency has grown from 808,366 people (2005) to 911,503 people (2010)
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and then to 917,511 people (2015), with the population trend increasing by 1.32
percent per year (BPS Jogjakarta Province, 2016).
Geographically, tourism in Bantul Regency is closely linked to the City of Yogyakarta’s
tourism industry. This city is the third most famous tourist destination after Bali and
Lombok and is well known as a city of culture and education. Yogyakarta attracted on
average 1,139,922 visitors during the period 2004-2008 (Dinas Kepariwisataan
Jogjakarta, 2008), but this number does not include the arrival of students from all over
Indonesia due to the many universities within this area. Also observing the
surrounding area, there are links between its natural beauty, cultural values and
historical sites as well as local home-based industrial products which have been
identified as the strength of the province of Yogyakarta’s tourism industry platform.
When the earthquake struck Yogyakarta, MSMEs were the most severely affected, and
at the same time they had the fewest resources with which to recover their businesses
and livelihoods (Sekretariat JRF, 2011). As a result, the impact on the local economy
can be clearly perceived, primarily due to the large number of MSMEs and handicraft
clusters in Yogyakarta and, in particular, Bantul Regency. There are 72 handicraft
clusters in Bantul (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 58) which are not homogenous from one
sub-district to another (as has been shown in Figure 4.3 in Chapter 4), and in which
most of the sub-districts already have their own featured or typical products.
Some of the well-known tourist shopping platforms in Bantul Regency include various
clusters (Bantul Regency, 2009b): Kasongan (pottery craft, 441 units of MSMEs; ibid.,
p. 16), Manding (leather-based craft, 55 units of MSMEs; ibid., p. 38), and Wukirsari
(batik craft, 414 units of MSMEs; ibid., p. 28). The evolution of becoming a tourism
destination for those village-based handicraft clusters took several years. In Bantul
Regency, the involvement of the village community in proposing their clusters as
tourism destinations is very important. The business incubation process has been
tiered upwards, from the village community to the regency government level (Saputra
and Rindrasih, 2012). Box 7.1 describes the profiles of home-based and small industry
entities in Bantul Regency.
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Source: summarized from Bantul Regency (2009b); Bantul Regency (2014a); Bantul Regency (2014b); and
Raharjo (2015b)
Box 7.1. Shopping Tourism Clusters: The Kasongan, Manding and Imogiri
The Kasongan cluster is located at Kasongan Hamlet, Bangunjiwo Village, in the sub-district
of Kasihan. The Kasongan cluster is the centre of the pottery industry in Bantul Regency.
This tourism village produces household products made from clay. Based on the
observation, this pottery cluster is relatively developed in comparison with other similar
shopping tourism clusters. Based on the interview, there are two types of actors within this
cluster; the first is the independent craftsmen who sell the product to the shops and the
second is the craft maker that works for the shop’s production. The first type of craft maker
is contracted by the showroom to supply the product for them. In the early 1600s, the
pottery produced was still limited to kitchen utensils. Now, the featured product of
Kasongan pottery has been innovated, likewise the jar products that started to develop
since 1986. The product has been exported to Australia, the US, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, Canada, Spain, Italy, Guam, New Zealand, Japan, Malaysia, Belgium and
Germany.
The Manding cluster is located on Parangtritis Street, at Sabdodadi Village, Sub-district of
Bantul. This place has many leather craftsmen and shops selling leather products such as
jackets, shoes, bag, belts as well as varied accessories made of leather like picture frames
and key rings. Manding, as one of the centres for the leather craft industry in Bantul, has
around 40 traditional leather industries involving hundreds of workers. The product has
been sold to the Netherlands, Malaysia and Japan.
The Batik Wukirsari cluster is located in Wukirsari Village, Sub-district of Imogiri. Batik is
important in the cultural heritage of Indonesia; in the present, batik craft is increasingly
widespread and has been developed throughout Indonesia. The diversity of motifs and
color elements owned by each region is very diverse, in accordance with the characteristics
of the region itself. Batik tulis craft is traditional batik craft, created by using canting as a
tool to attach the wax on the cloth, with certain kind of motifs, such as motifs parang,
sidoasih, sidomulyo, sidokaton and nitik.
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7.3 The Landscape of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in
Bantul Regency and Indonesia
This section provides the background regulation and information for this empirical
chapter: definitions and the roles of MSMEs according to regulations, and the landscape
of the local economy and MSMEs in Bantul Regency. The key finding in this section is
that the earthquake that hit Bantul and Yogyakarta in 2006 proved to lead to problems
for the MSMEs and their business continuity. This was mainly due to disruption of the
production process to serve the demand. Based on the findings, the disruption to the
production process was caused by (1) the damage of production facilities and
infrastructure; (2) the shortage of manpower; (3) the damage of transportation and
basic infrastructure; and (4) the non-physical damage aspect.
7.3.1 Definitions, Regulations and the Roles of MSMEs in the Indonesian Local
Economy
As the main reference for understanding MSMEs, the definitions stated in Law 20/2008
on SMEs is used as a reference in this thesis, as follows (Goverment of Indonesia,
2008c):
 The micro business is a productive business owned by an individual and/or
individual business entity fulfilling micro business criteria. The criteria for a micro
business are as follows: a) a net worth of at most IDR 50,000,000.00 (50 million
rupiah) excluding land and building of business premises; or b) annual sales of at
most IDR 300,000,000.00 (300 million rupiah).
 The small-scale business is a stand-alone productive economic enterprise
undertaken by an individual or a business entity that is neither a subsidiary nor a
branch of a company, nor becomes part of a medium-sized enterprise or a large
business, either directly or indirectly, but fulfils the small business criteria. Small
business criteria are as follows: a) a net worth more than IDR 50,000,000.00 (50
million rupiah) up to a maximum of IDR 500,000,000.00 (500 million rupiah)
excluding land and building of business premises, or b) having annual sale proceeds
of more than IDR 300,000,000.00 (300 million rupiah) up to a maximum of IDR
2,500,000,000.00 (two billion 500 million rupiah).
 The medium-scale business is a stand-alone productive economic enterprise,
conducted by an individual or a business entity which is neither a subsidiary nor a
branch of a company, nor part of a small business or a large business with the
amount of wealth net or annual sales proceeds stipulated as follows: a) net worth of
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more than IDR 500,000,000.00 (500 million rupiah) up to a maximum of IDR
10,000,000,000.00 (10 billion rupiah) excluding land and building of business
premises; or b) annual sales of more than IDR 2,500,000,000.00 (two billion 500
million rupiah) up to a maximum of IDR 50,000,000,000.00 (50 billion rupiah).
 The large-scale business is a productive economic enterprise undertaken by a
business entity with a net worth or annual sales total greater than the medium
enterprise, including state-owned or private national enterprises, joint ventures
and foreign businesses engaging in economic activities in Indonesia.
In addition to this, Bank Indonesia (BI, i.e. the Central Bank of Indonesia) through the
decree of its director, provides an overview of the characteristics of MSMEs. For micro
enterprises these are, among others (based on SK Dir BI No. 31/24/KEP/DIR dated 5
May 1998): 1) a business run by the poor or near poor; 2) mostly a family-based
ownership business which relies heavily on local resources and simple technology; and
3) the kind of business field that is easy to penetrate (both exit and entry).
Furthermore, it characterizes medium business (based on SK Dir BI No. 30/45/DIR/UK
dated January 5, 1997) as including total assets of less than IDR 5,000,000,000.00 (five
billion rupiah), assets less than IDR 600,000,000.00 (600 million rupiah) excluding land
and buildings premises, and annual turnover of less than IDR 3,000,000,000.00 (three
billion rupiah).
Despite the above-mentioned definitions, for practical reasons within the survey,
Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS, i.e. the Indonesia Central Bureau of Statistics) implements
other standards for MSME classification: that the small-scale business has a workforce
of 5 to 19 people, while the medium-scale enterprise has a workforce of between 20 to
99 people.
Sri Adiningsih, the well-known Indonesian economist, has predicted that the existence
of MSMEs in Indonesia would develop especially after surviving the 1998 economic
crisis (2004 as cited in Saputra and Rindrasih, 2012). Moreover, she claimed that the
macroeconomic situation influences the competition, growth and vulnerabilities of
MSMEs. According to BPS (BPS, 2013b), in 1997 there were 39.7 million MSMEs in
Indonesia; however, this number had significantly increased by 2013 to 57.9 million
MSMEs. This number created jobs for more than 114 million Indonesian people in
2013; this means that number almost doubled from the data of 1997. In Indonesia,
referring to the proportion of the number and variety of business types, the penetration
of MSMEs has been very evident across various economic sectors. In rural areas,
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MSMEs have been known as an alternative to fill the gap in the economic strata of rural
households, especially for those who have inadequate agricultural land. MSMEs are
mostly focused on trade, food production, textiles, garments, wooden crafts, wooden
manufacturing, minerals, and metal products.
Nevertheless, there is a mistaken assumption that MSMEs are a temporary transit for
workers who have not been able to enter the formal sector of the workforce. But this
assumption is no longer acceptable, because their existence is now considered an
engine of economic growth due not only to the MSME sector’s ability to absorb labor,
but also its potential revenue generated through exports. According to BPS (BPS,
2013b), in 1997 the export value from MSMEs was only 39,277.07 billion rupiah, but
within 15 years the number has reached 182,112.70 billion rupiah with its contribution
to gross domestic income reaching 1,536,918.80 billion rupiah. This leads to the
conclusion that MSMEs are very important for national economic development, in
which they have become the reliable flagship of non-oil exports and industrial
supporters.
7.3.2 The Landscape of the Local Economy and MSMEs in Bantul – Yogyakarta:
Before and Just After the Earthquake
In Bantul, sectors supported by MSMEs have contributed significantly to PDRB (i.e.
GRDP) postures. Based on preliminary data (2001-2005), which is processed through
LQ analysis, the existing leading base sectors in the Bantul Regency supporting local
development include the following: 1) the agriculture sector; 2) the manufacturing
industry sector; 3) the trade sector, including hotels and restaurants; and 4) the
services sector (Basuki, 2008). Furthermore, according to the 2005 data, 26 percent of
the population worked in the agricultural sector, while 19 percent worked in industries
and 21 percent in trade and commerce. Interestingly, in 2010 this combination had
shifted toward trade, hotels and restaurants (26.54 percent), while the section of the
population working in agriculture-based activities decreased to 19.17 percent (Saputra
and Rindrasih, 2012, p. 55). The data has highlighted the importance of the supporting
MSMEs within the tourism industry, in the form of the trade and service sectors
(including hotels and restaurants), in the development of Bantul Regency after the
earthquake. In this case, MSMEs became part of the manufacturing, trade, hotel and
restaurant sectors as well as the service sector, which are the motor of Bantul’s
economic growth.
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Most of the business activities in Bantul are home-based industries. Based on our
further observation, almost all the business entities within the handicrafts industry in
Bantul are small and home-based enterprises. Although most of them have a workforce
of up to 20 people, the recent data has shown that the handicrafts industry in Bantul
Regency is an important source of employment in the region, absorbing around 60,000
workers (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 58). In addition to this, around 65 percent of the
total handicraft exports in Yogyakarta Province are supplied by the industries located
in Bantul Regency (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 58). After the earthquake in 2010, Bantul
had 18,119 industrial activities, consisting of small and medium enterprises (BPS
Bantul Regency, 2011). This number trend then increased, up to 20,423 industrial
activities by 2015 (BPS Bantul Regency, 2017).
Through further observation of MSMEs, it can be seen that most of their production
activities, management and marketing are conducted in the same place, i.e. at home. In
addition, MSMEs are also characterized by reliance on local resources, private or
family-based ownership, small operational scale, labour-intensive, non-formal skills,
and the ease of penetrating business sectors, as well as a minimum amount of, or no,
promotion (see also Sub-section 7.4.3). Although most of the MSMEs are categorized as
family-based ownership, some have already had professional management with legal
permits and clear business structures. However, it is undeniable that many of them are
still managed in a conventional style that often mixes up the family or domestic needs
into the formal business balance sheet.
Based on various reports (International Organization for Migration, 2011; Tim Teknis
Nasional, 2007; Sekretariat JRF, 2011), the characteristics of MSMEs allegedly lead to
vulnerability to business shocks, such as those which occurred in the aftermath of the
Yogyakarta earthquake in 2006. That earthquake proved to create problems for MSMEs
and their business continuity. Moreover, the damage to houses caused by the
earthquake became a barrier for the household-based MSMEs to recover economically
and continue business. Following the earthquake, some of the local residents, who were
also working in MSMEs, eventually lost their income, which resulted in an increase in
the number of unemployment. This is mainly due to disruption of the production
process to serve demand. Summarized from the overall findings, the disruption of the
production process caused by the impact of the earthquake can be described as follows.
First, the destructive impact of the earthquake on buildings (i.e. the household building
as a place of production and selling point) and other means of production facilities
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caused disruption of the production process, which ultimately reduced the ability to
meet demand. Unmet demand certainly reduces revenue and reduces the ability of
MSMEs to survive and/or to expand their business.
Second, the deadly impact of the earthquake on human resources disrupted the bulk
production process. Those who were workers (either skilled or unskilled laborers)
and/or business actors at the same time became victims of the earthquake. Many of
them were taken to intensive care, ultimately experiencing disability or even death.
Due to the labor-intensive nature of MSMEs, emergency conditions after the
earthquake caused operations and production to be halted instantaneously,
temporarily or permanently. This also resulted in the reduced ability of the company to
meet the demand for bulk production orders.
Third, the destructive impact of the earthquake on transportation conditions and basic
infrastructure became a barrier for distribution processes and marketing purposes.
The disruption of transportation due to infrastructure damages resulted in obstruction
of the flow of goods, in both getting raw materials from suppliers and distributing
products to consumers. The scarcity of raw materials caused the price to become more
expensive, resulting in higher production costs. These increases in cost caused higher
vulnerability for MSMEs trying to maintain their business. The damage to the
transportation facilities would also become a barrier to redeveloping the local economy
of the impacted regions.
Fourth, the non-physical problems such as the decline in the reputation of the impacted
region, the remaining psychosocial problems following the traumatic event, together
with the infrastructure damage, had simultaneously affected the demand, especially
because most MSMEs were influenced greatly by the tourism sectors. The severity of
the MSMEs’ vulnerability and the impact on the local economy would also be influenced
by the availability of the business development plan (BDP) and business continuity
plan (BCP).
In summary, the problems experienced by the MSMEs in Bantul Regency caused
disruption to the production process in the following ways: (1) damage of production
facilities and infrastructure; (2) reduce availability of manpower; (3) damage of
transportation and basic infrastructure; and (4) non-physical damage. The four
aforementioned problems caused unfulfilled demand and diminishing incomes, which
are at the root of difficulties in fulfilling financial obligations to other parties. Hence the
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earthquake would have a great impact on the financial capacity of MSMEs, especially
for those who had difficulty accessing capital from legal financial institutions.
7.4 Post-Disaster Recovery Governance for MSMEs and the Local
Economy of Bantul Regency
This chapter is partly based on the data collected from questionnaires, and partly other
from interviews and analysis of official reports. From 125 questionnaires collected, we
validated about 100 with the number fairly distributed within the sampling sub-district
areas. Forty-nine percent of all the respondents were male, and 51 percent female.
Most respondents (75 percent) were over 40 years old and the rest below that age (25
percent). Furthermore, the oldest respondent was 73 years old, and the youngest was
18 years old.
The majority of the business entities (65 percent) were established before the 2000s:
that is, 51 percent of them were established during the 1980s or 1990s and
approximately 14 percent before that era (i.e. from the 1950s up to the 1970s). The
business is dominated by micro and small businesses (76 percent), comprising 35
percent for micro-scale businesses and 41 percent for small businesses. Meanwhile, the
rest are medium-sized businesses. Many of them have a workforce of up to 20 people
(84 percent) with capital of no more than 50 million rupiah (64 percent).
Those who are members of the clusters are generally craftsmen as well as sellers (i.e.
doing production and marketing activities; 72 percent). Despite being small-scale
business activities, through the distribution channels of exporters, about 47 percent of
them are already export-oriented. However, their businesses are varied; most are
dependent on their location in relation to the nearest craft clusters. The composition of
their core businesses can be seen in Figure 7.1.
The next sub-sections explore networks and the assistance during the recovery period
after the Yogyakarta earthquake. The first sub-section describes the government policy
platform on aid, projects and its kind. The second is continued by exploring the
recovery network in Bantul, and finally, identifying expectations (risk perceptions) and
the realities of assistance during the recovery period. Key findings of this section are
that the main actors on the international, national and local levels are IOM, Tim Teknis
Nasional, the Industry, Cooperation and the SMEs Board, respectively. Meanwhile, risk
perceptions among MSMEs cover issues of place of business, raw materials, tools and
machinery, marketing, and capital injection.
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Figure 7.1. The Composition of Respondents Based on Core Business
7.4.1 Government Policy Platform, Mechanism and Issues
From the post-disaster recovery process observed, it can be inferred that the
Government of Indonesia (GoI) adopted a community development platform.
Community development is a concept of economic development that encapsulates
social values and networks within the community (Gilchrist, 2009). Within that
platform, GoI efforts to empower communities can be seen from three angles: 1)
enabler, means to create an atmosphere or climate that enables the community’s
potential to be developed; 2) empowering, means to strengthen the potential or power
of the community; and 3) affirmative action and protection, means to protect and
support the weak and vulnerable ones.
However, community development meant here is not intended for the community to
become increasingly dependent on various charity programs, because everything has
to be achieved through the self-effort and involvement of society as the main actor.
Thus the ultimate goal of community development within the recovery process is to
empower the community, enable and build the capacity to advance themselves towards
a better life and sustainability. As part of community development, economic
empowerment may be initiated by the government, but the greater role should be given
to society as the symbol of responsibility, in particular, of the advanced society.
Capital difficulties led to the slow pace of business development and the low income
level of MSMEs. Nevertheless, through various lessons, the provision of capital grants to



















by a firm mechanism, even a revolving fund will become stalled in the middle of its
process which ultimately distorts the market. So far, the government has agreed that
the most appropriate way is to facilitate access to capital through existing financial
institutions. Hence after the disaster, one of the core problems experienced by MSMEs
and which will be discussed in the following section is the aspect of capital (see
Figure 7.3 in Section 4.3).
Mechanisms of economic empowerment, including by credit distribution, can be
undertaken in groups. Based on the GoI experience, the empowerment effort through
individual approaches has been less successful, due to the fact that accumulation of
capital will be difficult to achieve among the poor. Moving together in a group,
partnership or joint venture is a rational choice. By joining several activities within
groups’ mechanisms, business is claimed to be more efficient, in terms including (but
not limited to), the distribution of products and ordering of raw materials. Through the
group mechanism, it is hoped that they will not only build economies of scale together
efficiently and economically, but also build the strength and ability to access existing
financial institutions and capital.
7.4.2 Networks for MSMEs’ Recovery
Almost all respondents (96 percent) agreed that when the earthquake occurred in
2006, the disaster greatly affected their business continuity. From those who were
affected, 56 percent of businesses were closed down temporarily for one to three
months, 22 percent for three to six months, and the rest (22 percent) for more than six
months. This condition has been addressed through a series of policies, regulations and
programme activities from many actors, such as basic living-needs assistance, housing
reconstructions (either temporary or permanent), livelihood recovery and local
economic development (see Chapter 6).
Highlighting the post-disaster programmes for MSMEs, it was noted that the
redevelopment of MSMEs in Indonesia was primarily managed by the Ministry of
Cooperation and Small Medium Enterprises (red node 13). In addition to this, the
Ministry of Tourism (red node 14) and The Bank of Indonesia (i.e. the central bank of
Indonesia; red node 11) also take part in policy development. The local government of
Bantul Regency (blue node 21) approaches MSMEs recovery with many programmes
and activities as part of their local economic development. They have a vision that the
Cooperation and MSMEs will be among the main supporters for the local economy
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(Saputra and Rindrasih, 2012). In addition to this, to promote shopping tourism,
agencies such as the Cultural and Tourism Board (blue node 43) and the Industry,
Cooperation and SMEs Board (blue node 42) at the local level have been working hand-
in-hand to provide assistance with the recovery of handicraft shopping tourism clusters
in Bantul. The network support for the MSMEs and local economic recovery can be seen
in Figure 7.2.
Through the algorithm of the K-core network, it is shown on the graph that most of the
actors are connected to one of the large sub-structures (i.e. shown by the nodes with
the black dots). This implicitly states the high level of interconnection among the
actors. As regards the closeness centrality, the Bantul government (blue node 21) and
the Industry, Cooperation and SMEs Board (out, blue node 42) have the highest
closeness centrality, both appearing as meso level actors. Meanwhile, based on degree
centrality, the main actor on the international level is an NGO, i.e. IOM (yellow node
27). IOM as an international NGO becomes one of the main actors, due to its role in
bridging the interests of the donor community and the GoI, and in accordance with its
practical experiences of working closely with grassroots level actors. Subsequently, on
the national level is Tim Teknis Nasional (red node 17), and at the local level is the
Industry, Cooperation and SMEs Board (blue node 42). The most critical player in the
network, based on calculations of betweeness centrality, is the Industry, Cooperation
and SMEs Board (blue node 42), which acts as connector of many small sub-networks,
including linking directly to the beneficiaries (grey nodes 31, 32, 33, 34).
In addition, using multi-dimensional scaling (i.e. iterative MDS) methods, the whole
network can be regrouped into two large groups, implicitly named as macro-meso level
actors and meso-micro level actors. At the macro–meso level, the assistance of
international agencies was recognized: the European Union (yellow node 26), Asian
Development Bank (ADB, yellow node 29) and World Bank (yellow node 25), according
to the mechanism, as follows: BAPPENAS (red node 24), local governments (blue nodes
18 and 20) and donors (consisting of the European Union, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, ADB, Canada, Finland, and Denmark) created a multi-donor fund, namely the
Java Reconstruction Fund (JRF; pink node 22), with the GoI (represented by
BAPPENAS, red node 24), European Union and World Bank forming the joint steering
committee. The project started in 2006 and officially closed in the year 2012; that is,
after the project period was extended due to the Mount Merapi Eruption in 2010. The
project was meant to back up the government programmes (i.e. Tim Teknis Nasional,
red node 17); therefore, many of the activities were in line with the government’s
182
efforts. However, some of them were also a refinement based on the lessons taken from
previous disaster governance (e.g. MDFF Aceh-Nias, pink node 36).
Furthermore, at the meso-micro level, the recovery activities were partnered with
many stakeholders: among others, local government boards (shown by blue nodes 42,
43 and 44), Bank Indonesia (BI, i.e. central bank of Indonesia, red node 11),
microfinance institutions (orange nodes 2, 3, 4, and 5), and PT Permodalan Nasional
Madani (PNM, brown node 1), as well as the private sectors within the platform of
business investors and partners (brown nodes 45 and 46). Broadly speaking, the two
large groups mentioned above represent the characteristics of most of the actors: the
macro-meso level is dominated by the bureaucratic nuances of the public sector,
including international agencies, while the meso-micro level is dominated by economic
networking activities, including the private sector.
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Figure 7.2. The MSMEs and Recovery Network Post the Yogyakarta Earthquake
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7.4.3 The Assistances: Between Expectations and Realities
Based on their characteristics, each MSME will face different difficulties from one
another. According to questionnaires from a hundred valid respondents, we have
classified the five most widely perceived problems during recovery periods, as can be
seen in Figure 7.3 below.
Figure 7.3. The Most Widely Perceived Business Difficulties after the Earthquake
The top five problems that led to difficulties for MSMEs within the period of the first six
months were damage to place of business or production, the need for capital injection,
marketing problems, and damage of tools and production machinery, as well as
availability of raw materials. Meanwhile, after the first six months, the problems shifted
to marketing problems, the need for capital injection, the availability of raw materials,
damage to place of business or production, and damage of tools and production
machinery. Furthermore, referring to these aforementioned facts, problem findings
based on Section 7.3.2, and the recovery network described above, the following
explanation elaborates the assistance further according to seven themes.
7.4.3.1 Business Assets
The main asset includes land and buildings for production purposes. Based on
observations, land and business premises in Bantul and Yogyakarta districts often get
mixed with the business owners’ houses; at the same time, the locations are also
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home-based industries, damage to their houses will definitely impact on their
continuity as small businesses, since housing damage also means damage to the place
of business itself (INT11, as documented in The Industry MSMEs and Cooperation
Board, 2015), ‘the economic downturn was a real impact of the disaster because of the
loss of business opportunities. On the other hand, with a ruined house, there was no longer
a place to live, and even to start a business,’ said the local government respondent.
Furthermore, it was predicted that these MSMEs would not have the funds to replace
the assets in a short period of time; therefore, loss or damage to productive assets
might have an impact on MSMEs’ long-term revenue.
According to the questionnaire respondents, the damage to their houses was the first
problem and presented the highest level of difficulty in the recovery process of their
businesses (as shown by the rating of 5). In this case, the Government of Indonesia
(GoI) anticipated the issue in a timely manner and with the right policy focus. Working
collaboratively with the local government, international agencies and NGOs, the GoI
placed housing rehabilitation and reconstruction as the first priority after the
emergency period was over. Housing development assistance was strongly felt by
beneficiaries, especially MSMEs. According to the group leader respondent, such
assistance helped business actors to concentrate more on improving their business
(INT13, as documented in Community Groups & Associations, 2015). The speed of
housing reconstruction was also recognized as a result of joint working between many
parties, including the community group itself.
After six months, the housing problem had been largely resolved in most areas of
Bantul. This was shown by a substantial decrease in housing demands of around 80
percent, according to the first statements of the respondents. Six months after the
earthquakes, the respondents placed housing reconstruction as their fourth-highest
priority (as shown by the rating of 2).
7.4.3.2 Production facilities
Production facilities are related to the tools and machinery used for production
processes, which in the aftermath of the disaster were partially damaged by the ruins of
the roofs and buildings. In a crisis situation followed by declining revenue, MSMEs
acknowledged that the replacement or addition of production equipment had been a
difficult decision. This is because the prices of some of the tools they needed were
expensive (even before the earthquake), and this was aggravated by the increasingly
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expensive price of raw materials after the earthquake. The machine repair option for
some businesses was also dilemmatic because some of the spare parts were difficult to
obtain and/or expensive.
In this regard, experts expected the government to pay more attention to their
aspirations, by channelling aid in the form of tools and production machinery, for
example, and training for the tools’ repair/maintenance so that MSMEs could re-start
production immediately. However, in contrast to the need for home asset provision as a
place of production, according to the respondents, the need for tool provision or repair
training assistance only occupies the fourth position (as shown by the rating of 2)
within the first six months after the disaster. This position declined to the last priority
after the first six months, as shown by the rating of 1. It is argued that the MSMEs
preferred the additional cash transfer instead of tool or machinery replacement.
Nevertheless, the government still ran the program and relieved the burden of the
MSMEs through machinery replacement programs, as in Manding in Bantul, a leather-
based handicraft cluster. In this case, the government contributed to each entrepreneur
machines and compressors to the value of US$ 900 (Saputra and Rindrasih 2012, p. 60).
According to the local government respondent, GoI much preferred to provide
appropriate assistance than mere cash aid (INT11, as documented in The Industry
MSMEs and Cooperation Board, 2015):
So, indeed, to grow the initial capital in order to be able to start a business again, (the government)
... uhmm did not provide cash assistance, but in the form of machinery and equipment for production
process. Much of this kind of assistance came from the central government.
In addition to this, through IOM-JRF, asset replacement assistance and granting access
to alternative financing were conducted. Approximately 4,300 MSMEs had been
assisted in the form of damaged tool and machinery replacement and restoration of
destroyed facilities.
7.4.3.3 Workforce
The most significant impact of the earthquake was the loss of life and the injured
people. According to the official GoI data, the total death toll in Bantul reached 5,760
people (BAPPENAS, 2010). In the context of MSMEs, the availability of manpower is
crucial due to MSMEs’ characteristic labor-intensive operations. Recruitment and
training could not be undertaken immediately because at that time the situation and
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conditions had not yet stabilized in many places around Bantul and Yogyakarta. This
certainly resulted in disruption of the capability of MSMEs to fulfill the demand.
The recruitment of workers from areas outside Yogyakarta also had insignificant
impact. For the first few months, the conditions were not conducive due to a series of
minor but frequent earthquakes that occurred. In addition, MSMEs in some business
fields desperately needed specific expertise related to the local characteristics of
handicraft clusters (e.g. batik). As a result, the production process was disrupted by the
lack of skilled labor or the new prospective employees who still needed further skill
training. Most MSME’s business owners expected that there would be a time
adjustment for regular bulk ordering during this period in order to avoid losing
customer trust in the long run due to their inability to meet the targets.
GoI programmes and projects had anticipated this by providing a great deal of
assistance, which took the form of training (e.g. design, product, business management
and book-keeping), such as the projects arranged by the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) and the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GmbH (GIZ), funded by the Java Reconstruction Fund (JRF). Besides training, the
livelihood recovery project by JRF covered access to microfinance, replacement of
production tools, renovation of showrooms or workshops, access to markets, and
capacity building (International Organization for Migration, 2011). At the practical
level, local government insisted that training and coaching for the MSMEs should be
delivered in groups, as the respondent below explained (INT11, as documented in The
Industry MSMEs and Cooperation Board, 2015):
Before they form a legal entity or co-operative, we do direct the craftsmen to initially form a group,
at least in the form of a ‘paguyuban’ (i.e. groups or associations). In addition to helping facilitate us
to communicate through the heads of 'paguyuban', the group's existence is also expected to facilitate
them internally to help each other and exchange their experiences.
These by-designed-networks are expected to give advantages for themselves, especially
in the case of future crises due to disasters.
In addition to the problem of business resumption is the issue of unemployment.
According to the interviews of five districts in Bantul, shopping tourism has become the
livelihood of many people living in the handicraft cluster area. Besides selling unique
and genuine souvenirs, the clusters often open the handicraft making workshops, like
workshop of batik-making in Wukirsari Village and pottery-making in Kasongan
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Village. Some additional tourist attractions, such as cultural events and traditional
performances, were found to be a part-time occupation whenever there is demand
from a tourism agency or visit from a larger tourist group.
However, workers cannot stay in a region if they cannot earn their living from it. In
order to ensure the workforce remains a valuable asset to the community or region
after a disaster, local government should work together with the private sector to
assess business climate, track job losses, assist displaced workers, and understand the
availability of skilled workers to meet specific employment needs after a disaster.
Changes in demographic after the disaster as well as the emergence of disaster-related
work could result in mismatches between available skills and available jobs (Schwab,
2014).
7.4.3.4 Transportation and basic infrastructure
From the perspective of local economic redevelopment, the infrastructure
improvement project is truly crucial. The infrastructure includes highways, electricity,
water and telecommunications. Accelerating productivity and business growth through
capital access policy will have no significance if the product cannot be sold at the most
appropriate price. After the earthquake, some roads were damaged and cracked;
therefore, an important component in improving MSMEs’ business after the earthquake
was to improve the transportation and basic infrastructure in order to reduce
production costs. Even if they were not damaged, transportation was hampered by
fallen trees or building debris. Just after the earthquake, many victims preferred to
sleep in front of their gardens, residential roads and public fields or parks because of
their fear of the impact of aftershocks (Shakuntala, 2007, pp. 21-22).
The earthquake impact caused the products of MSMEs could not be marketed properly,
or could only be marketed with low profit margins due to high transportation costs.
Post-earthquake, the MSME owners expected the government to immediately complete
the reconstruction of the basic infrastructure as it was related to transportation of raw
materials and product distribution. In some cases the craftsmen’s villages were not
heavily damaged, but the shop cluster areas and surrounding infrastructure were
devastated. The silver crafters experienced this, which resulted in difficulties selling
their products at Kotagede. However, the marketing problems raised were not only the
result of the damage to infrastructure cutting the distribution lines to other areas, but
also of losing so many nearby customers due to the significant death toll.
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In addition to this, as elaborated in the interviews and questionnaires, the MSMEs
identified global potential threats to their business continuity. They argued that power
outage was the most frequent and persistent disruptive problem for their operational
and production processes. Also related to MSMEs’ recovery, beside power outage, is the
water supply, which influences the production process. This improvement was
considered strategic for them in order to support the increasing revenue of MSMEs.
This situation was set as the GoI priority, and state-owned enterprises were instructed
to restore their services within the impacted area, such as communications by Telkom,
electricity by PLN, etc.
7.4.3.5 Raw materials
After the earthquake, some handicraft clusters experienced scarcity of raw materials,
which impacted on increasing production costs. Raw material contributes the largest
component of production cost and has been an issue for most MSMEs up to now.
According to respondents, the issue of raw materials for production was perceived as of
higher importance after the first six-month period, increasing from a rating of 1 to a
rating of 3. This is mainly because within the first six months, the survivors were still in
the adapting period, so their attention was mostly focused on fulfilling basic needs.
Despite still struggling with the living costs after the emergency period, the MSMEs
should have dealt with the main obstacle that was the lack of capital cash to cover
production costs. Some others did not face the constraints of the availability of extra
funds but still experienced difficulties due to the delay of raw material supplies. This
was related to the condition of the infrastructure for distributing the raw materials to
the place of production. MSMEs had already attempted to replace raw materials with
similar materials (i.e. substitution) and re-arranged the schedule of ordering raw
materials (to order them earlier) or increased their inventory of the materials.
As reported by the respondents, many business actors tried to restore their business by
accepting a large number of orders. However, due to unstable cash flow conditions,
they were unable to fulfill the demand. According to them, MSMEs only needed a short-
term loan as a bailout during the production period, that is until the buyer paid for the
entire order (e.g. usually not more than 6 months). However, from the bank side, such
loans are considered unprofitable, because the profitable loan should have a minimum
of 3 years tenure. It was further explained that cooperatives have not been able to
handle these problems, due to the maximum loan ceiling that local cooperatives could
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give only, i.e. 25 million rupiah. Therefore MSMEs hoped that the government could
control and maintain the stability of the raw material supply and fuel prices as the main
components of production costs. In addition to this, MSMEs also wished that there were
credit facilities for paying the expensive raw material prices in order to ensure the
continuity of the production process.
7.4.3.6 Innovation and Marketing Strategy
The MSME’s expectation of the government and similar agencies regarding this issue
was marketing through promotion. With the diminishing demand post-crisis, MSMEs
also expected the government to assist them in the form of constant orders from
government and private partners, especially during the early period of their efforts to
re-operate. Such income was used to strengthen cash flow and to continue to perform
financial obligations to other parties. In addition, the bulk ordering mechanism from
customers who paid in advance or that preceded with a significant amount of down
payment would surely help the MSMEs.
The successful story of the stimulant policy of housing reconstruction was not followed
by a smooth shift to another stimulant policy specifically for business recovery. In the
second six-month period of recovery, the government failed to anticipate the MSMEs’
greatest difficulty: marketing problems. The marketing problems had actually been
moderate in the first six months; however, while the people still had their basic needs
met by assistance from the government and or other parties, they did not demand too
much for a solution. After the emergency period was over, the aid became far less
frequent, and at the same time, the crafts orders had substantially decreased since the
earthquake (Sekretariat JRF, 2011, p. 38). At that time, MSMEs realized that they had to
speed up the business recovery in order to earn money at their normal living levels.
Actually, micro and small business entrepreneurs in general have the skills and courage
to run the business but have difficulty in marketing the product. They still need the
transfer of knowledge, management and technology to increase capacity. Therefore
another role of government, through the JRF Project, was to facilitate technical and
product innovation training, sales and marketing, and entrepreneurship. During the
two years of the project, this technical assistance reached thousands of MSMEs and
medium enterprises (Sekretariat JRF, 2011).
One of the local government’s efforts to restore livelihoods was through increasing
demand for batik by government officials obliging their staff to use batik for their
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working uniforms. In addition to this, the local government also facilitated the
craftsmen’s participation in provincial, national and international promotional events
and/or exhibitions (Raharjo, 2015a; INT11, as documented in The Industry MSMEs and
Cooperation Board, 2015); ‘in general, the Bantul government has cooperated with the
foreign ministry … as a way of promoting, their offices display Bantul products, in
particular the embassies in the territory of America, Europe, Asia and Africa’.
Furthermore, through KADIN -a formal and legal business association in Bantul
Regency-, a cooperation has been established, especially with Qatar, Turkey and
Suriname (INT13, as documented in Community Groups & Associations, 2015).
The Bantul government claimed that small-scale manufacturing and handicraft
products in Bantul Regency have been exported, among others, to the US, Germany,
Spain, the Netherlands, South Africa and Australia (Bantul Regency, 2008; Raharjo,
2015a). However, this marketing development has not been encouraging owing to the
lack of initial capital and the difficulties facing small and medium-sized craftsmen when
conducting export trading negotiations and transactions with potential buyers. Another
problem regarding exporting was the low capacity of crafts industries, especially due to
the characteristics of the hand-made products: more detail with a longer process
production (INT11, as documented in The Industry MSMEs and Cooperation Board,
2015). Hitherto, the export process has been conducted only by large companies or
professional exporters; some of them were even exported through the distribution
lines of Semarang, Jakarta, Surabaya and Bali tourism (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 55-56;
Bantul Regency, 2009b). In addition to having a large production capacity, the
exporters have also been supported by the broad craftsmen’s networks in order to fill
the gap between production capacity and bulk order (INT14, as documented in The
Industry MSMEs and Cooperation Board, 2015).
MSMEs that relied heavily on the shopping tourism clusters (i.e. direct/offline
marketing) suffered the hardest impact from possible prejudicial post-disaster news
which resulted in a decreasing number of tourist visits to Yogyakarta. However, the
impact of media coverage was different across clusters, especially to the Kasongan
cluster. A local officer of Kasongan Village observes that media, in addition to broadcast
of the disaster news, had accidentally become an effective means of promotion.
According to the respondent, the disaster exposure to the public had surprisingly
impacted on the increase of omzet by more than 300 percent. Many buyers ordered
online and others came directly to the shops, resulting in the revival of the pottery
business within period of 6 to 7 months (INT14, as documented in The Industry MSMEs
192
and Cooperation Board, 2015). Therefore, IT-based marketing was another attempt to
effectively boost the MSMEs’ sales. The local government argued that online selling
would be more suitable for the condition of MSMEs, as they would not experience the
lack of capital as like when they have to meet the export demand. Through online
selling, they could also sell at more appropriate and relatively higher prices than they
could sell to the collectors and/or exporter (INT11, as documented in The Industry
MSMEs and Cooperation Board, 2015).
However, the fundamental problem of using information technology for MSMEs was
the provision of equipment and availability of operators. According to them, the use of
technology surely increased the operational costs, especially the cost of purchasing
equipment and paying for internet access. Moreover, the lack of employees who were
able to operate and fix equipment faults was also the basic reason for the reluctance to
use technology. On the other hand, there is still an inherent stigma about the insecurity
and distrust of potential buyers when using the online system. Face-to-face trading is
still assumed to be more secure by prospective buyers, so that many MSMEs decided it
is not necessary to use technology for now.
7.4.3.7 Financial Access and Capital Injection
Theoretically, all the impacts mentioned above would simultaneously affect the ability
to fulfill demand. Unfulfilled demand and diminishing revenues are at the root of
difficulties in fulfilling financial obligations to other parties. Hence, the earthquake
would have a great impact on the financial capacity of MSMEs, and especially for those
who had difficulty accessing capital from formal financial institutions. The constraint
on the MSMEs preventing them from gaining financial access was especially relevant
when the house assets and business premises were damaged due to the earthquake. As
is widely known, the credit procedure of any formal financial institutions requires
collateral; unfortunately, most of the important documents – including land ownership
certificates – were missing under the debris. Furthermore, most homes were damaged
and destroyed with land boundaries that were difficult to clarify accurately and quickly.
With this post-crisis situation, the MSMEs expected that government would provide
easier financial access. The availability of a mortgage facility for small-scale soft loans
with quick processing would also be very helpful for them. In addition, the
restructuring of previous debt was needed and expected to overcome various
limitations and barriers in production and promotional activities. Besides restructuring
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loans, affirmative banking policies were also expected, with the policies emphasizing on
easy requirements, affordable interest rates and adequate credit ceilings. The MSMEs
admitted that the interest rate was above their average capability at that time. During
the crisis, MSMEs expected that the government would subsidize interest, so that they
could continue their existing financial obligations, as well as exploring any other
funding alternatives.
The local government cannot do much about the above mentioned problems (INT11, as
documented in The Industry MSMEs and Cooperation Board, 2015). Besides, banks
have their own settled system, according to regulations, the role of monetary and
financial institutions supervision was still handled by Bank Indonesia (BI, i.e. the
central bank of Indonesia) at that time. BI thus remains a critical actor in supporting
the economic recovery by stipulating special treatment for credit practices in the
disaster-affected areas. For the policy of treating banking credit in the disaster area, BI
referred to Bank Indonesia Regulation (PBI) No. 8/15/PBI/2006 dated 5 October 2006,
concerning the special treatment of bank credit for particular regions in Indonesia
affected by disasters. BI followed this up by conducting debt restructuring for
Yogyakarta and Central Java earthquake survivors, as can be seen in Figure 7.4.
Figure 7.4. Debt Restructuring after the Earthquake
Source: BI Jogjakarta (2007)
According to the respondents, financial access was consistently the second highest
priority, both within the first six-month and after it. In relation to this, the GoI and JRF
agreed to increase financial access and provide revolving funds for the MSMEs. The
project was partnered with local government, the microfinance institutions, and PT
Permodalan Nasional Madani (PNM). Technical support was also provided to engage as
many as possible of the financial institutions to ensure the coverage and sustainability
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of the programme. The provision of financing access was implemented through the
IOM-JRF project, and around 10,000 MSMEs accessed financing from 1,200 MSMEs that
were previously targeted. Loans were disbursed through 26 microfinance institutions
(MFIs) and were designated as revolving loan funds that provided financing access for
MSMEs to re-establish their businesses (Sekretariat JRF, 2011).
Furthermore, institutional arrangements were required in order to implement a
revolving loan fund mechanism; thereby, the assistance could be carried out in
accordance with the spirit to be independent. Moreover, the main objective of the
institutional arrangement was to reach the widest possible marginal beneficiary
groups, including the informal sectors or non-bankable groups, to obtain loans.
Meanwhile, PNM, a state-owned financial institution, served as the top institution that
managed post-disaster revolving credit funds provided by JRF donor communities,
channeled through rural banks, MFIs and cooperatives. Through this arrangement, the
revolving loan was expected to provide the benefit of accessing revolving loan funds to
the target group for at least 10 years after the project ended.
7.5 Local Economic Recovery in Bantul Regency: Lessons and Strategies
Reflected by the achievements in housing rehabilitation and reconstruction, which
significantly fulfilled housing needs within the first 18 months (Tim Teknis Nasional,
2007), the reports from other agencies (Sekretariat JRF, 2011; International
Organization for Migration, 2011) also revealed a similar result, in particular in terms
of MSMEs’ recovery. At the end of the JRF project assistance, through the results of
internal evaluations from the polls, it was found that 87 percent of MSME beneficiaries
of the project were back to operating capacity, sales and profits at their pre-disaster
levels.
This is also in line with the results from the 100 questionnaire respondents in this
thesis. According to these respondents, the indication of the MSMEs’ recovery was felt
much earlier than the GoI predicted: that is, approximately 55 percent of the 96
respondents claiming to be affected by disaster could re-start a business normally and
had begun to earn a profit within the first six-month period; 16 percent started
between the six-month and one-year periods, and the rest (29 percent) started after a
one-year period (as shown in Figure 7.5 below). Similar findings were also obtained
from interviews with respondents from business associations; that is, it took around 4
months to 12 months for MSMEs to re start and operate (INT13, as documented in
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Community Groups & Associations, 2015). Furthermore, it was explained that the
simple indicator of MSMEs recovery is if there are demands on one side, which
followed by the ability to start serving demands, on the other side. However, the most
important thing is the spirit and determination to rise, in which the MSME’s actors
must be sure that their business will re-exist.
In this section, the discussion covers the aspect of lessons and strategies for local
economic recovery in Bantul. The first sub-section explores the lessons, and the second
consists of strategies to revive the local economy. Key findings of this section are the
five lessons and two key strategies as follows.
Figure 7.5. The Recovery Period of MSMEs Post the Yogyakarta Earthquake
7.5.1 Lessons from the Bantul Regency Cases
This section aims to draw lessons from the underlying processes beneath the network,
in reference to the facts revealed from or implicitly stated in the seven themes
previously discussed (in Section 4.3), as follows:
7.5.1.1 Stimulant and affirmative policy
In addition to the stimulant policy, like the housing reconstruction broadly explained in
Chapter 6 and in Section 4.3, it would also be worthwhile to apply an affirmative policy
to women in disaster-affected areas. In Bantul, most of the batik crafts are produced by
women, and more than half of the respondents in this thesis are also women (51
percent). Women’s resilience in reviving from post-disaster crises was influenced by
motherhood characters, societal environment and social capital (Yusuf, 2014).
According to Yusuf (2014, p. 242-243), which based on FGDs with women’s batik
groups in Bantul, It is said that after the 2006 earthquake, the women income from
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these batik craft contributed about 70 percent to the family income. Their toughness is
especially driven by their motherhood characters, keeping struggling to the lives
sufficiency and to feed their children.
The other example was within the framework of the JRF project which involved groups
of women training in food processing in order to produce a variety of snacks and
crackers from banana, cassava and peanuts. They have successfully created new brands
for their products. Thus, in addition to food-processing skills, the women were also
taught to create a brand, market it and find partners for marketing purposes
(Sekretariat JRF, 2011).
To sum up, women as craft workers in the tourism industry in Bantul have played a
critical role. They succeeded in generating their economies or establishing new
businesses, both in the independent and collective business schemes, as the result of
the use of their social capital (Yusuf, 2014). It is interesting to observe that women,
who have been widely assumed to be the most vulnerable actors in the face of disaster,
proved to be the tough actors in dealing with economic challenges within the critical
recovery phase.
7.5.1.2 Aid disbursement and information
Most respondents said that they obtained assistance from the government. Besides
government support, they claimed that local and international NGOs, international
agencies, and private companies (through corporate social responsibility/CSR), as well
as financial institutions, also played important roles in supporting them in restarting
their businesses. Interestingly, a number of respondents admitted that they also
received assistance from the Indonesian Furniture Industry and Handicraft Association
(i.e. ASMINDO), and furthermore from personal donations or charity. The donations
could be from their kinship relations and extended families or even from unknown
generous people. From the aforementioned facts, it can be inferred that social networks
and connections do play an important role within the MSME recovery process.
In the beginning of the recovery phase, the disclosure of aid information about
assistance from the GoI and other agencies was an important for the people. Later on, it
became a crucial factor in eliminating the sense of unfairness between survivors as well
as achieving the equalization of aid disbursement. Within the first three months, the
situation was almost chaotic due to information being unmanageable (Widyanta, 2007).
Some people suspected there were unfair practices in the aid disbursement process.
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The government had anticipated this by formulating a group mechanism, in which they
decided themselves who should be given the highest priority for assistance. It is
claimed that social control occurred during this process within the groups, lowering the
likelihood of potential conflicts.
The other interesting finding is that the aid also created another problem. As an
illustration (Saputra and Rindrasih, 2012), some of the skilful senior craft workers,
supported by aid from government and non-government organizations, tended to build
their own businesses, leaving the old ones temporarily disrupted due to shortage of
labour. Thus, after the earthquake, entrepreneurs faced difficulties in hiring staff and
skilful craftsmen since the new craftsmen had not received formal training, as most
craftsmen learned their skills from senior workers or parents, without any formal
training (Sekretariat JRF, 2011, p. 38). Therefore the candidate workers had to rely on
the senior craft workers for training and guidance. For the owner, the time taken for
the process of training, is an investment, yet time-consuming.
7.5.1.3 Community engagement
Following the process, community engagement, based on the local wisdom of ‘gotong
royong, saiyeg saeka kapti’ (Tim Teknis Nasional, 2007), which was adopted as the
value of partnership for sustainability (Sekretariat JRF, 2011, p. 19), has been claimed
to be an essential element of successful recovery.
Although the losses at the Kasongan pottery handicraft centre were estimated to reach
around 22 billion rupiah, the craftsmen worked hard to recover, and as a result, it was
recorded that UMKM activities were relatively normal again by mid-2007 (Tim Teknis
Nasional, 2007, p. 168-9). Furthermore, from the interviews, the spirit of togetherness
was also found within the tourism of the handicraft cluster, the local MSMEs and the
community, which also strove to work together. Some of them acted as entrepreneurs
in shopping tourism (i.e. the shop’s owners) and souvenir suppliers (i.e. the craftsmen),
while others acted as the owners of home-stay and transportation businesses (i.e. car
rental).
These dynamic interactions between shopping tourism destinations and other kinds of
tourism attractions strengthened both. As a result, the local people began to believe
that shopping tourism would provide them not only with sufficient income but also
enable them to take on a profession, i.e. as an entrepreneur. In the long run, the
craftsmen or labourers themselves had been evolving and became the new
198
entrepreneurs. Thus it is claimed that tourism encouraged many new business players
around the Bantul area.
7.5.1.4 Private partnership
In the context of MSMEs relating to large industries, business recovery is usually in the
forms of raw material assistance and production training: for example, what the flour
industry did to assist their foster children, i.e. home-based culinary and bakery
industries. Various training courses on baking and food processing were conducted for
them within the framework of the links between large industries and small industries
(Tim Teknis Nasional, 2007). The partnership with the private sector in the provision
of raw materials was also performed within the batik industry, such as through the
partnership of providing the fabric materials (e.g. in cooperation with PT. Primissima)
required for the batik process (INT11, as documented in The Industry MSMEs and
Cooperation Board, 2015).
In addition, the partnership cooperation was carried out in the form of a product
packaging scheme. Generally, most MSMEs are able to produce good products, even
high quality product, but products become less competitive due to poor packaging
(INT11, as documented in The Industry MSMEs and Cooperation Board, 2015). For this
purpose, the mediation process between large, medium, and small business was also
initiated by associations of entrepreneurs and business, especially to match the
minimum orders and price levels in accordance with the capacity of small business
(INT13, as documented in The Industry MSMEs and Cooperation Board, 2015).
According to Unilever Indonesia Foundation, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is
no longer merely for giving away corporate money, but rather there is an element of
ownership within CSR activities. That is, empowerment should be a two-way process
between the company and the beneficiary: ‘The boundaries between the ‘given’ and
‘giver’ becomes disappeared gradually, thereby they can grow and be mutually
reinforcing’ (Tim Tempo Institute, 2011, p. 17). A CSR program will have a significant
impact on society, when it is designed, managed and controlled as well as supervised by
professionals, and aimed to be sustainable from the beginning. The key is to make the
community as the owner of the program. When the community is actively involved,
then its successful strategy might be replicated elsewhere and for other programs.
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Source: Tim Tempo Institute (2011)
On the other hand, for many companies (including Unilever), investment in the form of
community empowerment and education is another form of promotion and product
branding to the public as potential customers. CSR through a corporate foundation has
become 'a catalyst connecting companies and communities' (Tim Tempo Institute,
2011, p. 24). Input from the community becomes easier to collect, and at the same time
the message to be conveyed by the company can also be channeled. This type of
‘mutualism symbiosis’ connection has been clearly stated by the respondent (INT12, as
documented in Yayasan Unilever Indonesia, 2016):
Every farmer or MSMEs empowerment should have relevance to Unilever's business,
otherwise it will be difficult to sustain. Thus, in practice, besides wanting to realize social
responsibility, the company also thinks about the guaranteed supply of materials
7.5.1.5 Local culture and network
Most of the shopping tourism clusters in Bantul are based in one geographical area (i.e.
the village-based clusters), and their activities are dominated by the cultural values of
cooperation, the social network and trust. From the observation, although those
handicraft clusters have the same captive markets – the tourists who visit Bantul and
Yogyakarta – still MSMEs perceive that the business competition level remains
relatively low.
In order to illustrate this, Saputra and Rindrasih (2012) have provided an evidence-
based study regarding the connectedness and cooperation between the villages of
Pundong and Kasongan. Most of the Pundong craftsmen produce a typical plain
ceramic, but the Kasongan craftsmen produce ceramics with various patterns. In a
practical way, many of the Kasongan craftsmen often buy the plain ceramics from
Box 7.2. Unilever Indonesia Partnership Programme
The Unilever Indonesia Foundation partnership programme with Indonesian farmers started
in 2002 in Bantul, Yogyakarta. At that time, 25 black soybean farmers were invited to become
the raw material supplier for Kecap Bango. By 2010, the number of black soybean farmers who
had joined reached 6,600 farmers (Tim Tempo Institute, 2011, p. 56). The Foundation also
partnered with a team of researchers from Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, to ensure the
quality of soybean produced by farmers. The interesting thing about this partnership
programme is the market guarantee for their crops, ‘this programme is like providing hooks as
well as access to ponds and markets’, said one of the beneficiaries. The soybean farmers had
been planting approximately 1,170 hectares of land and produce crops that account for about
30 percent of Kecap Bango’s raw materials (Tim Tempo Institute, 2011, p. 60).
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Pundong and put a pattern or colours on them, e.g. woven rattan and banana stem bark
patterns. In addition, from further interviews, some products which are meant for
export often have the same distribution line, though they do not go to the same target
market. In another lesson from the JRF Project, the silver crafters received aid in the
form of production facilities, such as tools and machines. They had to form groups in
order to accept the assistance from this project. These groups also helped them to
connect with other craftsmen, who had previously worked individually (International
Organization for Migration, 2011).
In addition to these local cultural values, during the recovery period, the local
government ran an aggressive campaign with the motto, ‘Stand up on our own feet’, or
in other words, the aid should assist communities so that they can help themselves
(Tim Teknis Nasional, 2007). This message was meant to lighten the spirits of the
survivors who became depressed due to the aftermath of the disasters. Denis Nihill, the
chief of Mission IOM Indonesia, clearly stated, ‘During these visits, I have also been
pleased to note an increase of vibrancy and sense of optimism in the communities’
(International Organization for Migration, 2011, p. 6). Furthermore, the government
suggested people should not only be optimistic but also not over-dependent on any
external aid. Some of the respondents admitted that they never received any assistance
from any parties. They purely relied on their existing savings and/or their own assets.
7.5.1.6 Business Continuity Plan (BCP)
Just after the earthquake, the MSMEs’ predictions for their business continuity were
varied. Only about 25 percent of the respondents were optimistic that their business
would survive for the next 10 years. Nearly 60 percent thought they would close in less
than 10 years, and the rest answered in other ways. This subjective opinion is a
common view within a post-crisis picture; interestingly, despite living in a disaster-
prone area, more than 77 percent of business actors chose not to move the location of
their business, and still wanted to revive and/or expand the business again (90
percent). Unfortunately, the facts revealed that almost all the respondents had no
business development plan and resilience strategy, or so-called business continuity
plan (BCP).
The Bantul government thought that BCP is not yet necessary for MSMEs. Furthermore,
based on the personal opinion of respondents, local government might only pay
attention to high risk areas where the BCP may be introduced. The lack of
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understanding of the local units on disaster risk reduction has been illustrated by the
following opinion: 'local government has been choosing a role to accommodate the needs
of MSMEs, rather than providing incriminating regulations to the business community. I
see no urgent need (for imposing BCP) for now’ (INT11, as documented in The Industry
MSMEs and Cooperation Board, 2015). Implicitly, local government apparatus was not
fully aware that BCP is, indeed part of risk reduction efforts and business resilience,
and aims to avoid as much possible losses and/or business shocks in the case of future
disasters. On the other hand, the business associations have already been aware of the
important of BCP; however, they are still at an early stage of classifying the MSMEs
based on their risk and vulnerability.
In addition, the dysfunction of public service owing to disaster, especially at banks and
MFIs, could exacerbate the situation. Even though MFIs might have strategic roles due
to their proximity to customers, and as 'recovery' actors that help to improve
livelihoods and the economy, the majority of MFIs do not have a BCP (Mercy Corps
Indonesia, 2014). Damage to the functioning of financial institutions as a result of
disasters will have a direct effect on the recovery because the community will need
financial institutions, specifically to take deposits, postpone installments, and borrow
funds as well as for other bank services. Moreover, the function and role of MFIs for
small business groups in rural areas is enormous.
When the MFIs collapsed in the aftermath of the disaster, the small and micro
entrepreneurs also faced more loss and it was difficult for them to recover in a short
period of time. This collapse could have been caused by two things (Mercy Corps
Indonesia, 2014): namely, physical damage or infrastructure supporting MFIs’
operational processes, and the paralysis of MFI services to the community (business
actors). Mercy Corps, through its experiences in the Indonesia Liquidity Facility After
Disaster (ILFAD) program, claimed that by preparing these microfinance institutions to
operate quickly and effectively in the event of a disaster, then the MFIs could play a role
during the time lag before cash aid or liquidity facilities(in partnership with
commercial banks) is initiated.
7.5.2 Strategies to Revive the Local Economy
From empirical findings, the MSMEs issues in the Bantul recovery case are summarized
in Figure 7.6.
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Figure 7.6. Problems Mapping of the MSMEs’ Recovery in Bantul Regency
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In addition to the problems summarized above, Figure 7.7 below provides the general
framework consisting of four stages that help with understanding the paths to
economic revival, which include stages of protection, prevention, promotion and
transformation (Balgos and Dizon, 2015). Usually, charity and donations are placed for
the short term and on the first stage component of post-disaster financial assistance
(Becchetti and Castriota, 2011), particularly early after a disaster, when media
attention is high (Arendt and Alesch, 2015). In this early stage of recovery, much of this
assistance is focused on the immediate needs following the disaster, but some
organizations also provide aid for recovery, such as immediate repairs to homes and
funding for long-term investment in housing, schools, infrastructure, and other critical
elements of the community’s wellbeing.
Figure 7.7. General Framework of Disaster Resilient Recovery
Source: Modified from Balgos and Dizon (2015, p. 143)
In addition, the second stage solution is financial assistance through portfolio
microfinance: for example, micro insurance as preventive measure to avoid further
economic shock to livelihood after disaster. In this case, micro insurance is required as
a risk management system that is expected to back up low-income society and avoid
increasing financial pressures. Some other financial products may be provided by local
banks or MFIs (Mercy Corps Indonesia, 2014), such as:
 Emergency savings. These disaster emergency savings can be either voluntary or



































































withdrawn under normal conditions but can only be used by customers when they
are in an emergency situation or disaster crisis.
 Physical construction loans. The loan is given to customers with lower interest
rates to improve their home and/or place of business.
 Business rehabilitation loans. The loan is granted as a means to purchase raw
materials, production equipment or trade equipment.
 Micro insurance. Losses covered can include loss of life, health, education and
damage to business facilities.
The next strategy to be discussed in this sub-section focuses more on the third and
fourth stages to revive the economy, especially the affected area based on the tourism
industry, and to place MSMEs as economic prime movers.
7.5.2.1 Re-developing the local tourism industry
The local economy would be greatly affected by the impact of a disaster, especially in
regions that are heavily reliant on the tourism sector. Even if tourism-related facilities
can be quickly restored, the public perception of those destinations may not improve at
the same pace. This is especially affected by the media, which tends to broadcast bad or
misleading news which results in negative public opinion, so that a disaster-stricken
area is unlikely to attract visitors and investors (Schwab, 2014). During the first year
after the earthquake, the tourism sector in Yogyakarta Province slumped: for example,
in Yogyakarta City, hotel occupancy rates and travel agency bookings also experienced
sluggishness. This was mostly due to cancelled visits and deferred travel bookings
which were influenced by the gossip about the insecurity level of visiting Yogyakarta
after the earthquake (Shakuntala, 2007, pp. 177-8).
According to anthropological debates, the development of tourism will surely impact
on the people living within the area by giving them an option to work, ‘natural rotation
of the workforce between tourism and agricultural sectors’ (Nash, 1996, p. 20).
Furthermore, they predicted the benefit would exceed the cost that may burden the
wider society. In this case, Schwab (2014) argues that branding strategy is an essential
component of economic disaster recovery in the most affected areas. The strategy
might focus on tourism renewal or re-development in order to attract the new business
investors and workforce. On the other hand, the other experts in tourism development
also remind us that the benefits, either direct or indirect, might not work as planned. In
numerous cases, tourism development initiated from outside a region will leave the
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local people behind. Local government should anticipate the situation of the lower-paid
local workforces and import goods and facilities from outside the regions that may
cause the ‘leakage’ of revenue that should be earned from the development of local
tourism (Nash, 1996, p. 21).
Similarly, the main challenge facing Bantul Regency post-earthquake was the re-
branding and promotion of the tourism sector. Bantul has long been known for its
multiple tourist attractions. As well as its natural beauty, Bantul is also recognised for
its cultural values and historical venues, as well as being home to thousands of MSMEs
supporting the shopping tourism experience. As the tourism industry consists of parts
that closely interface one another, thus many sectors must also be taken into account:
for instance, transportation and accommodation. For promotional purposes, all of these
should be packaged attractively, so that within one itinerary, these destinations can be
included together. Bantul Regency promotion should include all these potential
attractions in order to give an open menu to tourists, especially for exploring all the
tourist sites in Bantul, Yogyakarta and nearby areas: for instance, places like
Parangtritis Beach, Gabusan Crafts Art Market and the Art Centre of Bagong
Kussuadiardjo, and including the local art and cultural performances, e.g. ketoprak,
jathilan, karawitan, gamelan, slawatan, sendra tari, wayang kulit, campursari, etc.
In tourism areas in southeast Asia, international tourists tend to look for a genuine and
local life experience (Saputra and Rindrasih, 2012; Azmi et al., 2016). Their goal is not
only to explore exotic and historical places but also to bring memories back to their
home countries. It is no wonder that the shopping tourism of handicraft souvenirs has
become one of the main activities whenever people visit Indonesia, including
Yogyakarta and Bantul. Tourists often feel that their trip would be incomplete without
some shopping time and buying something as part of the memories of their travels.
Bantul Tourism has been directed to become a sector that can boost Bantul regional
revenue (Bantul Regency, 2008, p. 82). For that purpose, the government should take
an active role in tourism development (Jenkins, C.L. and Henry, 1982). The GoI and JRF
have already formally established IOM Marketing and Promotional Task Forces. Along
with the village promotional teams, the Task Forces initiated the ‘Free Tour
Programme’ to get attention from foreign tourists. In addition, the preservation of local
heritage has been incorporated into the sub-component REKOMPAK project, which
focuses on cultural heritage and has been implemented at the community level of four
villages in Kota Gede, Yogyakarta and two villages in Klaten Regency.
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However, the local government has suggested conducting an in-depth study of the
shopping behaviours and preferences of both international and local tourists, and is
thereby trying to be much more responsive to their expectations. This research may
then be used for re-branding the shopping tourism clusters post-earthquake.
Elaborating from various studies (Jenkins, C.L., 1982; Getz, 1993; Dredge, 2006), the
local government is expected to have a certain level of understanding by conducting
insightful research into the following issues:
 The roles of MSMEs in the local tourism industry landscape, by conducting an
observational study of them to detect the shifting pattern of the products and
services and their impacts on the local economy;
 The shopping behaviours and preferences of both international and local tourists,
while trying to be much more responsive to their expectations in order to
encourage minimum targets of longer stays and repeat visits;
 The branding strategy, including advertising themes that meet the need for
attractiveness but are still in harmony with the local culture and values;
 The local government regulations, especially regarding investment incentives for
the potential investors who will naturally see the investment risk in disaster-prone
regions as higher than in other places;
 Periodic monitoring and evaluation to keep up the level of local community
engagement, and to get feedback on the impact of existing tourism
operationalization within their village area.
Finally, the government should anticipate the competing interests of the concerns of
local economic development with other needs, such as social, cultural, and
environmental loss. Thus formulation of the future sustainable development of
shopping tourism within the framework of regular village development planning
processes (e.g. musrenbang desa/kecamatan) is essential. These should be integrated
with local business continuity plans, especially for the shopping tourism clusters to
anticipate and deal with future disasters.
7.5.2.2 Re-starting the business
Even those businesses that do not receive direct damages may suffer extensive
disruption from problems in infrastructure and/or the supply chain. Large companies
within the community are generally already prepared with business continuity plans or
have resources to ride out business interruptions or losses resulting from disasters.
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Small businesses, however, are more likely never to reopen after a disaster or fail
shortly after reopening (Schwab, 2014). Many local governments did not give sufficient
assistance to local businesses with financial needs arising from disaster. Most local
governments were observed as having little experience of helping local businesses
remain in business in the community or helping them bounce back after disaster. They
are more likely to have more experience trying to attract new business and industry to
the community, than supporting the old ones’ revival.
Business recovery means the ability of business entities to recover assets lost in
disasters; the extent of adverse effects on business dependencies (e.g. suppliers,
customers, and employees); and the ability to adapt quickly and appropriately to new
realities in a post-disaster environment. In principle, the MSMEs’ recovery activities are
aimed at ensuring that their business can be revitalized and/or operate on an ongoing
basis, and directed to be more resilient to shocks due to disasters. Based on lessons
learnt and perceived needs of MSMEs in Bantul-Yogyakarta, we elaborated the essential
strategies for MSMEs to re-start business, as follows:
 The settlement of non-performing loans for the affected enterprises: for example,
through the support of government policies by which eligible borrowers (i.e.
MSMEs) with post-disaster arrears are assisted in negotiating and restructuring
their credit obligations in order to accelerate the business recovery;
 The improvement of the ability of UMKM to access various financing alternatives,
including sharia schemes through micro finance institutions. If it was conducted in
the form of revolving fund assistance, then the principles of transparency, fairness,
independence of the scope of assistance and sustainability should be placed as the
basic criteria. In addition, on the principle of self-reliance, other assistance must
include capacity building of debtor business management – for instance,
administration, book-keeping and business management – to overcome the post-
disaster financial problems;
 The recovery of the MSME’s production capacity and resources, including the
replacement of the productive assets damaged by the disaster. In terms of
improving competitiveness, there is a need for workforce capacity building through
skills training, in accordance with the local need for excellent products;
 The improvement of the ability of MSMEs to penetrate the market locally,
regionally and globally. The assistance can be focused on promotional and expo
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events for the local products affected, as well as organizing the event to facilitate
the relationships with potential buyers and investors;
 The creation of opportunities to improve the resilience and competitiveness of
MSMEs, including workshops on digital marketing and product innovation,
business development plans, and business continuity plans (BCP).
Research (Flynn, 2007) has shown that there is a need for government to
formulate policy stipulating the importance of BCPs, especially in small business
societies. He refuted the assumption that business owners and managers who have
experienced many disaster events will automatically prepare for the next disasters
without certain quality levels of planning. Moreover, it is stated that the existence of a
qualified BCP is one determinant of efficient recovery (Flynn, 2007, p. 508):
Too little planning, on the other hand, can create problems for general by increasing the number of
businesses likely to require disaster aid and increasing the disruption of services to the local
population.
7.6 Concluding Remarks
In most developing countries, including Indonesia, the traditional market and clusters
of handicraft shops have become popular tourist destinations. Bantul, part of
Yogyakarta Province in Indonesia, is well-known for its various handicraft clusters: for
instance, Kasongan for pottery or Manding for leather-based handicraft. These village-
based handicraft clusters were heavily damaged by the earthquake in 2006, which led
to the disruption of livelihoods and tourism in that region.
Most MSMEs are vulnerable due to 'shocks' in the aftermath of disaster. In the context
of Bantul and Yogyakarta, disaster caused by an earthquake was proven to greatly
impact the financial capability of MSMEs. However, on the other hand, MSMEs within
the tourism industry had an important role as one of the prime movers of the economy
after the disaster. There are several insightful points within the process of post-disaster
economic recovery in our case study, i.e. stimulant and affirmative policy, aid
disbursement, financial access, partnership and community engagement, local culture
and networks, as well as business continuity plans.
Based on the network analysis, it can be seen that for the entire process the actors from
different levels (such as macro, meso and micro) strive together in the economic
recovery process in the aftermath of disaster. The development of the MSME sector
should be planned sustainably, and in Bantul, the development of MSMEs should be
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continuously driven by the development of the tourism sectors along with all the
relevant actors who either directly or indirectly interact with the tourism industry. This
strategy can also be adapted for other regions by taking account of the specific
conditions of each case study and its sector base, and primarily referring to its own
recovery network.
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Chapter 8. The Nexus of Post-Disaster Recovery and
Development: A Synthesis from Disaster Recovery
Governance in Bantul Regency
8.1 Introduction
In 2008, it was noted that Indonesia faced two major problems in disaster governance
(Haifani, 2008, as cited in Kuncoro and Sartohadi, 2012). The first concerned the low
level of public awareness in reducing disaster risk. The second was related to the mind-
set of policymakers (whether in local or central government), which has not been
reformed yet, as evidenced by most of the development plans, which failed to include
integrated environment management and disaster risk reduction measures. A decade
later, this latter problem has not been substantially resolved, except at the national
level, where most of the reforms have been carried out. More effort is needed to
strengthen local institutions and integrate disaster reduction approaches into
development policies at every level, even at the village and community level (Mardiah,
Andri N. R. et al., 2017).
Furthermore, as has been identified earlier in Chapter 2 (Section 3.3.), disaster can also
be viewed as an opportunity to bring about sustainable development (McEntire, David
A, 2004; McEntire, David A., 2014). Efforts can be mainstreamed within all phases of
disaster management cycles, including disaster recovery. By designing a sustainable
development agenda, the critical nexus of disaster and development can be embodied
in attempts to create resilient recovery. However, if one compares recovery to other
phases, then one will perceive recovery as the slowest and longest as well as most
problematic phase (Kapucu, 2014, p. 42).
According to Ansell and Torfing (2015, p. 315), a collaborative form of governance is
most needed whenever ‘no single actor has the knowledge and resources to solve
complex societal problems’. In addition, owing to the complexity of post-disaster
development issues - such as in economic and tourism redevelopment context (see
Chapter 7) - where responsibility for policy making and implementation is shared
amongst public and private sectors, then a shift toward governance is believed to
encourage cooperation (Dredge, 2006). Thus, the important thing to be discussed in
this chapter is the role of collaborative governance in many development scenarios,
including in building resilient recovery for post-disaster development.
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This chapter is a synthesis of the three previous evidence-based chapters, which
discussed post-disaster recovery governance from a multi-level perspective. In
particular, this chapter focuses on collaborative governance principles that have been
applied – though without having been explicitly stated – to disaster recovery in
Indonesia, and especially in Bantul Regency and Yogyakarta. Therefore, the research
question that guides this chapter is: ‘How can collaborative governance and networks
in post disaster recovery contribute to local economic revival and resilient recovery for
development?’. Objectives included within this chapter are (1) to construct a
conceptual model to integrate post-disaster recovery into sustainable development
policy and identify the essential elements of resilient recovery; (2) to develop a
theoretical framework of collaborative governance in the context of disaster recovery,
based on knowledge derived from the case study; and finally, (3) to formulate




Governance can take the form of less-binding relationships, such as coordination and
cooperation, to more formal relationships that involve mandated or formal
partnerships. Collaborative governance emphasizes collaboration that is beyond mere
coordination and requires the achievement of shared goals and shared decision-making
through both inter-organizational and cross-sector efforts and relationships (Agranoff
and McGuire, 2003). Along with the key principles identified in the collaborative
governance literature, leadership is a pertinent element of collaborative and networked
governance, wherein public managers and leaders help to mobilize, facilitate, and
implement collaborative and cooperative structures (Kapucu, 2014, p. 45) to achieve
set goals and take responsibility to engage stakeholders in deliberative ways (Wallis
and Gregory, 2009).
Collaborative forms of governance continue to change and develop, ‘fuelled by
institutional complexity and political fragmentation and driven by the recognition that
no single actor has the knowledge or resources to solve complex societal problems’
(Ansell and Torfing, 2015, p. 315). Emerson et al. (2012, p. 7) have formulated an
integrative framework for collaborative governance, named ‘the collaborative
governance regime’. The framework contains three elements: system context, drivers
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and collaborative dynamics. System context consists of, amongst other things: policy
and regulatory frameworks, political dynamics (e.g. power relations), network
connectedness, level of conflict, trust, socio/economic/cultural diversity and resource
conditions. Drivers can be divided into four components: leadership, consequential
incentives, interdependence, and uncertainty. The core element of this regime is
collaborative dynamics, which consists of three components: principled engagement
(i.e. discovery, definition, deliberation, determination), shared motivations (i.e. mutual
trust, mutual understanding, internal legitimacy, and shared commitment), and
capacity for joint action (procedural/institutional arrangement, leadership, knowledge,
and resources).
Meanwhile, from the disaster literature’s point of view, the factors which made the
community able to recover successfully, among others (Davis and Alexander, 2015):
minimum deaths and injury to members; culturally and environmentally sensitive
design of the settlement and its dwelling; a high level of participation by the
beneficiaries; reconstruction made also as an effective generator of livelihood;
organizational support; inspired people; and regional economic condition.
Furthermore, the four stands of recovery were identified as follows: ‘vision and
leadership, resources, participation and ownership, as well as organization’ (ibid. p.16).
8.2.2 Methods
This chapter provides a synthesis of the empirical chapters, supported by a discussion
of relevant literature. It has two streams of analysis: explorative analysis using
thematic coding in order to conceptualize the model; and then compares them using
indicators provided by existing literature on collaborative governance regimes and
other governance frameworks, such as crisis and/or risk governance, and a discussion
of many cases of recovery in Indonesia and other parts of the world.
8.3 The Interface of Disaster Recovery and Development
Recovery is a long process that offers many opportunities to rebuild and redevelop
resilient communities and development (McEntire, David A, 2004; Kapucu, 2014). It is
not an exaggeration to say then, as many scholars have, that the goal of a successful
recovery is not just to return a society to pre-disaster conditions, but to make it better
and safer, with an increase in resilience in the future (McEntire, David A., 2014).
Building community resilience generally requires time, persistence and consistency.
This is because post-disaster recovery generally takes a long period of time, even for
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people return to only their normal lives (Kapucu, 2014). The resilience of communities
to disasters before the disaster occurs and during the recovery period is expected to
enhance their ability to recover quickly in the future (Sunarti, 2013). Furthermore, a
resilient recovery serves as the bridge that integrates the recovery process into
sustainable development.
In order to understand the interface of disaster recovery and development more
closely, the next discussion will focus on (1) conceptual models and discussions of the
essential elements needed for resilient recovery; and (2) a framework derived from the
three previous empirical chapters, followed by discussion of relevant factors (i.e.
influential, determinant and driving factors).
8.3.1 A Conceptual Model of Resilient Disaster Recovery
8.3.1.1 A Conceptual Model: from Resilient Recovery to Sustainable
Development
Natural or man-made disasters certainly impact on the community. Hence an
understanding of the disaster must be holistic, including from within, to understand the
interaction between unplanned actions and their unintended consequences (Maarif,
2010). In fact, the strategies applied in the pre-disaster phases certainly impact the
ways in which communities and agencies respond to abnormal situations that arise
because of disaster (Arendt and Alesch, 2015). When dealing with a long-term social
and economic problem exacerbated by disaster, there needs to be a more thoughtful
process involved, rather than simply aiming for quick and instant results (Waugh and
Streib, 2006, as cited in Kapucu, 2014).
This points to the importance of pre-disaster recovery planning, as well as efforts to
link disaster recovery to economic development. From the empirical findings, it can be
concluded that not only basic needs, shelters or cash are needed for survivors, but also
mutual trust, shared goals and social learning, which drive sustainable disaster
governance. In addition, a community’s social capital, in the form of existing social
networks and interconnectedness, can be interpreted as a form of ‘informal insurance’,
helping disaster-affected people to stay, access resources, and engage in recovery
planning and implementation (Schwab, 2014, pp. 134-5). Referring to the Sustainable
Livelihood Framework (SLF), introduced by International Development Studies,
sustainable livelihood is described as follows (as cited in Nurhadi, 2015, p. 109):
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A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and
activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope and recover
from stress and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, while not undermining
the natural resource base.
From the definition above, it can be inferred that social resources are acknowledged as
essential assets to support livelihood to be more sustainable. This is in addition to
social, human (e.g. skills, health, physical strength), natural (e.g. land, water), physical
(e.g. production tools, livestock, infrastructure), financial (e.g. credit, capital,
insurance), which are also part of the system of livelihood assets (UNDP, 2008a).
The mechanism for integrating the development of community resilience against
disaster into development programs should start in the pre-disaster phase, especially
when a disaster has not yet occurred. However, such integration can also be carried out
in the post-disaster stage and should be implemented continuously, and embedded in a
regular development process (Sunarti, 2013). Taking into account various natural
disasters, areas, and their different characteristics, it is difficult – if not impossible – to
provide a detailed blue-print for all types of disaster recovery cases. There is no one-
size-fits-all solution, as the disaster management and recovery patterns of a region are
strongly affected by local conditions (INT1, as documented in BAPPENAS, 2015b).
Therefore, in this thesis the researcher proposes a conceptual model that has been
abstracted from the thesis as a whole. This is shown in Figure 8.1.
Referring to the proposed model, a community-based consensus is essential to
achieving resilient recovery, and resilience becomes a supporting condition for
sustainable redevelopment. Resilience is defined as, ‘the ability of a social system to
respond and recover from disaster … as well as the post-event adaptive processes that
facilitate the ability of the social system to reorganize, change and learn in response to
a threat’ (Guarnacci, 2016, p. 181). Community-based approaches work when they seek
to encourage understanding amongst stakeholders. This type of social learning plays a
critical role in, and underpins, the institutional, policy and technological assessments
subsequently needed in the building of resilience. It appears that in the aftermath of a
disaster, some survivors adapt to the crisis by depending solely on their own informal
social networks. However, to better support survivors and in order to achieve a smooth
transition from emergency relief to recovery and from recovery to development,
external agencies involved in the recovery should have a clear partnership strategy and
engage local partners from the beginning. Thus any strategies that are chosen should
be firmly rooted in local communities’ needs. Indeed, what makes the approach
215
applicable is if true participation takes place. It is expected that this would produce
shared decisions and team-derived actions concerning many things, such as prioritised
activities and (if necessary) financing the community recovery process.
The ability to cope is related to the capacity to anticipate, deal with, restrain, and
recover situations from the impact of hazards (Sunarti, 2013). However, limited access
to resources prevents businesses and people from successfully coping with the crisis.
Subsequently, community resilience can be built by increasing knowledge of risks, tools
and resources to deal with threats and create opportunities. One of the initial steps in
building the resilience of nations and communities against disasters is to be aware of
the importance of disaster risk reduction (DRR) and encouraging community-based
DRR. Community-based DRR has a strategic position, given the wide and diverse
threats and potential disasters that need the active participation of the wider
community (Sunarti, 2013).
Based on data from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED, as
cited in Nurhadi, 2015, p. 106), poor countries experience the worst impact of disasters
and it is the poor who suffer most. Vulnerable areas in the Bantul region have a high
population density and a high residential area density (Kuncoro and Sartohadi, 2012, p.
80). Unfortunately, a recent study conducted in Bantul (Kuncoro and Sartohadi, 2012,
p. 85) showed that the lowest level of education on average was found in the most
vulnerable areas. In addition, the lowest average level of income was found in the most
vulnerable areas. Thus, income levels and education levels are correlated with levels of
vulnerability. The social and economic conditions underpinning society also have the
opportunity to magnify the threats and contribute to disasters. Disruptive disasters
thus can be treated as a window of opportunity that breaks that vicious circle by
allowing for the emergence of resilient recovery initiatives. In principle, disaster
recovery should be based on a vision to build back better and safer, which is
implemented in the systematic disaster risk measures toward resilience.
Community resilience can also be enhanced through economic improvement (Sunarti,
2013, p. 9). As an illustration, those who are poor usually have low income levels, i.e.
between 30-50 thousand rupiah per day. Most income is spent on daily needs; as a
result, the accumulation of financial capital is difficult to achieve. The biggest impact
experienced post-disaster was the inability to pursue education higher than senior high
school and build earthquake-proof housing (Nurhadi, 2015, p. 112). As has been
explained in detail in Chapter 7, for middle-income families or those who run small
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businesses, complicated procedures, high interest rates, and a lack of collateral prevent
people from accessing new capital. These kinds of disadvantages increase the level of
risk. Livelihood recovery of disaster victims should be sustainably integrated into the
regular development and poverty alleviation strategy, as well as in the DRR program
(Sunarti, 2013, p.77).
Figure 8.1. Conceptual Model: ‘From Resilient Recovery toward Sustainable
Development’
8.3.1.2 Discussions of the Essential Elements for Resilient Recovery Model
The essential elements of disaster recovery include social learning, consensus building,










































Recovery has no definite end point; it depends on communities’ expectations
concerning post-disaster recovery, which might change over time as the process
unfolds. Disaster provides opportunities for communities to learn from their
experiences and from any phases of the disaster management cycle (O'Brien et al.,
2010; Schwab, 2014, p. 8). Ideally it will lead to the formulation of a sustainable
recovery framework. The process should enhance stakeholders’ engagement and give
the community the opportunity to truly engage. Community participation means that
people’s contribution in the disaster management cycle can begin with basic steps and
end in achievement and institutionalization in the community (Jahangiri et al., 2011, p.
82).
Scholars agree that recovery is not achieved merely when all damaged houses or
destroyed buildings are restored or replaced. In the early stages of the Yogyakarta
recovery, critics said, ‘[the application of) regional autonomy requires social
reconstruction to guard the physical or building reconstruction, while the central
government tends to prioritize the physical construction of buildings’ (Shakuntala,
2007, p. 83). According to Johnston et al. (2012, p. 252), the main point of recovery is
‘how society organizes, mobilizes and coordinates the diverse range of organizational
and professional resources that can be called upon to assist recovery’. As Nigg (1995, p.
5) pointed out:
If one takes (the) perspectives that community recovery can be equated with outcomes in the built
environment solely, the sociological significance of what really transpires in the post-disaster
experience is missed. Recovery is not merely an outcome, but rather it is a social process.
Therefore, recovery is no longer understood as a linear process, but rather as the
interactive process between decision makers and communities in broader sense,
including households, businesses, and various community groups or institutions.
However, according to Shaw (2013), one should remember that there might be a trade-
off between deliberative processes, speed and the quality of resources.
Consensus Building
A number of scholars have different opinions on the recovery process. Revisiting the
recovery as process, Olshansky (2005) contends that 'recovery' should be placed at its
minimum target, that is a completed housing reconstruction and economic activities
functioning as they were pre-disaster. Many others understand recovery as a ‘return to
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normalcy’. However, what is the meaning of ‘normal’ in terms of disaster recovery?
Arendt and Alesch (2015, pp. 150-151) discuss ‘normal’ with reference to ‘what has
been achieved when the community develops to levels of system performance that are
likely to have been achieved had the disruption not occurred’.
Nevertheless, they disagree with the idea that recovery meant rebuilding exactly what
was there before the disaster. They contended that ‘if the pre-disaster community was
vulnerable to this disaster, chances are that, if it is rebuilt just as it was, it will be
similarly vulnerable to subsequent disaster’ (ibid., p. 151). The challenge for local
government and community members is to build a better community, one that is more
resilient than that which existed prior to the disaster, but which still embodies the
community’s essential nature and core competences. Thus, recovery should embody a
sense of ‘rebuild back, stronger than ever’ (Phillips, 2009, p. 21).
Defining shared recovery goals can enhance collaboration and overcome any possible
differences (Schwab, 2014, p. 73). Therefore, communities must first decide on a clear
definition of recovery from many perspectives, such as environmental, physical,
economic, social, institutional, etc. Whilst the discussion of detailed indicators is still
evolving, general indicators of successful recovery are widely known: speed and quality
(Olshansky, 2005). The speed of recovery is essential to many businesses and the
public, both of whom have experienced great loss and suffered psychological stress
(Schwab, 2014, p. 9). Therefore, realistic timeframes and outcomes should be clearly
defined and monitored.
Networking
From an economic perspective, recovery is influenced by former socioeconomic levels;
the higher the socioeconomic level, the more likely businesses are to recover to the
same level of prosperity that they experienced prior to the disaster (Olshansky, 2005).
Moreover, community diversity, according to Johnston et al. (2012, p. 253), has
determined how well the community responds to recovery demands, and also
influences their ability to use resources and past experiences to fulfil needs and to plan
future strategy.
In addition, it is not only socioeconomic levels but also social networks that play an
important role during periods of recovery. This means that the level of attachment
individuals have to certain networks affects how quickly recovery can take place. This
is related to the fact that great support from friends and families will accelerate the
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recovery process (Johnston et al., 2012). Unlike man-made disasters, natural disasters
bring some ‘advantages’. Ride and Bretherton (2011) argue that a perception amongst
victims who believe a natural disaster comes ‘purely’ from outside the human, as well
as beyond the habits of the local community, encourages them to become tied to one
another and to stand up to confront the crisis collectively. Furthermore, communities
with a high degree of horizontal integration will form a strong network. This would
privilege them with the possibility of becoming problem solvers. Conversely, a
community with a low degree of horizontal integration, to some extent, would lose this
privilege (Warren, 1963, as cited in Berke et al., 1993).
In line with this, the idea of social capital implies that connections can be profitable;
like any other form of capital, ‘we can invest as well as expect a decent return from it’
(Field, 2003, p. 12). Field (2003, p. 3) underlined the fact that ‘if we do share a value, we
are much more likely to cooperate to achieve a mutual goal’. In order to achieve a
certain level of livelihood and local economic recovery, the idea of a bonding
community that helps each other to cope with disaster can be used as a reference
(Woolcock and Narayan, 2000, p. 226):
When a people on hard times, they know it is their friends and family who constitute the final safety
net. Intuitively, then, the basic idea of social capital is that a person’s family, friends, and associates
constitute an important asset, one that can be called on in crisis, enjoyed for its own sake, and
leveraged for material gain. What is true for individuals, moreover, also holds for groups.
Resiliency
Resilience is not only the domain of government, but also of individuals, organizations
and businesses. Resilience is claimed to allow communities to respond and recover
more effectively from disaster (Schwab, 2014, p. 21). Furthermore, resilience is also
used interchangeably with the term ‘community sustainability’ (Arendt and Alesch,
2015, p. 169). It is claimed that opportunities to advance community resilience are
brought about during the long-term recovery from a disaster (Godschalk, 2009, as cited
in Schwab, 2014, p. 25). Therefore it is important to embed the concept of resilience
within the wider framework of sustainability aiming to preserve resources and
opportunities for future generations.
It is also claimed that it is the practice of everyday resilience when responding to daily
stress that best equips organizations to deal with disasters and other unexpected
challenges (Schwab, 2014, p.31). According to the 2012 Report (p. 2), ‘Disaster
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Resilience: A National Imperative, the National Research Council provided a summary
explanation of the interconnection between resilience and recovery, as well as other
components in disaster management (as cited in Arendt and Alesch, 2015, p. 170):
Developing of culture of resilience would bolster support for preparedness and response, and would
also enable better anticipation of disaster and their consequences, enhancing the ability to recover
more quickly and strongly. Resilient communities would plan and build in ways that would reduce
disaster losses, rather than waiting for a disaster to occur and paying for it afterward
In the context of the nexus between disaster and development (Anderson, 1985;
Pelling, 2003; Collins, 2009), it is necessary also to note the link between
‘suffering/loss’ and the element of ‘coping ability’. Disaster can be assumed to be the
prominent sign of development failure; meanwhile, development also can be used as an
integrative process to reduce vulnerability to disaster. Moreover, development is said
to have failed if the communities have a low capacity to cope with disaster, which
implies that suffering and long-term loss cannot be minimized.
Post-disaster redevelopment
Whenever disasters affect the economic activities of key employers or major
businesses, it is likely that there will be long-term hardship for the surrounding
community (2009, as cited in Arendt and Alesch, 2015). The problems that might arise
involve permanent employer relocation, shutdowns, disruption to major supply chains,
or other chain reactions in the business community. They will cause major and possibly
enduring disruption in the local and regional economy. The failure to bring the
development back on track may lead to a disparity between regions.
Schwab (2014, p. 84) argued that sustainable and resilient economic recovery planning
should focus not only on the rebuilding of damaged structures but also issues on the
resumption of business activity and retention of the local workforce. Economic
recovery is a complex policy area that is not easily developed through traditional
government action. Instead, it requires participation from the private sector (Schwab,
2014, p. 84) as well as the community, as the community depends on its economy for
survival, and the business often depends on the community within which they exist for
their viability (Arendt and Alesch, 2015, p. 87).
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8.3.2 Collaborative Platform for Disaster Recovery Governance
8.3.2.1 Collaborative Platform to Integrate Recovery into Development Policy
Disaster recovery is a longer and more complicated process than disaster response; it
can take years before the entire disaster area is completely redeveloped (Kapucu,
2014). The complex nature of recovery planning and efforts requires pre-disaster and
post-disaster collaboration between different stakeholders including public, private,
non-profit organizations and the broader community (Kapucu, 2014, p. 42). A strong
foundation for collective action can be developed through an inclusive recovery
planning process. Implementation will be more collaborative and well-coordinated if
there is active engagement between government agencies and the public in decision-
making, policy-making and program design (Schwab, 2014).
Below is the proposed disaster recovery governance platform (DRGP) that has been
derived from the whole chapters in this thesis. It has been abstracted from a dialogue
between the empirical chapters, existing theories and recent discussions of disaster
and resilience in the context of sustainable development.
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Table 8.1. Disaster Recovery Governance Platform (DRGP) based on Governance Regimes and Extant Disaster Studies




Pre-Disaster Conditions, Systems and Context
a.1 Policy and Regulatory Frameworks Chapter 5 Lassa, J. (2013) Emerson et al. (2012, p. 7)
a.2 Political Dynamics Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Enia (2016) Emerson et al. (2012, p. 7)
a.3 Global Platform:
e.g. Sustainable Development Goals; Sendai Framework
Chapter 5 Djalante, Riyanti et al. (2012) Tierney (2012)
a.4 Socio Cultural Resources:
e.g. trust, social relations, etc.
Chapter 6
Chapter 7
Kumara and Susetyo (2008);
World Bank (2012)
Kusumasari and Alam (2012b);
Davis and Alexander (2015);
Dokhi et al. (2017)
Emerson et al. (2012, p. 7);
Huxham et al. (2000, pp. 351-2);
Silvia (2011, p. 70)
a.5 Local Collaboration History Chapter 6 (Households)
Chapter 7 (MSMEs)
Nurhadi (2015) Emerson et al. (2012, p. 7)
B. Driving Factors:
Encouragement to Initiate and Accelerate the Process
b.1 Network Leadership Chapter 6 - Silvia (2011);
Emerson et al. (2012, p. 7);
Huxham et al. (2000, p. 353)
b.2 Consensus Building and Shared Understandings Chapter 6
Chapter 7
World Bank (2012) Silvia (2011)
b.3 Networked and Well-Connected Communities Chapter 6
Chapter 7
Pelupessy et al. (2011); Guarnacci
(2016)
-
b.4 Mutual Needs or Interests Chapter 6
Chapter 7
- ‘Interdependence’ as cited in
Emerson et al. (2012, p. 7)
b.5 Commitment Chapter 6 - ‘Thuggery… be active or get out’ as
cited in Huxham et al. (2000, p.
353); Silvia (2011)
b.6 Incentives and Stimulants Chapter 6
Chapter 7
- Emerson et al. (2012, p. 7);
Huxham et al. (2000, p. 340, 353)
C. Determinant Factors:
223








Saputra and Rindrasih (2012) Huxham et al. (2000, p. 351)
c.2 Institutional Networks with Legitimate Arrangements Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Chapter 7
Lassa, J.A. (2015); Bisri (2016);
Kusumasari (2014a); SFDRR, as
cited in UNISDR (2015)
Emerson et al. (2012, p. 7)
c.3 Leadership and Key Organizations Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Subagyo and Irawan (2008);
Kusumasari (2014b); Davis and
Alexander (2015)
Emerson et al. (2012, p. 7);
Silvia (2011, p. 69)
c.4 Capacity and Capability of Key Organizations Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Indah et al. (2008); Kusumasari
and Alam (2012a); Kusumasari
(2014a)
Silvia (2011, p. 67)
c.5 Financing and Aid Disbursement Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Chapter 7
Resosudarmo et al. (2012);
Kusumasari (2014a)
Huxham et al. (2000, p. 353)
c.6 Strategies and Affirmative Policy Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Chapter 7
Indah et al. (2008); Basuki (2008);
Yusuf (2014); Kusumasari (2014a)
-
c.7 Communication and Exchange of Resources
e.g. personnel, knowledge, data and information,




Badri et al. (2008); Davis and
Alexander (2015)
Huxham et al. (2000, p. 340);
Emerson et al. (2012, p. 7);
Ansell and Torfing (2015);
D. Principle Elements:
Mainstreaming throughout the Governance Process
d.1 Social Learning Chapter 6
Chapter 8
Maarif (2010) -
d.2 Partnership, Participation and Empowerment Chapter 6
Chapter 7
UNDP (2008a); World Bank
(2012); Yusuf (2014); Davis and
Alexander (2015)
Huxham et al. (2000, p. 340)
d.3 Resilience and Sustainability Chapter 6
Chapter 7
Chapter 8
Alexander et al. (2006); UNDP
(2008a); Guarnacci (2012); World
Bank (2012); Sunarti (2013); Seng
(2013); (UNISDR, 2015)
-
d.4 Transparency and Accountability Chapter 6 UNDP (2008a); World Bank (2012) -
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8.3.2.2 The Factors: A Discussion of What Works, What Does not Work, and
Why?
A recovery is said to be successful if it is able to balance between various criteria,
including, amongst others, speed and quality (Olshansky et al., 2012), and sustainability
(INT10, as documented in BAPPENAS, 2015b). However, it takes a longer period of time
until people return to normal life. As an illustration, in Japan, a developed country with
a relatively well-performing disaster management system, one year after the
earthquake and tsunami in Tohoku Region, many people still lived in refugee camps, a
quarter of businesses had not yet recovered and some businesses were forecast to
never re-open (Sunarti et al., 2013).
If a disaster is not handled swiftly and quickly, then the prolonged disaster will impact
upon the economic circumstances of local families, thus disrupting the functioning of
the family and social stability (Sunarti et al., 2013). Meanwhile, an improvement to
quality is indeed essential, and this can be enforced through planning; plans can be
used to determine recovery steps and further particular development phases as early
as possible. As soon as data of damage and loss is provided, the plan can be
immediately mobilized, during the earliest possible recovery period (INT10, as
documented in BAPPENAS, 2015b).
Success and failure in disaster recovery governance is affected by many factors, most of
which have been listed in the proposed DRGP (see Figure 8.1). In order to understand
these factors and before being discussed further, a working definition is needed. A
working definition for the ‘determinant factors’ (C) used within DRGP is the essential
managerial components applied during the post-disaster recovery period that most
likely determine the success or the failure of the recovery process, while the ‘driving
factors’ (B) are described as the components that help to initiate and accelerate the
recovery process. The ‘influential factors’ (A) are defined as the pre-disaster conditions,
system and context that altogether or partly affects the recovery process in positive
ways or in reverse. Lastly, ‘mainstreaming elements’ (E) are basic principles that
should always be referred to and considered in all activities and throughout the
recovery process.
Decision-making processes that seek to achieve consensus-building (b.2) should adopt
a community-based inclusive approach, which encourages greater involvement (d.2) of
marginalized groups, especially women and the poor. Inclusiveness can start from the
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lowest level, the neighborhood and village environment, where communities are
invited to identify needs and strategies for disaster risk reduction, response and
recovery (b.4). The disaster recovery approach is a multistage approach, with
concurrent and overlapping streams and stages. A communicative decision-making
process (c.7) and participatory planning will enhance accountability (d.4) and program
ownership (c.1) throughout the recovery process (i.e. rehabilitation and
reconstruction), wherein communities voluntarily take an active role in improving
their own lives (d.2). It will further have an impact upon the decrease in communities’
complaints and the increase of conflict resolution (d.1).
In the context of Bantul and Yogyakarta, the fulfillment of basic needs, housing demand,
livelihood recovery, infrastructure and local economic revival are streams that occur
simultaneously and which are interrelated. Furthermore, the involvement of
international agencies and international NGOs in official government projects has
largely followed the above mentioned patterns, albeit within a wider portfolio that
includes the provision of temporary shelter, access to finance and the rehabilitation of
MSMEs. However, on top of that, the arrangement of institutional networks (c.2) should
be based on a common understanding (b.2) of goals in the form of, amongst others,
joint planning and/or binding procedures (c.1). The commitment (b.5) of local actors to
agreements is crucial for their long-term sustainability (d.3). According to Gray, 1989,
as cited in Huxham et al. (2000, p. 351), ‘agreeing a definition of joint purpose tends to
be difficult for collaborations because of the diversity of individual and organizational
goals, some of which may be conflicting’. Thus, a good leader (c.3) is said to be a
reflective practitioner who fully understands the essential issues involved (a.1-3) in
collaborative processes (b.1) (Argyris and Schon, 1974, as cited in Huxham et al., 2000).
The capacity (c.4) of network leadership (b.1) is required if a wide range of
organizational and institutional networks are involved. Thus, an organization is not
only expected to have internal leaders with strong leadership characteristics (c.3), but
also the capability (c.4) to organize the implementation of the plans amongst the
organizations involved in the disaster recovery agenda (b.1). As Huxham et al. (2000,
p. 353) argues, the ‘dominance of a governance area by one or a number of
organizations over others can provide the stage for the creation of a framework within
which independent and collaborative activity in the arena can take place’.
The former Secretary General of the Indonesian Society for Disaster Management
(MPBI) argues that economic development, to some extent, distances communities
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from their culture and undermines the essentials of local wisdom. Furthermore, in his
view, each region should have local wisdoms (a.4) for tackling disasters (Tim Teknis
Nasional, 2007). Without social and cultural resources (a.4), or a history of
collaborative work (a.5) within communities, then ‘it generally takes a long time – at
least two years in many cases – and many cycles of direction setting, action and trust
building for a collaborative relationship to settle in’ (Huxham et al., 2000, p. 352).
Besides influencing the time span of recovery, trust will affect the decision or
continuity regarding whether or not to stay fully engaged in the network’s mission
(Silvia, 2011).
In addition to the cultural values and social resources that already exist in the
community, local government capacity (c.4) also plays an important role in mitigating
and controlling post-disaster conflict (INT10, as documented in BAPPENAS, 2015b)
and in the transition period, where the recovery project is transferred from central to
local government, before finally ending (INT6, as documented in BAPPENAS, 2015b).
Capacity-building activities of local governments to ensure recovery should be focused
in synergy and in accordance with mutually agreed plans (c.1). This is important
because the required capacity of key organizations (c.4) differs considerably from that
in non-essential organizations. On this note, Silvia (2011, p. 67) argues that,
‘increasingly, the capacities required to operate successfully in network settings are
different from the capacities needed to succeed at managing a single organization’.
In the implementation of recovery programs, financial accountability and professional
administrative capacity (c.5; d.4) is also required. Emergency response operations
require large aid flows within a very short period of time and amongst uncertain
conditions, which can pose a risk of corruption. If not properly regulated (a.1), this will
also affect the accountability (d.4) underpinning the long-term recovery plan. Although
legally regulated - for example, in Indonesia Law no. 24/2007 stated that misuse of
disaster funds and assistance will entail more severe sanctions than other corruption
crimes – it is still worthwhile embedding collaborative and mutual monitoring through
agreed joint procedures (c.7). Therefore, establishing a mechanism for tracking aid has
always been a very important issue.
In relation to affirmative policies (c.6) and their sustainability (d.3), the
implementation of microfinance and revolving funds in post-disaster situations is very
challenging, since there is a need for it to reach beneficiaries quickly and to ensure
rigorous accountability mechanisms (d.4). Policy needs to also reflect and respond to
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the needs of women (c.6), especially because many MSMEs are run by women, for
example in the snack food industry and batik. As a result of the JRF recovery project,
more than 40% of microfinance loans have been distributed to women (Sekretariat JRF,
2011). Assistance to women serves to strengthen the role of women in the post-
disaster recovery process in particular and family resilience in general.
Disaster-affected communities should have access to information on emergency
response and recovery (c.7), as well as their rights. Therefore, a recovery program
should be identified and prioritized through a participatory process (d.2) within
affected communities, and ‘participation generally means inclusion of stakeholders in
the decision making processes that affect them’ (Huxham et al., 2000, p. 340). In the
early stages, communities should be involved in planning, implementation and
monitoring, so they can convey their aspirations. In addition, the active participation of
affected communities in emergency and post-disaster response operations will reduce
the risk of corruption in aid delivery (c.5). Empowerment can be understood as another
kind of participation, meaning that stakeholders should be involved, ‘to take a central,
rather than peripheral, role in the collaboration, including having direct authority for
spending its budget’ (Himmelman, 1994, as cited in Huxham et al., 2000, p. 340).
Partnership (d.2) is very important in disaster governance, and is more than merely
establishing a forum. Rather ‘this has to be community-driven. Initiatives should come
from private sector and civil society. We do appreciate the establishment of those
forums. However, without partnership, it is pointless’, (INT9, as documented in The
Ministry of Village Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration, 2015). In addition, the
same respondent argued that it should be based on the 4P principles – public, private
and people/community partnership. This is an extension of the public private
partnership concept. In this case, the involvement of the community has been shown to
be very important, since a community-driven effort can help to mobilize local resources
(c.7) and initiatives (Huxham et al., 2000). Furthermore, exchanging (or even pooling)
resources will determine what the network actually can accomplish (Silvia, 2011). In
fact, the network can encourage collaboration, if only there is willingness from most
key participants in the network to share their resources to be used for the agreed
purposes.
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8.4 Resilient Recovery Discourses for the Disaster Recovery Governance
Platform: the ‘What’, ‘How’ and ‘Who’
There are two similar conceptual understandings, though they are not the same
(Sunarti, 2013). First, development that is based on community disaster resilience, and
secondly, integrating community disaster resilience initiatives into development. The
first concept emphasizes the greater initiative of development actors to consider
disaster in a series of activities of development, such as planning, funding and
implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation. Meanwhile, the second concept
emphasizes the initiative and pro-activeness of disaster management actors to provide
various program inputs and action plans for disaster management, then propose and
encourage development to consider, match and integrate these programs within its
relevant development programs. Thus, these two understandings imply different
mechanisms, although both lead to the shared goal of becoming a more resilient nation.
Throughout this thesis, the researcher has proposed that the two above mentioned
conceptual understandings can actually work synergistically, and that the mechanisms
can be combined in a hybrid form, as proposed in the conceptual model presented in
Section 8.3.1 (please refer to Figure 8.1 for the next explanation). The researcher has
conveyed the idea that the first conceptual understanding has been visualized at the
stage of 'risk management' and 'consensus building', which consists of three core
elements: policies (i.e. tools of development), institutions (i.e. implementers or actors
of development) and the use of science or technology, also supported by the social
learning process therein (involving a multi-stakeholder dialogue process and feedback
from actual practices) in order to achieve the agreed development goal.
Subsequently, the second understanding in Figure 8.1 is represented in the 'resiliency'
stage, wherein the resilience of a community that has been assumed to be formed and
invested in the previous development process is then naturally tested by disasters. A
disaster can be regarded as an experimental laboratory to pilot the discourse of
resilience and sustainable development in the real world. At this stage, it will become
clear which aspects of the various development programs need to be improved for
them to be sustainable and beneficial to society.
All proposed improvements are then reintegrated into sustainable development, with
due regard for the success and failure of the program in every phase of the disaster
governance cycle and its relation to the realities of adaptation, coping capacity, and
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weakening/strengthening community resilience, as well as ideas to improve innovative
risk reduction measures. In short, the two understandings are different, but they are
not separate, and can even be aligned in a framework geared towards sustainable
development. Moving forward from the model, the researcher attempts to visualize
these two understandings in more practical terms within the context of the disaster
recovery governance platform (DRGP), as can be seen in Figure 8.2.
Figure 8.2. The Wheel of Disaster Recovery Governance Platform (DRGP)
Source: Analysis (2018)
Recent findings from the Bantul case show that a household’s economic segmentation
affects its ability to recover quickly from disasters (Nurhadi, 2015). A number of
household characteristics can be identified, as follows. The rich have the ability to
reduce the impact of disasters. They can, for example, use their assets and resources to
repair earthquake-damaged houses. In extreme cases, people with better economic
circumstances tend to experience fewer losses, as they can anticipate material losses by
building better-structured houses. Meanwhile, the poor have better social networks,
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which can help to minimize the cost of housing reconstruction. They use the social
capital embodied within the network to work together (i.e. gotong royong). In between
these two groups, there are a number of households who lack private assets or other
privileges, such as social networks. They tend to rely on their own means, but this is
insufficient for their recovery.
To address this, empowering MSMEs is essential for processes of disaster recovery,
especially in Indonesia, or any other country whose regional economic backbone is
small-scale businesses (i.e. MSMEs). However, a number of points need to be noted
regarding empowering MSMEs, particularly in terms of their access to capital: 1) capital
provision and aid must not cause any kind of dependency; 2) the capital provision
should be conducted through the creation of an enabling system to gain access to
financial institutions; and 3) the capital-allocation policy should not be misused for the
subsistence economy of the recipient. The objectives of facilitating access to capital
should encourage MSMEs to act responsibly and become accustomed to cooperating
with financial institutions. There are many other aspects that need to be restored in
order to revive the local economy. This has been broadly described in chapter 7.
In addition to this, BNPB is developing a disaster resilient village as one of its flagship
programs, supported by the Ministry of Disadvantaged Area Development. In 2011 the
program was launched and continually refined. Disaster resilient villages are self-
sufficient villages designed to adapt and deal with potential disaster threats, and
recover quickly from adverse catastrophic impacts. This is expected to be a reference
for the future development of resilient villages, especially for livelihood resilience and
for taking into account the role and function of the village as an autonomous region, as
stipulated in Law No. 6/ 2014 on the Village (Hadi, 2014). Therefore, it will be a
strategic effort to integrate community disaster resilience within frameworks of socio-
economic development that are regularly implemented by the government. In the post-
disaster period, a recovery plan and resilient concepts need to be integrated into the
framework of sustainable development through innovative rehabilitation and risk
reduction policies (Hermawan, 2014). The efforts undertaken in the recovery phase
aim to restore the affected area to a better and safer state than it was before the
disaster, so that the livelihood of communities and the strength of the local economy
can be restored, and local people can re-engage in the regular development process.
After explaining the conceptual model (i.e. the ‘what’) and the focus of the recovery
program (i.e. the ‘how’), the researcher will attempt to scrutinize 'who should be doing
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what' throughout the recovery process. This will be discussed in the following part, and
then finally the guidelines will be framed in the context of DRGP, as presented in
Table 8.2.
8.4.1.1 The roles of the key governmental agencies
In principle, the implementation of post-disaster recovery is the responsibility of local
governments, supported by the central government. Governments should pay attention
to long-term solutions rather than temporary resolution of problems. To implement
this, the government should play a unique leadership role (Subagyo and Irawan, 2008).
The main role of government is to provide integrated policies and circumstances that
support the acceleration of recovery, and to ensure better resilience to future disasters,
including what resources to mobilize, who is doing what, the recovery directions, the
timeframe, and the things that society could do to help improve the situation (ibid.).
As the key local actor, the local government should focus not only on providing aid, but
also on changing underlying patterns of exclusion and inequality; furthermore, they
should take into account cultural awareness (local wisdom) and support as well as
engage in multi-skilled recovery networks. In addition to this, local government should
support local efforts, as well as ensure access to information for all stakeholders and all
types of recovery activities that are required.
In the case of Indonesia, local government roles are handled by BPBD, and regulated in
Government Regulation No. 21/2008 on Disaster Management, among others. This
seeks to coordinate rehabilitation activities conducted by local government units and
related institutions; coordinate the establishment of government-assisted aid
mechanisms for community house improvement; coordinate psychological social
services implemented by relevant institutions; coordinate efforts to restore public
health conditions implemented through the health service centers set by the relevant
agencies; and to coordinate with related institutions in the implementation of measures
to improve socio-economic conditions post-disaster.
8.4.1.2 The roles of non-government stakeholders
In addition to the role played by both central and regional government, other key
players in the recovery process include civil society and business actors (Government
of Indonesia, 2007). There are many civil society networks that move with their
respective programs and targets. These civil society actors include those who are in
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disaster-affected communities, in both urban and rural areas. In the context of
Indonesia disaster governance, a network of stakeholders already exist to improve the
quality of disaster management at the regional level throughout the country (Mercy
Corps Indonesia, 2014). The disaster risk reduction forums themselves, which are
initiated by civil society, are now formed from the national level to the village level. At
the National Level, there is a National Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Platform (called
Planas PRB), a civil society forum, a forum of businesses, a DRR higher education forum
(FPT-PRB), a media forum, and an international agencies forum. In addition to this,
there are regional thematic forums, such as Forum Merapi, Forum Citarum, and Forum
Semeru.
In disaster recovery, there is a need for greater community involvement and
participation, both in terms of the affected communities and the general public. For that
purpose, community members should be informed of performance standards they can
expect and the extent to which governments and other agencies can help. People must
learn how to voice their opinions, especially when it comes to working together and
better meeting their needs. In addition, local leaders and committees should know how
to communicate and inform people of their needs. In addition, community leaders and
committees should learn to better use assistance, to be accountable for financial
administration, and to work collaboratively with representatives of aid agencies in
relief activities or projects.
Networking is considered important as a system to share information and liaise
between CBOs, the different organizations involved, and administrative bodies. NGOs
should have good relationships with the community to assess their needs and to find
resources to fulfil those needs. The relationship is not always simple, as it involves the
creation of regular meetings to address community recovery challenges. However, local
NGOs and CBOs should learn about governmental structures and relevant departments
and institutions, as well as how to contact and initiate cooperation when needed. NGOs
should be able to communicate to donors (and amongst themselves) the value of
population-centered aid, to ensure incoming donations will benefit the community.
Given the increasing complexity of natural disasters, including complications
introduced by climate change, such relationships are valuable, not only for funding, but
also in terms of expediting recovery (Schwab, 2014, p. 47).
There are some areas where BPBDs are weak but where the disaster forum is strong
because of the presence of national and international institutions. There are also BPBDs
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that are inactive because they do not have a good understanding of the issues. Thus, in
this case, universities in the region should play the role of a ‘think-tank’ of BPBD. They
should be encouraged to make use of their expertise in the recovery process. The
university forum has evolved into the Indonesian Association of Disaster Experts
(IABI). In addition to this, there is also the Disaster Education Consortium, which is
aimed at developing disaster knowledge through education and research and applying
it in the community, as well as supporting the development of sustainable DRR
education policies and practices that are both formal and informal and at national and
regional levels.
It is imperative that the restoration of local economic conditions involves as many local
economic actors as possible. The reason the private sector needs to be involved in
recovery is clear: disasters sometimes have an impact – and indeed sometimes paralyze
– the production sector. This can take the form of disruption of raw material supply
chains, damage to transportation facilities and paralysis of communication that impacts
on company operations. Disaster impacts also sometimes cripple microfinance
institutions (MFIs) that support small and medium business activities in both rural and
urban environments. This paralysis will certainly exacerbate affected communities and
disrupt regional and personal economic circumstances.
In terms of the private and business sector, a number of measures can be taken within
the disaster recovery context: 1) ensure the standardization of earthquake-resistant
buildings; 2) speed up recovery of infrastructure, such as electricity and
telecommunications; 3) provide insurance payouts to cover damage to assets and loss
of human life; 4) help to accelerate business growth by providing capital loans; 5) use
CSR funds to build social and community functions; 6) provide mitigation and business
continuity plan training for MSMEs; 7) provide professional input to the government in
formulating the recovery strategy of small and medium enterprises affected by
disaster; and 8) encourage sustainable economic rehabilitation.
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Table 8.2. Guidelines for Stakeholders Derived from the Disaster Recovery Governance Platform (DRGP)
Key Players Influential Factors Driving Factors Determinant Factors Mainstreaming Elements
Governmental Actors
Central Government  Policy and regulatory
framework. There needs to
be a clear indicator for
determining a state of
emergency/disaster status,
and recovery indicators at
each stage
 Political dynamic. In order
to be sustained, a resilience
oriented disaster recovery
must be integrated into the
development planning
process at all levels
 Commitment. There needs
to be a sense of ownership of
disaster-related programs by
all line ministries
 Communication for shared
goals. Governments need to
engage in dialogue with local
communities, civil societies,
donors and business
communities to agree on a
framework for action and
priorities
 Strategy. There is likely to be




and provide clear signs so
that such policy efforts can be
stopped properly without
causing excessive
dependence or are instead




 Institutional network and
arrangements. To avoid a
slowdown in economic
recovery, preparations for
the transition of recovery
activities from central
government assistance
activities to full and holistic
local government
 Resilience. For resilient
recovery, governments must
be firm in zoning policies,
relocation, and compliance
with agreed upon spatial
planning of the affected areas
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Key Players Influential Factors Driving Factors Determinant Factors Mainstreaming Elements
management are required.
Local Government  Social and cultural
resources. Local government
should be sensitive to the
cultural, social, political, and
geographical area
 Commitment. There needs








and international agencies, as
well as private companies’
CSR in the needs of fulfilling
quick budget in the early
recovery period
 Data and information. Local
government should perform




 Capacity building. It is





 Leadership of key
organization. In the case of
the ad-hoc project, local
government as the key
organization should be
actively engaged and capable
of monitoring and controlling
the recovery target
 Affirmative policy. Local
government should observe
changing underlying patterns






should prepare from their
own off-budget (apart from
central government) for
support for an emergency or
early recovery of impacted
 Social learning and
participation. Post-disaster
technocratic planning should
be combined with result from
community needs
investigation, therefore, the
use of participatory analysis,
planning and assessment is
recommended;
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Key Players Influential Factors Driving Factors Determinant Factors Mainstreaming Elements
regions
 Strategy and procedures.
Local government should be
aware of the real situation in
the field, as it might need to
be quickly reviewed and with
some flexibility adapt
existing procedures for the
needs of the local community
Governmental Leaders  Political dynamic. There




 Network leadership. To
generate support from other
stakeholders, the key
organization can alert the
mission or accomplishment
gained during the recovery
process
 Resources exchange. Local
government must be fully
aware of its existing
resources, or those of other’s
in the network for the shake
of the recovery process
 Social learning and
transparency. Governmental
leaders should establish a
robust complaint-handling
mechanism, and at the same
time become the feedback for




Local Opinion Leaders  Political Dynamic. Local
opinion leaders can play their
roles to minimize conflicts or
act in dispute resolution roles
 Communication. There
should be a good
communication system
among key organizations and
endorsed by local opinion






opinion leaders should be
capable of multi-way
communication to convey the
wider people’s needs to the
authorities
 Transparency. The leader
can use community media,
such as radio and newsletter
to inform community
members about the existence
of the project or the
availability of funding
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Key Players Influential Factors Driving Factors Determinant Factors Mainstreaming Elements
Community Members  Local collaboration history.
Pre-existing community
groups and activities provide
government with an easy
means to channel the
resources directly to the local
level
 Consensus building. By




agents in their own recovery
 Well connected community.




their member to be engaged
with outsider stakeholders
 Communication. Community
members should be well
informed about the necessary
information regarding the
program in which they are
expected to be involved
Business Entities (i.e.
MSMEs)
 Incentives and Stimulant.
For the MSMEs, the incentive
and stimulant provision
during the recovery program
is essential, especially in the
first 6 months post-disasters
 Well-connected
communities. It would be
better for MSMEs to be joined
in associations or groups in
order to have access to
certain resources or
information post-disaster
Private Sector (i.e. Large
and Multinational
Companies)
 Mutual needs and interest.
The private sector may (or
more precisely, may tend to)
collaborate through CSR in
the framework sustainable
local economic development
according to its relevance to
its specialties or product
supply chains
 Communication and shared
information. Expectations of
the private sectors or NGOs
partnered with them through
CSR funding when they
initially want to be involved
in the disaster recovery
process are: 1) situation
report; 2) needs; 3) locations;
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Key Players Influential Factors Driving Factors Determinant Factors Mainstreaming Elements
 Networking. The private
sector can work together
with universities and
local/national NGOs in the
context of a wide range of
implementation and
consultative measures




update; 6) updated aid-
beneficiary mapping
Local CBOs and NGOs  Local collaborative works.




and after) the disaster
 Partnership. CBOs and NGOs
should have a good
relationship with the
community to assess needs
and to find the resources to
fulfil needs
Scholars and Practitioners  Networking. Universities
and practitioners can work
together with key
organizations and
communities in the context
of a wide range of
consultative measures
 Resource Exchange. Local
universities can cooperate
with local key organizations,





International NGOs (INGOs)  Social Resources and
Collaborative Work
International agencies and
INGOs should take into
account the local conditions.
It is not advisable to pledge
aid that undermines the
inclusion of social values of
local communities
 Stimulant and incentive.
The mechanism of stimulants
/ incentives is often




effort should not cause
excessive public dependence
on this kind of program




programs, delay in disbursing
funds should be avoided. This
also applies to local NGOs and
CBOs
 Exit Strategies. International
NGOs should prepare the
process of transferring
assets, personnel, equipment
and documents before the
 Sustainability. The
sustainability of an ad hoc
project should have been
planned from the beginning,
even before the program
implementations
 Partnership. International
NGOs should have good
networks with local NGOs
and CBOs, especially
regarding investing in local
wisdom-based activities
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Key Players Influential Factors Driving Factors Determinant Factors Mainstreaming Elements










organization would make the
process of recovery smooth
 Strategies. The proposed
strategy should be adapted to
be in line with the local
government or key
organizations’ strategy
within the impacted country
 Capacity building.
International agencies are
expected to be involved in
capacity building and
knowledge transfer to the
local government.
 Sustainability and
partnership. In an ad hoc
project, the involvement of
local government is essential,
starting from the very
beginning of project
preparation until the




international agency as the
coordinating agency of donor
community aid should
establish a transparent
system for ensuring that
financial and other
information is shared widely
among stakeholders
Donor Communities  Policy and regulatory
framework. Any initiated
assistance from Donor
Communities is subject to
compliance with the
regulatory framework within
the jurisdiction of the
disaster-affected country
 Leadership. Donor countries
and agencies should respect
the leadership and any
directions issued by the
authority of the disaster-
affected country and regions
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8.5 Concluding Remarks
Resilient recovery is associated with various political, economic and socio-cultural
dimensions. The researcher has systematically underlined those crosscutting issues
(see also Chapters 5, 6 and 7), resulting in the argument espousing the importance of
social networks and the need for collaborative forms of disaster governance in order to,
for example, negotiate various interests and tackle the complexity of disaster recovery
processes.
The complexity of disasters calls for collaborative platforms involving the cooperation
of various stakeholders so that a resilient recovery and the ultimate vision for a more
resilient nation can be achieved. Disaster governance is the responsibility of everyone;
disaster should be everybody’s business. Thus the participation of all parties is needed,
not only government, but all elements within society. The economic and social impact
of disaster can be reduced more effectively by integrating not only a disaster risk
reduction program (Siagian et al., 2014), but also resilient recovery efforts into the




The overarching research question is ‘to what extent can disaster recovery be
enhanced through collaborative governance and social networks to significantly
influence the revival of the local economy?’. Implicitly, the central thesis
underpinning this research is that network-based and collaborative forms of
governance within the community, between stakeholders, and at multiphase and
multilevel scales serves as the engine of recovery after disasters and helps recovery
efforts to run smoothly to meet their goals. By means of mixed-methods, this thesis
derived a whole set of findings that support this statement. A recovery process that
uses this kind of collaboration should not just be comprehensive and embody shared
understanding, but should address gaps in government capacity to be thoroughly
capable in implementing its processes. Having considered all of the causes and impacts,
it can be inferred that disaster governance is not solely the responsibility of
government, but also requires the active involvement of other stakeholders, in
particular, communities and other development actors (Maarif, 2010).
At the end of this thesis, there will be a series of concluding statements that offer
reflection on the implications for Indonesia's disaster management policies and the
implications of research for the body of knowledge in the form of ten propositions for
disaster recovery governance. Subsequently, the limitations of the research and future
research agendas will also be explained, then finally completed by the closing
statement.
9.2 Reflection
In accordance with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR), there
needs to be a contribution that links research to the SFDRR’s priorities. Amongst other
things, this includes research on disaster occurrence (e.g. hazards and climate change),
investing in resilience (e.g. structural mitigations, preparedness drills, and early
recovery activities) and strengthening disaster governance, i.e. in the emergency
response context and in terms of recovery geared towards sustainable development.
The researcher has focused on the latter, and the discussion that has ensued will
contribute to the development of practical policy that can be implemented in Indonesia
and in other parts of the world that share similar socio-political arrangements and
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socio-cultural values. It has also strengthened our understanding of disaster recovery
governance, especially in the recovery phase, and in particular it has re-conceptualized
models, frameworks and propositions that can account for disaster governance. The
two following sub-sections discuss these contributions in more detail.
9.2.1 The Implications of the Research for Disaster Governance and
Development Policy in Indonesia
Some disasters are said to be the result of natural phenomena. However, many
disasters actually occurred or were worsened because of mismanagement and/or the
inappropriate implementations of development policy. Even if policy has been on the
right track, low levels of participation from relevant stakeholders, especially
communities, could lead to only partial or unsuccessful policy implementation.
Therefore, this thesis suggests that communities, discussed in the broad sense, should
take charge, or at least become actively engaged in their own recovery (see Chapter 6).
From this perspective, communities must have (or be facilitated to have) an established
mechanism to build understanding, cooperate, communicate and monitor priorities
that have been defined by a range of stakeholders, including local (i.e. BAPPEDA and
BPBD or Satkorlak/Satlak before 2008) and central government (i.e. BNPB or TTN
before 2008), who are identified as the key players in Indonesia’s disaster governance
efforts (see Chapters 5, 6 and 8). However, on top of that, there need to be harmonious
and clear regulations stipulating that the disaster-related agenda is internalized into
development policy, and fostering a resilient recovery for the input of development
process (see Chapter 5).
The existence of community-based organisations (CBOs) and opinion leaders prior to
and during disasters can also play a strategic role. The nature and extent of
relationships and networks that exist between communities and these local actors
prior to disasters have proven to facilitate communities’ needs to be channelled
towards broader consensus agreements, policy formulation and the next level of
implementation (see Chapter 6). In the context of livelihood and economic recovery,
local MSMEs, business associations and local micro finance institutions (MFIs) are
crucial and are broadly accepted as the backbone of the Indonesian economy,
particularly, in the case of Bantul Regency and Yogyakarta Province (see Chapter 7).
NGOs (e.g. IOM, see Chapter 7), international agencies and private sector actors (see
Chapters 6 and 7) can also play a role in disaster governance, provided that they are
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subject to, and comply with, the law and the development agenda to build a resilient
nation.
The cultural values and good relationships that exist amongst stakeholders prior to
disasters have always been a valuable resource for (among others but not limited to)
building trust, mutual understanding, mutual cooperation, enhancing accountability,
resource exchange (including information) between agencies and amongst
development actors (see Chapter 6 and 8). This means these cultural values and
relationships are a key part of the recovery process, especially during and after the
crisis (see Chapter 8). Local and central government are expected to facilitate
empowerment through their leadership capability (Chapter 6) and the affirmative
policy during economic crisis situations (Chapter 7).
This section elaborates the findings presented in the empirical chapters, such as the
perceived needs of MSMEs, and the essential elements and recovery model as well as
the factors and platform to collaborate within the disaster recovery process, which
enable a resilient recovery to be integrated into the further development process.
Resilience is believed to be a key prerequisite for a prosperous nation. Moreover,
resilience in the face of disasters should be one of the foundations of a nation, so as to
bridge the post-disaster regions to be developed as sustainable prosperous regions.
Thus, an agenda for realizing resilient recovery toward development can be drawn
from the findings based on the empirical chapters, as follows:
 Encouraging the integration of the efforts of building community resilience to
disaster into sustainable socio-economic development agendas (e.g. national
and local development plans). This includes activities designed to oversee
development policies and implementation - both at the central and local level –
so that the development activities will not generate or encourage the
occurrence of further catastrophic events;
 Involving all stakeholders relevant to disaster governance, especially those that
share similar interests and visions on the development of community resilience.
Such involvement should be underpinned by shared values and understanding
that is based on regulation, agreement or consensus, and then followed by
capacity building for the purpose of the division of roles and duties in building a
resilient community;
 Capacity building of local government, especially BAPPEDA, BPBD, Trade and
Industry Boards, Small and Medium Enterprises and Cooperative Boards. These
local units are related in terms of their proximity (location, duties and
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structure) and their strategic role in building community resilience after
disasters;
 Analyzing and mapping the socio-economic resilience and vulnerability of
communities to disasters. This should include a focus on marginal people and
those who do not have access to resources or networks;
 Selecting, setting and designing priority programs and activities that have
double effects and leverage for community resilience. Efforts to build
community resilience should run accompanied by the development of other
disaster management components and by the application of all (or some of) the
components of the disaster governance framework proposed in this thesis;
 Establishing a standard of need assessment procedure and reporting on
community resilience during disaster governance to facilitate coordination,
cooperation, collaboration, monitoring and evaluation.
9.2.2 The Implications of this Research on the Body of Knowledge: Ten
Propositions for Disaster Recovery Governance
As has been broadly explained in Chapter 2 (Section 6), research on disaster recovery is
limited since only less than 15 percent of papers on disaster study focus on the
recovery phase (Elsevier, 2017, p. 17). Most research focuses too much on emergency
responses (Kapucu, 2014), or prevention and preparedness (Elsevier, 2017). In terms
of the post-disaster situation, and after bridging social network theory into
development concepts, there are some propositions advocated by interdisciplinary
scholars which at the same time have been revealed as findings from the discussions in
the empirical chapters. Summarized from Chapter 8, the propositions are as follows:
First, communities that have better social ties and networks which are well-connected
recover relatively quickly and/or more effectively than those which do not (Olshansky,
2005; Kapucu, 2014).
Second, communities that have greater resources or better access to resources -
whether through networks or not - suffer less and/or recover relatively faster than
those that have no or limited access (Anderson, 1985; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000;
Semitiel García, 2006). This is related also to access to information and conveying
aspirations.
Third, networks and collaborative work among stakeholders to some extent require
pre-conditions (Ansell and Gash, 2008), but play an important role in the recovery
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process. Network and collaborative governance are challenging at any scale; however,
the failure to define an appropriate scale for collaborative governance may lead to the
failure of policy development (Ansell and Torfing, 2015).
Fourth, disaster recovery governance is influenced by pre-disaster conditions and the
system contexts. These include (see Chapter 8): (1) policy and regulatory frameworks;
(2) global platforms, e.g. the SDGs and the Sendai Framework for DRR; (3) social and
cultural resources, e.g. trust, social relations, local wisdoms, etc.; and (4) a history of
local collaboration, e.g. through charitable activities, business associations, etc.
Fifth, disaster recovery governance can be initiated and accelerated by the existence of
(see Chapter 8): (1) network leadership; (2) consensus building and shared
understandings; (3) mutual needs or interests; (4) commitment; and (7) stimulants and
incentives.
Sixth, the components of post-disaster management that determine the
implementation of disaster recovery governance, are as follows (for complete
references, see Chapter 8): (1) shared (and agreed) goals/plans/guidelines with a
sense of ownership; (2) institutional networks with legitimate arrangements; (3)
leadership and its key organizations; (4) the capacity and capability of key
organisations; (5) financing and aid disbursement; (6) affirmative policy and strategy;
and (7) communication and exchange resources, knowledge, data, and information.
Seventh, the essential elements of disaster recovery governance consist of the
following (for complete references, see Chapter 8): (1) social learning; (2) partnership,
participation and empowerment; (3) sustainability and resiliency; and (4)
transparency and accountability.
Eighth, social learning should be implemented at least within the process of policy
assessment, institutional analysis and the use of technology and science (for complete
references, see Sub Chapter 8.3.1.1 in Chapter 8).
Ninth, resilient economic recovery includes a focus on maintaining well-being,
restoring livelihoods and redeveloping the local economy (for complete discussion, see
Sub Chapter 8.3.1.2 in Chapter 8).
Tenth, resilient recovery is the nexus between disaster and development. The extent to
which resilient recovery can be said to be successful depends on how well it fits and
how smoothly it is integrated into the sustainable development agenda.
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9.3 Limitations and the Potential for Future Research
The limitation of this study is that it only focuses on aspects of livelihood and local
economic recovery. In future research, other aspects related to sustainable
development should be further explored and scrutinised: (1) not just livelihood and the
local economy but also the complete responses of and mechanisms used by
stakeholders when collaborating with one another; and (2) how these correlate to the
achievement of the SDGs. Nevertheless, the following features contributed from this
research can be used to design future studies.
The comparability of network data and/or its results
The network analysis results can be used to compare one case study to another.
Moreover, if another researcher is capable of collecting data from a large number of
disaster cases across the globe (with a focus, for example on extreme cases or best
practices), then that kind of research served as a rigorous test (i.e. can reject or
validate) of a network theory or proposition in a disaster context.
Modelling and framework contributions
The variables within the framework developed in this research can be further used in
the future to monitor or predict failure in recovery governance programs. It can also be
used to identify the most influential variables in other disaster recovery cases by using
Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP) with respondents such as: experts, key
stakeholders, and program beneficiaries. Furthermore, if another researcher uses the
same few or all variables within the framework consistently, the researcher will be able
to rank the likely success of recovery projects (i.e. by ranking their value from highest
to lowest) using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Predicting and measuring the
success of recovery would be valuable for future research and the effectiveness of
disaster policies. However, these are only examples; there are actually many other tools
within the proposed framework that can be used for different purposes in disaster
studies.
9.4 Closing Remarks
Development of unsustainable practices, ecosystem destruction, extreme poverty and
climate change have led to an increase in the intensity of disasters, whether natural or
man-made disasters. A number of major cities in Indonesia are located in areas prone
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to earthquakes. Meanwhile, rapid urbanization and the development of new illegal
residential areas mean more people are at greater risk of disasters. In short, it is
undeniable that disaster and development are interconnected.
In late 2014, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were launched by the United
Nations to replace Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This development platform
has been adopted by most countries, including the Government of Indonesia (GoI).
Achievement of the SDGs will inevitably be affected by the occurrence of catastrophic
events and the impact of climate-related disasters. Nowadays, their implementation is
more synergetic with the discourse of disaster resilience, risk reduction and impact on
life and livelihood, and is mainly supported by the launch of the Sendai Framework for
Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) period of 2015-2030. In many ways, Indonesia has
placed disaster risk reduction at the forefront of its national development program.
However, the persistent targets - initially in the Hyogo Framework and then continued
by the Sendai Framework - are still relevant in efforts to build a more resilient nation in
the face of disaster.
However, because of the government limitation in disaster management due to the
complexity of disasters, multiple stakeholders and multiple resource streams need to
be involved. Coordinating synergies within the framework and a shared vision of
achieving a resilient recovery are therefore very important. For that reason, the
community must have a sense of preparedness and resilience, as well as a willingness
to initiate self-recovery, and then are expected to collaborate with government, NGOs,
universities, businesses and the international community. Learning from many
Indonesian disasters, especially from an insightful study into the 2006 Yogyakarta
Earthquake, one can observe the efforts of collaborative work, networks and
governance in order to achieve local resilience, not only in terms of the institutional
perspectives but also in terms of policy impact and its determination of the
implementation throughout the process. Furthermore, along the process –during all the
phases, not only in the recovery of the economic sector-, one may also note that much
potential is revealed, such as leadership, cultural values, community engagement and
so on, which can continue to be maintained as the engine of development growth,
especially during and after the crisis.
Many scholars have shown the importance of social capital in disaster recovery studies
from around the world (Olshansky, 2005; Aldrich, 2011; Aldrich, 2012a; Olshansky et
al., 2012; Aldrich, 2012b), as well as from Indonesia (Kusumasari and Alam, 2012b).
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Most of the premises state that cultural values and social capital play an important role
in the disaster recovery process. Nevertheless, this study has found slight differences
compared to the findings of previous research. Social resources are indeed essential for
the recovery process, as they are always part of disaster governance, and are necessary
in most recovery cases across the globe that apply a collaborative governance regime.
However, in this case study, it has been carefully considered that social resources
should be seen as potentially useful only if they are used effectively in the context of
network frameworks and collaborative forms of disaster governance. The researcher
has unpacked the detailed story behind the case of Bantul Regency in Chapters 5, 6, and
7, then grouped and systematized these findings into Chapter 8. The evidences therein
have shown that the activation and optimization of social resources is closely linked to
cultural or naturally established networks, and/or networks of collaborative
governance, the aims of which were to achieve shared goals in correlation to SDGs and
the disaster risk reduction platform, as well as to build community resilience.
To sum up, because of the complicated nature of problems caused by disasters that lead
to complex post-disaster recovery management, it cannot be denied that the recovery
effort should be conducted collaboratively with the aim of achieving resilient recovery.
Furthermore, based on lessons learned from the disaster recovery cases in Indonesia, it
can be concluded that the effectiveness of disaster governance is closely related to the
resilience that is embedded in the community and the sustained development process.
Lastly, allow me as a researcher to give closing remarks for my thesis:
Disaster is a real-life laboratory, where we are able to reexamine the extent to which the hidden
values of goodness within us can blossom and become an inheritance for humanity, making it a
process that should compel us to examine, assess and evaluate the extent to which development has
proceeded within a corridor of natural wisdom and a balance between the two, yet further and most
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Appendix A. Research Matrix








Overview of Case Study
Chapter 4
Methodology
‘To what extent can disaster recovery
be enhanced through collaborative
governance and social networks to
significantly influence the revival of a
local economy?’.
1. 'How is the regulatory and
institutional framework in the
recovery phase organized so as to
revive the local economy?'
Objectives:
a. To explore the regulatory
framework and post-disaster issues
in the general context of disaster;
b. To investigate the latest national
policy-based networks at the
macro level;
c. To provide an overview recovery-
related policies designed to








 Regulatory Mapping (RegMAP)
 Discourse Network Analysis (DNA)














‘To what extent can disaster recovery
be enhanced through collaborative
governance and social networks to
significantly influence the revival of a
local economy?’.
2. ‘What were the multiphase
governance and multilevel
networks that operated during
the economic revival in Bantul
after the 2006 Yogyakarta
earthquake?’
Objectives:
a. To explore the disaster recovery
governance during the recovery
phase in Bantul aftermath the
Yogyakarta earthquake;
b. To analyze the existing networks
in aggregate level, and to explore
insightful mechanism beneath the
network based on the case study of
Bantul-Yogyakarta;
c. To understand recovery and
unpack the principles in facilitating
the disaster recovery governance
Chapter 6
An Aggregate Approach for Disaster
Recovery Governance: A Multiphase
and Multilevel Analysis for Bantul
Regency – Yogyakarta Province
Quantitative Analysis, using:

















to revive the local economy.
‘To what extent can disaster recovery
be enhanced through collaborative
governance and social networks to
significantly influence the revival of a
local economy?’.
3. ‘‘How did the local-community
actors in Bantul Regency –
Yogyakarta Province, initiate,
cooperate and network to revive
the local economy, at the level of
micro, small and medium
enterprises (i.e. MSMEs)?’
Objectives:
a. To explore the mechanism of
MSMEs to recover and revive the
local economy of Bantul after
earthquake;
b. To investigate the actors’ network
at the local-community level in
Bantul Regency –Yogyakarta
Province;
c. To identify the lessons and key
policies for the revival of the local
economy.
Chapter 7
In-Depth Analysis from Individual-
Local Perspectives: Risk Perceptions,
Implementations and Strategies to
Revive the Bantul Regency Economy
Quantitative Analysis, using:
 Descriptive Statistical Analysis




















‘To what extent can disaster recovery
be enhanced through collaborative
governance and social networks to
significantly influence the revival of a
local economy?’.
4. ‘How can collaborative
governance and networks in post-
disaster recovery contribute to




a. To construct a conceptual model
for integrating post-disaster
recovery into sustainable
development policy from: the
understanding of the essential
elements and the influencing
factors of a resilient recovery (i.e.
what works, does not work, and
why) based on the case study;
b. To develop a framework of
collaborative governance in
disaster recovery to be integrated
into development policy.
Chapter 8
The Nexus of Post-Disaster Recovery
and Development: A Synthesis from






















Appendix B. Theory of Regional Development
Myrdall (1957), has developed a theory of ‘Cumulative Causation’ to explain regional
development. He referred to ‘leading-lagging’ regions, as well as ‘backwash effect’ to
describe the process by which areas are sucked of growth elsewhere. Leading regions are
characterized by a comparative advantage due to their location, infrastructure, and other
factors. Then, an agglomeration process occurs, which results in increasing investment. A
small amount of investment then spurts from leading regions to lagging regions; however, it
is still controlled by the leading regional elites to assure the domination of leading regions.
Lagging regions are further inhibited in development process because of backwash effects.
Skilled workers, educated professionals, business leaders, and venture capital that may
emerge in the lagging regions then will be drawn to the leading region as they seek out
higher returns. Goods and services produced in the leading regions are marketed to lagging
regions at low prices, such that local industries in lagging regions cannot survive. The effects
of investment flows would benefit lagging regions when they are higher than the backwash
effect. Myrdall saw no sufficient automatic corrective mechanism for this process within the
price system and thought that government is required to overcome backwash effects by,
among other, encouraging investment in lagging regions. In other words, affirmative policy
is needed. Another theory that is based upon similar ideas was developed by Perroux
(1955) and Albert Hirschman (1958), who coined the term ‘polarization’ to describe
unbalanced growth. Polarization involved a process by which development in one area of a
country siphoned off resources from other areas, causing some to advance while others
either stagnated or lagged behind. However, growth may also lead to a trickledown effect to
the hinterland. This may in the form of manufacturing investment, or population settlement.
Meanwhile, Neil Smith, with his theory of uneven-development, argued that capital moves to
areas that offer the highest profits for investors, resulting in the economic development of
these areas. The geographical concentration of production in such locations results in
differentiation, as they experience rapid development, while other regions are left behind.
As result, there are gaps in living standards and wage rates between regions.
Underdevelopment leads to low wages and high unemployment. According to Neil Smith,
over time, capital will ‘see-saw’ from developed to underdeveloped areas, ‘jumping’ between
locations in its effort to maintain profit levels. It is this movement of capital that creates
patterns of uneven development, according to Neil Smith, ‘capital is like a plague of locust. It
settles on one place, devours it. Then move on to plague another place’ (p.152).
Source: Summarized from Anderson (1985), Bingham and Mier (1993), and MacKinnon and Cumbers (2011)
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Appendix C. Technique of Selecting Case(s)
No. Method Definition Cross-Case
Technique
Purpose Representativeness








By definition, the typical
case is representative
2 Diverse Case (two or more)
illuminate the full range





















Diverse case are likely to





3 Extreme Case (one or more)
exemplify extreme or
unusual values on X1 or
Y relative to some
univariate distribution
A case lying many
standard deviations
away from the mean




comparison to a larger
sample of cases







After the case study is
conducted, it may
corroborated by a cross-
case test, which includes a
general hypothesis based
on the case study
research. If the case in
now on-lier, it may be
considered representative
of the new relationship








Not pertinent, given the
goal of the influential-case
study
6 Crucial Case (one or more) are
most or least-likely to







Assessable by reference to
prior expectations about
the case and the
population
7 Pathway Cases (one or more)
where X1, not X2, is














Cases (two or more) are
similar on specified












Case(two or more) are
different on specified
variables other than X1
and Y
The inverse of the
most-similar method












Appendix D. Rationale of the usage of mixed-methods Approach
Despite debates surrounding its philosophical grounding, the practicalities associated with
the aims of the mixed-methods becomes main reason why this method is still used by most
researchers. According to previous studies, there are few purposes and rationales behind a
decision to apply a mixed-methods approach. Greene et al. (1989,p.259) summarized these,
drawing upon a number of other key theorists, including: Cambell and Fiske (1959), Webb
et al. (1966), Sieber (1973), Denzin (1978), Madey (1982), Cook (1985), Rossman and
Wilson (1985), Shotland & mark (1987), Kidder and Fine (1987), as well as, Greene (1987),
as follows:
1. Triangulation. The design is meant to increase the validity of results by seeking
convergence, corroboration, correspondence of results from different methods but for
studying the same research object.
2. Complementarity. The design is to increase the interpretability and meaningfulness of
results by seeking elaboration, enhancement, and clarification of the results from one
method with the results from other method.
3. Development. The design is to increase the validity of results by using the results from
one method to help develop or inform the other method. The point is by focusing on the
strength of chosen methods.
4. Initiation. The design is to increase the depth of interpretation by discovering paradox,
contradiction, and/or new perspectives from the views of different method analysis.
5. Expansion. The design is to increase the scope of inquiry by using different methods for
different inquiry components.
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Appendix E. Stakeholder Analysis
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- Head of Regency
- International
Agency
7. Industry, SMEs and
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Data and information
on damage and loss
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Source: Preliminary Analysis (2015)
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Appendix F. Social Network Analysis (SNA)
Social network methods have developed over the past fifty years and have become an
integral part of advances in social theory, empirical research and formal mathematics and
statistics. However, the methods are distinct from the methods and applications of
traditional statistics and data analysis (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 3). Social network
analysis is concerned with understanding the linkages among social entities and the
implications of these linkages. Thus, there are several key concepts at the heart of network
analysis that are fundamental to discussion of social networks, they are:
Actors. Actors are discrete individuals, corporate, collective social units (whether formal
and informal) or formal organizations. Examples of actors are people in a group, department
within a corporation, public service agency in a city, nation-states in the world system, etc.
Sometimes, network actors encompass mixed types, such as an organizational field
comprising suppliers, producers, customers, and governmental regulators of health care.
Relational Ties. Relational ties are the linkages between a pair of actors. The range and
type of ties can be quite extensive, for instance: friendship, liking, respect, business
transactions, lending or borrowing things, association or affiliation, migration,
bridge/road/river, etc.
Dyad. Many kinds of network analysis are concerned with understanding ties among pairs.
The ties are inherently a property of the pair and therefore are not thought of as pertaining
simply to an individual actor. All of these approaches take the dyad as the unit of analysis.
Thus, a dyad consists of a pair of actors and the (possible) ties(s) between them.
Triad. Many important social network methods and models focus on the triad: a subset of
three actors and the (possible) tie(s) among them. This triad concept is important in
explaining ‘Balance Theory’.
Subgroup and Group. Subgroup is any subset of actors, and all ties among them, whilst a
group is the collection of all actors of which ties are to be measured. One must be able to
argue using theoretical, empirical, or conceptual criteria that actors in the group belong
together in a more or less bounded set. Indeed, once one decides to gather data on a group, a
more concrete meaning of the term is necessary. A group, then, consists of a finite set of
actors who for conceptual, theoretical or empirical reasons are treated as a finite set of
individuals on which network measurement are made.
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Relation. The collection of ties of a specific kind among members of a group is called a
relation. For many groups of actors, we might measure several different relations; besides
formal diplomatic ties among nations, we might also record the dollar amount of trade in
given year. Relations may be either directed, where one actor initiates and the second actor
receives (e.g. advising), or non-directed, where mutuality occurs (e.g. conversing)
Social Network. Having defined actors, groups, and relations we can now give a more
explicit definition of social networks. A social network consists of a finite set or sets of
actors and the relation (or relations defined on them).
In social network analysis the observed attributes of social actors (such as race or ethnicity,
or size or productivity of collective bodies such as corporations or nation-states) are
understood in terms of patterns and structures of ties among the units. Relational ties
among actors are primary and attributes of actors are secondary (Wasserman and Faust,
1994, p. 8). Fundamental difference between a social network explanation and non-network
explanation is the inclusion of concept and information on relationship among units in the
study. Theoretical concepts are relational, pertinent data are relational and critical test use
distributions of relational properties. Thus, social network analysis is based on assumption
of the importance of relationships among interacting units, and the relation defined by
linkages among units are a fundamental component of network theories (Wasserman and
Faust, 1994, p. 4).
Network models can be used for: 1) formal description (both theoretical and conceptual);
and 2) evaluation and testing. In terms of evaluation and testing, network models may be
used to test theories about relational processes or structures. Such theories posit specific
structural outcomes which may then evaluated against observed network data (Wasserman
and Faust, 1994, p. 4). For example, a study of pattern of trade among nations to see
whether or not the world economic system exhibits a core-periphery structure. In the
network analytical framework, the ties may be any relationship existing between units, for
example: kinship, material transaction, flow of resources and support, behaviour
interactions, group co-memberships, or the affective evaluation of one person by another.
Source: Summarized from Wasserman and Faust (1994), Scott (2000) and Knoke and Yang (2008)
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Appendix G. Aspects and Indicators Disaster Recovery Index
Aspects Indicators Measures
Humanity Health services Number of health facilities
Educational services Number of educational institutions
Housings and
settlements
Liveable home in accordance with WHO
standards
Floor area per capita
A clean water facilities Percentage of households who have




Lighting Electricity usage at home
Road and bridge infrastructure Access to health, education,
government and economic facilities
Social Education participation Net enrolment rate at elementary,
junior and senior high school age
Health participation Prevalence of particular type of
diseases
Economy Household economic productive Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
Regional economy Gross Regional Domestic Product
(GRDP) per capita
Employment Labour Force Participation Rate
(LFPR)
Unemployment Rate
Poverty People living below the poverty
line
Cross sectors Governance activities The completeness and functioning
of the government apparatus
Source: BNPB (2015)
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Appendix H. Criteria of Beneficiaries of Government Housing Assistance
The Head of Regency Letter No. 413/3772, dated 9 September 2006 regarding the
Implementation of Post-Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction18 addressed to all
Heads of Sub-district and Village Heads in Bantul Regency, emphasized things that need to
be agreed together with community groups in prioritizing housing assistance (Bantul
Regency, 2008, pp. 124-8):
 Having severely damaged housings according to the valid data of people receiving living
allowances (i.e. jadup);
 Never received any assistance from any parties in the form of permanent or temporary
housing;
 Never reconstructed the house yet and still living in a tent or temporary shelter;
 The owner and not a tenant of the damaged house;
 Having members or head of family who are dead or disabled due to the earthquake;
 Having an elderly person and/or a toddler child/baby within their families;
 Other criteria based on the results of deliberation and local wisdom.
Other additional rules applied (Bantul Regency, 2008, pp. 124-9):
 Data was considered final if the data had been verified by PokMas in consultation with
facilitator and Management Consultant of Regency (KMK);
 Only one heavily damaged house that received one aid package;
 For collapsed/severely damaged houses that were occupied by more than one family,
they receive only one aid package;
 For the community living on land owned by others and whose houses have collapsed or
are severely damaged may still receive the aid package as long as there was no objection
from the landowner;
 For those who have restored houses that had collapsed or were severely damaged using
their own money may be given technical assistance within the context of an earthquake
resistant construction standard;
 For those whose house is built by other parties in permanent form and has met the
earthquake resistant structure standard did not get help anymore.
18 Referring also to the Yogyakarta Provincial Governor Regulation No. 23/2006 on the Operational Guidance
for Post-Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Yogyakarta Province in 2006.
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Appendix I. Description of Projects on Livelihood and Local Economic Recovery
REKOMPAK (Community-Based Settlement Rehabilitation and Reconstruction) is the
abbreviated Indonesian name for the relief project in several locations: the post-earthquake
of Yogyakarta and Central Java on May 27, 2006; tsunami in West Java (i.e. Pangandaran) on
17 July 2006; and the Merapi eruption in Yogyakarta in 2010. The funding was from a grant
from the Java Reconstruction Fund (JRF) under the Grant Agreement between the
Government of Indonesia and the JRF, which was signed on February 6, 2007. The
implementing agency was Directorate General of Cipta Karya, The Ministry of Public Works.
The components of REKOMPAK-JRF activities include (Sekretariat JRF, 2011, p. 50):
a. Provision of earthquake resistant house structure, including community settlement
plans (CSP)
b. Recovery of community’s infrastructure
c. Capacity building of local government and communities
d. Project management
The components of JRF-GIZ activities include (Sekretariat JRF, 2011, p. 54):
a. Technical assistances for MSMEs in terms of access to finance
b. Loan settlement strategy for business with non-performing loans
c. Capacity recovery and opportunity creation to boost the competitiveness of medium-
sized enterprises
d. Project management, monitoring and evaluation for the efficiency of the project
implementation
Through the mid-term review of the project, the restructuring of financing components
from components (b) and (c) to component (1) occurred. This was due to the decreasing
demand of components (b) and (c). The redistribution of project component financing was
supported by the steering committee in October 2010, enabling this project to support more
MSMEs at the grassroots. During this project, from a revolving fund of around US $ 5 million,
10,056 loans had been disbursed to MSMEs through 26 MFIs. In addition, from 582 MSMEs
facilitated for the settlement of non-performing loans, as many as 334 MSMEs restructured
their debt (based on data from 12 community credit bank/BPR).
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The components of JRF-IOM activities include (Sekretariat JRF, 2011, p. 58):
a. Assessment and selection of MSMEs’ beneficiaries
b. Asset replacement
c. Market access assistance
d. Capacity building and technical assistance
After the previous program of access to financing was cancelled, then the IOM funds were
reallocated to the other above mentioned four components. This project also facilitated
networking events to beneficiaries through marketing and product innovation workshops,
such as workshop activities to increase the market access, exhibitions, and technical
assistance in the form of training in business administration and writing business plans.
People's ability to overcome and be resilient to disaster can be supported by the provision
of financial funds. The financial access required during crisis situations can greatly reduce
the impact of disasters. Therefore, there are a number of component activities of Indonesia
Liquidity Facility After Disaster (ILFAD) (Mercy Corps Indonesia, 2014):
The ILFAD Program implemented disaster risk reduction and liquidity management training
in working area of the program located in 11 provinces. A total of 230 participants
(consisting of 49 women and 181 men) from 164 MFIs attended the ILFAD trainings.
Participants were representatives of 89 cooperatives and 75 BPRs located in the area of the
program. In addition, the ILFAD program has launched several types of savings through
joint cooperation between ACA Insurance, BPR and Cooperatives, namely:
 Meria Mulia Cooperative, DI Yogyakarta Province
 Kopwan Sumber Rejeki and SumberJaya, DKI Jakarta Province
 BPR Mutiara Pesisir, Agam Regency - West Sumatra Province
 BPR Nagari Development, West Sumatra Province
 Prajurit Market Cooperative, Malang City - East Java Province
Source: summarized from Sekretariat JRF (2011); MDF-JRF Secretariat (2012); World Bank (2012); Mercy Corps
Indonesia (2014).
